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MODERN JAPAN

PROBLEMS OF THE NATIONS

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Professor Hershey is author of The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, The Essentials of International Public Law, Etc.

MODERN JAPAN

SOCIAL—INDUSTRIAL—POLITICAL

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PREFACE

This small volume is not a book of impressions; nor is it a tourist's record of experiences; nor can it be claimed that it is the result of years of study and observation growing out of a prolonged residence in Japan or contact with the Japanese people.

Yet, after having devoted the leisure of several years to a study of things Japanese, the authors visited Japan and made their investigations under the guidance of friends and acquaintances—native Japanese and foreign residents of many years—who were far more familiar than they with Japan, its people, its laws, its traditions and its customs.

In fact, they have gathered their information from many sources which would be difficult to indicate, nor would it be possible to mention the names of the numerous people who, whether by their writings or by direct personal assistance, have been so very helpful.

The authors can here merely express, in a general way, their gratitude and appreciation for such aid, the results of which they have tried to sift and utilize to the best of their judgment and ability.

A. S. H. and S. W. H.

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MODERN JAPAN

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CHAPTER I

CHERRY BLOSSOMS AND REALITIES

I

When the curious foreigner landed in Japan, over sixty years ago, he imagined that he was entering a half-civilized country, peopled with semi-barbarians, whose strange customs and polite ways indicated a mere veneer or perhaps an imitation of Chinese civilization. What, therefore, must have been his delight when he found himself in the midst of a novel and highly developed culture preserved for centuries uncontaminated by contact with outside influences!

When this fascinating and artistic people showed itself eager to learn the secrets of modern civilization and exhibited a marvelous facility for acquiring and adopting Western ideas and machinery, is it surprising that their teachers should have sung the praises of their apt pupils and heralded to the world a somewhat exaggerated idea of their progress and capability?

After these facile students had learned that they

could walk and even run upon their own feet and could see with their own eyes, they dismissed their instructors (though with generous presents and profuse thanks), entered into trade rivalries with foreign agents or merchants, and finally demonstrated to the world that they could fight and win real battles in true European style. Is it therefore astonishing that the erstwhile benevolent and patronizing attitude of the foreigner should have changed to one of concern or disapproval? To a certain extent indiscriminate praise gave way to harsh and undiscriminating criticism. Instead of receiving smiles and words of praise, the former protégé was often greeted with frowns or sneers, his motives were frequently questioned or misrepresented and his weaknesses exposed or over-emphasized.

The Japanese themselves, though certainly more reticent and reserved, had undergone a somewhat similar process of disillusionment. Delighted at first with the novelty and utility of Western ideas and methods, grateful beyond words to their efficient instructors, overcome with a sense of their own ignorance and deficiencies, they naturally reveled in their new knowledge and often failed properly to appreciate the merits of their own civilization.

In the first mad rush for knowledge and enlightenment many of the Japanese had lost all sense of proportion and had surrendered themselves to undiscriminating admiration of nearly all things foreign. But when it became apparent that Western

civilization had its defects and blemishes, the Japanese began to suspect that their own culture contained elements which were perhaps equal, if not superior, to those of Europe and America.

They began to ask, "What would it profit us as a nation if we gained the whole world and lost our own soul?" A reaction set in which led them, at least for a time, to disparage Western ideas and over-value their own attainments and achievements. This reaction has by no means exhausted itself, but beyond question their best minds are dissatisfied with many things foreign and Japanese alike and are looking forward to a sort of fusion of the best and to an elimination of the worst in both civilizations.

And if it is true that the Japanese have begun to exhibit a juster and saner appreciation of things Western, is it not time that Westerners began to exhibit a juster and more discriminating appreciation of things Japanese? Is it not time that we realized that while the Japanese may still have much to learn from us, they may possibly be able to teach us something; and that we also should aim at the adoption of the best and the elimination of the worst in both Occidental and Oriental civilizations? The first prerequisite for such a purpose would be fuller knowledge and a mutual understanding in order that we may know what to accept and what to reject.

Though there are honorable exceptions, it must

be admitted that too many of the books on Japan hitherto produced have been written either by writers wearing rose-colored pro-Japanese spectacles or in an anti-Japanese spirit of undiscerning criticism. The Japanese themselves have begun to resent the cherry-blossom view of Japanese life almost as much as they resent the vexatious faultfinding inspired largely by the foreigners at the treaty-ports.

II

It must be admitted that an absolutely just and discriminating interpretation of things Japanese is a difficult and delicate, perhaps impossible, achievement. With the exception of the missionaries and diplomatic and consular officials, most foreigners in Japan are ranged in two opposing camps—labeled pro- or anti-Japanese. The visitor is in danger of being haled into one or the other of these camps and thus runs the risk of becoming hopelessly biased or one-sided.

In the clubs or at the treaty-ports he is in especial danger of falling into the hands of anti-Japanese merchants of narrow outlook and experience who are embittered by a sense of defeat or disappointment. On the other hand, if he be monopolized by certain types of missionaries or Japanese officials he may become saturated with too roseate a view of Japanese aims, methods and progress.

The Japanese are particularly prone to put their

best foot foremost, and unless one is careful he may be misled by official attentions which tend to conceal rather than reveal social and political defects.

If one allows for a certain amount of religious bias, the missionary-educators constitute, on the whole, the best available source of first-hand guidance, at least for the student-observer with limited time and a lack of knowledge of the Japanese language. Intelligent and experienced missionaries are almost the only foreign residents in Japan who really see beneath the mask of Japanese etiquette and succeed in breaking down the reserve of the people. They alone are as a class sufficiently equipped with that intimate knowledge, charitable tolerance, life-long experience and sympathetic insight which are essential to the understanding of any race. To them the Japanese are just plain ordinary folk with the vices and weaknesses of humankind the world over, but with infinite potentialities for progress.

Yet one must not forget that even the best missionaries have their own peculiar limitations, among which are a bias in favor of things Western and Christian and an optimistic faith in the appearance of progress and improvement not always justified by reality. They are perhaps too apt to accept promises for performances, and they do not always appraise at their real value Japanese virtues and ideals as compared with those labeled Christian and Western.

III

In the interpretation of Japanese life and institutions there is involved a yet more serious difficulty than that of weighing evidence or eliminating religious bias. It is that of establishing and maintaining a more or less consistent standard or basis of criticism. As Westerners imbued with Western ideas of progress and development, we are bound to judge with a certain Occidental bias and to apply merely Western standards. If, for example, we should feel it within our province to criticize Japanese art, music or literature, we should inevitably judge from a more or less Western point of view. So with Japanese political, social and economic conditions and institutions which to us seem rather primitive or belated in comparison with our own, defective and inadequate as these may be.

To Japanese such comparisons must often seem odious and unjust, though in a work of this kind comparisons of this sort are unavoidable. However, it must be said that by adopting the forms and standards of Western civilization the Japanese have themselves invited this comparison, and it is doubtful whether they would be willing to be judged by any other standard. Like Americans of an earlier generation, they are believed to be sensitive to unfavorable criticism, though they are supposed not to resent the strictures of sincere friends.

In this light the writers of this book would wish

to be regarded. Nothing has been set down in malice. Nor has aught been written in the spirit of patronage.

Though conscious of the many courtesies received at Japanese hands, the authors have no confidence in friendship which finds expression in a mere exchange of flowery compliments or expressions of mutual good will; nor in that fellowship which ignores the main points of dispute, and carefully conceals shortcomings and defects. They can only hope that friends in Japan will not misunderstand or misinterpret their motives in presenting to the public in the succeeding chapters a frank expression of their views.

CHAPTER II

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

I

LIKE Great Britain, the Japanese homeland is insular in character. The seventy to seventy-five million inhabitants occupy a long, continuous chain of over forty-two hundred volcanic islands in the Pacific Ocean. These islands, of which only about five or six hundred are inhabited, extend over two thousand miles in a longitudinal curve from Kamchatka in Russian Siberia almost to the northern extremity of the Philippine Islands. They lie from a hundred to five hundred miles distant from the continent of Asia and afford nearly every possible variety of climate and products. The Empire includes Korea, the southern extremity of the Liaotung Peninsula, the railway zone in Manchuria, and the colony of Formosa.

The main island—to most foreigners the real Japan or Nippon—is Hondo or Honshu, a narrow, crescent-shaped island extending northeastward eight hundred miles (1170 miles by railway) from Shimonoseki opposite Fusan in Korea, with an area of over eighty thousand square miles—about equal to that of Kansas—an average width of seventy-

five miles, and a coast-line variously estimated at from forty-seven hundred to sixty-six hundred miles. Honshu has a population of nearly forty millions, and contains the important cities of Tokyo, Yokohama, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe. The triangle formed by the three cities last named constitutes one of the most thickly populated regions of the globe.

The southern end of the main island is separated from two much smaller ones—Shikoku and Kiuskiu —by the beautiful Inland Sea, an almost landlocked portion of the Pacific Ocean two hundred and seventeen miles in length.

To the north of Honshu, separated by the Tsugaru Strait, lies the island of Hokkaido, formerly known as Yezo, with an area of thirty thousand square miles—about that of South Carolina. Yezo was long left to the hairy Ainu, the aborigines of Japan, and is still in process of colonization.

The area of Japan proper is over 142,000 square miles; that of the whole Japanese Empire 257,290 square miles, not quite equal to that of the single state of Texas.

Japan is a country of mountains and valleys surrounded by the sea and is indented with numerous bays or inlets, affording many harbors for safe anchorage, especially on the side facing the Pacific. Like Italy and Greece with regard to each other, Nippon may be said to turn her back upon the sea that separates her from coveted China. There is

a long chain of mountains running lengthwise through the main islands, or rather two chains which meet in the middle of Honshu, forming the immense upheaval popularly known as the "Japanese Alps." Thus in Japan, as the saying has it, "Two voices are there: one is of the sea, one of the mountains, each a mighty voice."

The country boasts of at least two hundred volcanoes, and the delicate instruments of expert seismologists are able to detect an average of nearly fifteen hundred seismic disturbances in the course of a year. But flood, typhoon and famine are much more destructive forces, and it may be questioned whether, except in the effect on Japanese architecture, earthquakes have materially influenced the art and civilization of the Japanese.

More important in its effects on Japanese art and civilization is the climate, which may in general be characterized as very humid, necessitating frequent hot baths with resultant personal cleanliness. Rains are extremely frequent, there being an average of but two hundred fifteen fair days a year in Nippon. Owing to the long extent of the islands from the arctic north to the tropical south, the temperature naturally varies from extreme cold to extreme heat. But the climate of the main islands is moderate.

To the insularity of Japan may be ascribed its immunity from invasion or attack. Only twice in their history have these islanders been even threat-

ened: once at the close of the thirteenth century when Kublai Khan, after his conquests in China, sent an unlucky armada to the Japanese coasts; and again in 1905, when the ill-fated Russian fleet met with disaster in the Korean Straits. Like England, Japan occupies a strategic position on the sea which, with the aid of her navy, has made her practically invulnerable to invaders.

To the student of Japanese economy, it is of the first importance to note that, owing to the mountainous character of the country, only about one-seventh, i. e., less than fifteen per cent., of the soil is arable or capable of cultivation. In spite of this fact the country is predominantly agricultural and from sixty to seventy per cent. of the people are farmers or peasants.

The lack of sufficient arable land for the rapidly growing agricultural population furnishes one of the most difficult problems of Japanese statesmanship. True it is that there is still left some margin for reclamation by means of the opening of new and uncultivated land, improvements in method of cultivation, and a readjustment of farms. By such means it has been estimated that in the course of time (probably in a few generations) the land may be made to yield an increase of over fifty per cent. Furthermore, there is still considerable room for settlers in the northern island of Hokkaido. But the population of Japan proper increases yearly from five hundred thousand to six hundred thousand, or

at an annual rate of 1.2 per cent., the rate being nearly equal to that of Italy and inferior only to that of Russia and Germany. Even now Japan is importing over twenty-five million dollars' worth of foodstuffs, including a cheap quality of rice from India, and her imports of both luxuries and necessities tend to increase. The average density of population surpasses that of Italy, Germany or France, and is only slightly exceeded by that of Belgium, Holland and Great Britain.

II

The peasants constitute the backbone of the nation. They are a hardy, thrifty, laborious folk, content with little and obedient to the point of servility to those in authority. They lead the normal life of the vast majority of mankind at all times and in all places and furnish a good illustration of the proprietary State which publicists like Belloc and Chesterton find so attractive. In no other country perhaps is there so large a proportion of small farmers owning their farms and the means of production. Nowhere is there a greater *appearance* of contentment, cheerfulness and prosperity in the midst of rural charm and picturesque scenery. Surely here, if anywhere, should be found a paradise on earth.

Though intensive farming is the rule and irrigation is extremely common, there is, judged by West-

ern standards, a great lack of live stock,* and the agricultural methods and implements are, generally speaking, of the most primitive description. Recently there has been some progress in fruit culture. Rice is the staple crop, though barley and wheat are also extensively cultivated, and to a lesser degree, the millets, maize, soya beans, buckwheat, potatoes, tea, tobacco, ginseng and so forth. The planting and manufacture of tea is a considerable industry, but has remained curiously stationary for a number of years.

Japan is preëminently a land of small holdings. The average area farmed by each family is usually from two to four acres, and most farmers are forced† to combine agriculture with other occupations. About one-half of the farmers own the land they cultivate subject to a heavy land tax of about fifteen to seventeen per cent. The tenants, who

*Through the aid and encouragement of the Government there has been great improvement in this respect within recent years. In 1912 there were 1,176,743 horses and 1,399,468 cattle in Japan or an average of nearly one animal to each two households, and human labor is in part slowly being replaced by that of animals. Until recently, owing to the absence of cattle, the Japanese consumption of milk, meat and butter was very small.

†This is according to the *Japanese Year Books*. Professor Tsumura (See *Japan Magazine* for July, 1915) says: "Not more than 32 per cent. of those now farming are cultivating their own land, which leaves at least two-thirds of the agricultural population tenant farmers."

constitute the remaining half of the cultivators, must pay an average of about fifty per cent. of the produce to the owner, who pays the land tax out of his share of the proceeds. But when it is noted that the tenant farmer has to pay all expenses incidental to fertilizing and sundries out of his half, it may readily be seen that the few acres under cultivation can hardly produce enough for the barest subsistence of himself and family. That the majority of peasant owners are little better off is indicated by the fact that the 5,410,000 peasant proprietors of Japan have an indebtedness of at least 541,000,000 yen or an average of one hundred yen, or fifty dollars per household.* In fact, neither the tenant nor the peasant owner could possibly subsist were it not for subsidiary occupations.

Chief among these subsidiary occupations are sericulture and filature or the rearing of silk-worms and the reeling of raw silk. These occupy at least a quarter of the households. Then follow the manufacture of such articles as braids, matting and ropes from rice straw; the making of matches, paper, fans and baskets; beekeeping, weaving, spinning, fishing and forestry-work.

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*This is the estimate of the *Japanese Year Book* for 1914, page 341. Some authorities make it much higher. Dr. Yokoi, for example, estimates the peasant indebtedness at 1,500,000,000 yen or nearly thrice as much. In one prefecture the money lent averages 320 yen per house. See *Japan Weekly Mail* for February 18, 1911.

Though the number has been increasing within recent years, there are still, relatively speaking, few Japanese landlords or middle class land capitalists with farms ranging from 25 to 75 acres, or even as large as 8 to 10 acres. Hired laborers form a very small class and earn a very small wage, ranging from $5 to $42.50 per year, an average of only $21.67 per year or 19 cents per day in the case of men, and $10.97 per year or 11½ cents per day in the case of women.

Intermingled with these millions of peasant cultivators are thousands of petty handicraftsmen and small retailers supplying the villages and countryside with their wares and labor.

III

It can hardly be maintained that the lot of these peasants or country and village folk is a happy one. Their economic condition is deplorable and seems to be steadily growing worse. Their mental and spiritual outlook is necessarily very narrow, and they are naturally extremely conservative, superstitious and patriotic. Except for an occasional festival or pilgrimage to some religious shrine, there is a great lack of recreation and of interests larger than those of the family or village. The peasants toil early and late with little hope of recompense or reward. Is it surprising that the young people yearn for the amusements and pleasures of

cities? The peasants make good soldiers but would seem to constitute unpromising material for the development of a political or industrial democracy.

However, the Japanese bureaucracy is doing much to improve and ameliorate the economic conditions of the peasants. Many model or experimental farms and agricultural stations have been established by the Government, the main or Imperial Agricultural Experiment Station being located at Nishigahara near Tokyo. It has several branch stations at Osaka and elsewhere, and there are also a considerable number of local or prefectural farms and stations. Numerous agricultural institutions are maintained by local funds, and hundreds of lecturers on agriculture are engaged in disseminating a knowledge of practical and scientific farming. As a consequence, about twenty-five per cent. of the farming population may be said to possess some knowledge of scientific agriculture, over a million having attended farming classes or evening schools in 1912. The crown of the system of agricultural education is, of course, the Agricultural College of the Imperial University at Tokyo.

Several institutes for the study and investigation of matters relating to sericulture (so important to the Japanese peasant as a subsidiary occupation) have been established, and there are also a number of local sericultural institutes. Especially to be commended are the efforts made by the Government to increase the number and improve

the quality of horses and cattle by means of Imperial horse studs and cattle breeding farms.

Within recent years the Government has been very successful in creating a spirit of co-operation and mutual aid among farmers. In 1900 a co-operative societies law was enacted providing for the organization of co-operative farmers' guilds or societies for obtaining credit on the purchase, sale and production of commodities. At the end of 1913 no less than 10,455 such societies had been formed with a total membership of 1,160,000 of which about eighty per cent. are farmers. Through the credit or loan societies, the hypothec and industrial banks of Japan have made considerable loans to farmers at from ten to fifteen per cent. interest, which in Japan is considered to be a low rate, the prevailing rate for a loan on credit having been as high as twenty per cent. and even more.

On the whole, it must be said that while the lot of the peasant has been somewhat improved and ameliorated, his condition, judged by Western standards, can hardly be said to be an enviable one. It is only his ignorance of the poverty of that condition and a lack of knowledge or experience of the luxuries of modern life that render his existence at all tolerable. But it is this same ignorance, combined with poverty, which induces him to submit to his fate with apparent cheerfulness, and even to sell his daughters into the slavery of the Yoshiwara or the modern factory.

CHAPTER III

THE JAPANESE FAMILY

I

THE whole structure of social and political life in Japan is based on the family. In order to understand the Japanese family, full account must be taken of its religious, feudal and patriarchal origins. Since a very early period religion centered closely around patriarchal ideals and gave solidarity to family customs and observances which in the long run contributed much to the stability and cohesion of the whole nation. Certain collateral social evils have developed, however, along with the system.

As in the case of the early Greeks and Romans, the first gods of the Japanese were the deified forces of nature and the dead or ghosts of the dead. In the main, nature-worship and the fear and worship of the spirits of the dead shaped the patriarchal system.

The cult of nature- and ancestor-worship or the worship of the so-called *kami*,* which included all things worthy of veneration, such as stones, moun-

*For an explanation of the *kami* and *Shintoism*, see *infra*, chapter VI.

tains, rivers, animals and superior human beings, developed at an early period into Shintoism. Gradually a few simple laws for governing the family, clan or community were formulated. These laws were in the course of time reinforced and modified by the advent of the two later religions—Confucianism and Buddhism — introduced from China. These new religions soon absorbed Shintoism, or at least the soul of it, but the soul of old Japan—the worship of the *kami*—remained essentially Shinto.

Ancestor-worship means that the spirits of the dead survive and are linked up with the spirits of the living descendants or hover always about them. The happiness and prosperity of the living depend largely upon the peace and happiness of the dead, who in order to continue happy require certain attentions from living descendants in the way of rites and ceremonies such as continuing the funereal repasts. Should they be neglected, the ancestral spirits would fall to the rank of malevolent demons and wander about in perpetual misery and unrest. Such spirits often bring retribution upon the living for neglect by inflicting disease upon some member of the clan, or sterility upon the soil. In fact, they often give the living no rest until the sacrifices and offerings of nourishment are renewed whereby they are restored to the tomb and to their divine attributes. Clearly the dead take a most important part in the affairs of the living and particularly in the perpetuation of families. In view of this fact, celi-

bacy was a grave impiety and calamity: an impiety because he who did not marry put the happiness of his ancestors in peril, a calamity because no offspring meant damnation to him who did not propagate. The man who died without a son received no offerings and was exposed to perpetual hunger.

II

An important canon of this ancestral cult held that the mysterious force which perpetuated life came only from the male. The female was merely a medium for protecting and nurturing this force, therefore she was relatively unimportant in the scheme of life. Herein lies the crux of the religious deification of the male and the subjugation of the female which appears in one form or another among most primitive peoples and religions.

Marriage in its early development under the patriarchal system was never the joining together of two equal beings to live in equal fellowship. In Japan it was bringing to the son a woman who abandoned her own parents, her own ancestors, her own cult to adopt his, since no one could invoke two series of ancestors. Her prime function from the time of marriage was to bear children to carry on her husband's family cult. Should she, perchance, prove sterile, this was ample ground for her being divorced, though later religious development made provisions against divorce in case the wife were

otherwise satisfactory to the family—that is, docile and submissive—by the adoption of a son of near kin or by acquiring a son through a concubine. Should the wife bear children but be otherwise unsatisfactory to her husband's family, she was divorced and the children remained in his family, she having absolutely no legal, physical or social claim upon them.

Thus we perceive how the patriarchal system established the inferiority of woman, and Buddhist and Confucianist teaching, which centered round the patriarchal ideals, helped to reinforce her subjection and subserviency. Since the male was endowed with all the life-giving power, the female could not be his equal. Clearly by divine will she was not intended to be; therefore the wife could not rank with the husband, or the sister with the brother. This conception, to be sure, was not confined to Japan only. Up to a comparatively recent period the idea of the relative unimportance and inferiority of the female formed the warp to the social fabric of all Occidental life just as it still does throughout the entire Orient.

Some years ago a social scheme was devised in Japan whereby the woman sometimes remains in her own family and a husband is adopted for her. Under this practice the woman does not perpetuate the cult of her own ancestors. This duty falls upon the adopted husband who, in turn, abandons his own family ancestors and takes her name. In case

the adopted husband is not satisfactory to her family, he is sent away and the children belong to her family. In any and all cases the ownership of the children is established with the family and not with the parents. But beyond question the patriarchal system implied the supreme dominance of the male and the absolute subjection of the woman and child, or at least the female child. Yet it is maintained that previous to the fifth and sixth centuries, when Confucianism and Buddhism were introduced, woman had more freedom and social privileges than she afterward enjoyed. Since then social and religious teachings have conspired to crystallize the standards which gave to man all the social and domestic privileges and to woman only the domestic duties.

Confucianism taught, in a word, that all women are naturally inferior to men; that the husband should have absolute right over the wife. Buddhism declares woman to be unclean and a temptation, and the moral code for women is covered by the three obediences: obedience while yet unmarried to the father; obedience when married to the husband and parents-in-law; obedience when widowed to the eldest son. "Buddhism," Chamberlain* informs us, "was the teacher under whose instruction the Japanese nation grew up." For centuries practically all education was in the hands of the Buddhist priests.

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*Chamberlain, *Things Japanese* (5th ed.), page 78.

In many respects the teachings of Confucius are above reproach, but undeniably the tenets concerning women are barbaric and contemptible to the last degree. They are:

I. Women are naturally inferior to men.
II. Education of women should be restricted to reading and writing.
III. Woman's primal duty is obedience.
IV. Men and women (above seven years of age) should not sit together.
V. Woman shall have no voice in selecting her husband.
VI. The husband shall have the absolute right to rule the wife.
VII. Between husband and wife let there be proper distinctions.

The great Japanese moralist Kaibara sums up the established womanly and wifely virtues in *The Greater Learning for Women* as follows: "It is the chief duty of a girl living in the parental house to practice filial piety toward her mother and father, but after marriage her chief duty is to honor her father-in-law and mother-in-law, to honor them beyond her own father and mother—to love and reverence them with all ardor, and to tend them with every practice of filial piety. . . . A woman has no particular lord. She must look to her husband as her lord, and must serve him with all worship and reverence, not despising or thinking lightly of him. The great life-long duty of a woman is obedience."

No less illuminating upon the legal and social status of women are The Seven Reasons for Divorce: "(1) A woman shall be divorced for disobedience to her father-in-law, or mother-in-law. (2) A woman shall be divorced if she fail to bear children, the reason for this rule being that women are sought in marriage for the purpose of giving men posterity. A barren woman should, however, be retained if her heart is virtuous and her conduct correct and free from jealousy, in which case a child of the same blood must be adopted; neither is there any cause for a man to divorce a barren wife, if he have children by a concubine. (3) Lewdness is a reason for divorce. (4) Jealousy is a reason for divorce. (5) Leprosy or any like foul disease is a reason for divorce. (6) A woman shall be divorced who, by talking overmuch and prattling disrespectfully, disturbs the harmony of kinsmen and brings trouble on her household. (7) A woman shall be divorced who is addicted to stealing."

Feudalism taught also that woman weakened courage and was an obstacle to the performance of duty.

Clearly under the old Confucian-Buddhist feudal code the woman had little or no personal, social or legal standing. In fact, until a comparatively recent period the whole world has held to similar ideas concerning women, and has accepted the dominance of the male along with the idealization of war and its barbarities, and other social absurdities.

Ethical teaching in Japan as well as in most parts of the world has doubtless been partly responsible for the subjection and social segregation of women. The teachings of Paul concerning women are in keeping with those of Confucius and Buddha.

Under the old Japanese law the woman could not herself demand a divorce, become head of a house, hold property, contract in her own name, become guardian of her own child or adopt a child in her own name.

Luckily in recent years, since the Japanese have become more familiar with European and American civilization, much has been changed by the promulgation and enactment of better laws concerning women, though public opinion still holds so tenaciously to the old standards that a woman rarely takes advantage of her legal rights and it is said the courts discourage such action on the part of women by favoring men. However, under the new civil code a married woman may hold property in her own name and she may seek a divorce from her husband for bigamy, adultery, desertion with evil intent, sentence for an offense of grave nature, such cruel treatment or gross insult as make living together unbearable, and for various other causes.

III

In considering the Japanese family one must bear in mind the complete absence of romantic love in

marriage and the absence of romantic gallantry in the feudal code of the Samurai. If love develops during wedded life, it must not appear in open demonstration, and whenever the demands of duty are pressing, affection must be renounced for the higher duty. Indeed it has not been an uncommon occurrence for a wife to be sent home because her husband was too fond of her, as too much affection for a wife was considered a sign of weakness and demoralization in the husband, which might lead to neglect of other family obligations. Of loyalty and chivalry there was plenty in *Bushido** or the Way of the Warrior—but it was always between lord and vassal, master and servant, and never included women, at least not during the last ten centuries.

Woman's part in marriage was one solely of duty, necessity and convenience—a matter over which she had no control and which she must accept patiently and resignedly as she did her other obligations. As a child she belonged to her father and his family, and as a wife to her husband and his family. Under such conditions it would seem that the lot of woman was exceedingly hard and cruel, yet she had certain family and community rights of courtesy and respect accorded her and any infraction of these rights was punished by salutary family or community ostracism, often subtle in nature, but most effective. Friction, we are

*See explanation of *Bushido, infra,* page 103.

told, was and still is most uncommon in the Japanese family.

Although the duties and obligations imposed upon women by religion and the patriarchal and feudal systems were heavy and numerous, there were duties and obligations imposed also upon all members of the family, clan or community. No one was free from such responsibilities.

A family was a group of persons who were under religious obligation to invoke the same sacrifices and to offer funereal repasts to the same ancestors. In the course of time many families had common gods. These families formed a clan or village community and were bound together by worship of a common god which imposed equal duties upon all.

The *Ujigami* was the clan god, or first clan ancestor, who brought good or bad luck, according as he was treated. If one member of the family or clan offended him, the whole community might suffer calamity, hence the obligation of each individual to conform to the clan requirements. In case of drought or famine the farmer prayed not to the Buddha, but to the *Ujigami.* If there were plentiful crops, it was not the Buddha who was thanked, but the ancient local clan god.

A crime or breach of custom committed by an individual was a crime against the family or community and the family or community god. Therefore, it was the business of the community to watch each member's conduct and to report all misde-

meanors. Even to-day communal feeling runs strong and one is apt to suffer from it since the community may feel and act as one person. Lafcadio Hearn says: "By a single serious mistake a man may find himself suddenly placed in solitary opposition to the common will and most effectively ostracized. The silence and softness of the hostility only renders it all the more alarming."

No wonder the Japanese are a custom- and convention-bound people, almost incapable of understanding Western individualism, or the desire to do as one pleases. Even the little child is not exempt from the penalties of non-conformity. This, of course, partly explains Japanese reticence, conventionality and reluctance to speak frankly when frankness might offend, all of which the Westerner often misinterprets as deceit or disingenuousness and lack of imagination.

Formerly the rigid Shinto communal code was made absolutely effective by laws forbidding a stranger to settle in a community without official permission. The official punishments for misdemeanors were physical punishment, ostracism or banishment for a period of years or possibly for life.

A banished man became a social outcast. The very fact that he was banished was proof that he had offended his own local gods, and naturally no other local gods would accept him, therefore no community must accept him. For the same reason he could not be allowed to work at his trade or occu-

pation since the labor guilds, which were well organized and powerful, dared not accept him.

IV

In the light of the old established Japanese family code of social ethics, it is no wonder that progressive Japan is puzzled as to how to amalgamate the best Western family and social morality with the best of her own, since she has no intention of unqualifiedly accepting or adopting Western customs and institutions. While the Japanese absorb and imitate readily, they do not absorb and imitate uncritically; and they have begun to realize that much of their own civilization is better and preferable to ours and should be preserved. Yet they do not fail to see the evils and burdens fastened upon them by the old patriarchal feudal system, which is perhaps the least disturbed of all their old institutions. Collectively and individually the whole nation appears to be casting about for methods of eradicating these family evils. At the same time most of them are hoping to preserve the fabric of the family.

Not the least of these family evils is the heavy burden placed upon the eldest son. The custom of the father turning over his business, often in the prime of life, to the eldest son is beginning to be regarded with constantly growing disfavor. By this custom the eldest son assumes the economic responsibility not only of his own parents, his wife

and his own children, but of all members of his father's family who are in need of support or assistance. With the increased demands of living, this custom often places terrific burdens upon the eldest son and yet more onerous duties upon his wife.

This change of attitude is only one of many evidences indicating that many links of the long chain of family customs and ideals which govern Japanese life no longer hold so tenaciously and will eventually break. The result will be the gradual disintegration of the whole patriarchal system, and a reconstructed, modernized family ethics and morality.

CHAPTER IV

PROGRESS OF THE JAPANESE WOMAN

I

SINCE the emancipation of the Japanese woman implies the breaking up of the whole patriarchal system, her social evolution bids fair to be of long incubation and to follow in the rear of all other progressive movements in Japan.

The modern progressive Japanese man may have acquired a passion for social development, he may have undergone a radical change of heart in matters of political and economic import, but in matters concerning woman he is apt to be tenaciously Oriental and patriarchal and to believe that the best way of preserving the virtues of woman is by keeping her more or less in subjection.

Critics and students of Japan agree that in respect to the domestic virtues the Japanese woman, according to ancient ideals, is irreproachable. She is unanimously conceded to be the most docile, devoted, long-suffering, self-sacrificing and patient of her sex. In fact, she is the incarnation of domestic virtue. Her religion is one of untiring, uncomplaining service, not in the larger, social sense, but to the family, more especially to the husband and mother-in-law, yet withal she is a Spartan pa-

triot, as is every one in Japan, including the Japanese child.

But the Japanese woman is in no way considered the equal of her husband. As wife she is commonly addressed *Okusama,* meaning the honorable lady of the house, though the literal meaning is honorable back room, implying retirement and seclusion. She is still only the first servant of the household and as such is respected according as she fulfills the standard wifely requirements of docility, patience and service to husband, mother-in-law and family.

First and foremost, the Japanese woman is mistress of the art of administering to the physical comfort and well-being of the male, and we are told that the average Japanese man has not advanced beyond desiring a wife who can best administer to his personal comfort. One eminent writer maintains that the ordinary Japanese man is still very vain, loves to be ceremoniously honored and glorified in his household as only the old-time wife can serve and glorify. Since the educated woman does not so easily lend herself to such subserviency, the average man will have none of her.

Be this as it may, certain it is that of all modern progressive tendencies, the Japanese man admires least the freedom and aggressiveness of the modern progressive Western woman. His natural Oriental, patriarchal sex bias and restraint prevent him from studying the progressive woman at close range and

with an open mind as he studies other subjects. Consequently, he does not understand her and frequently confounds her with a pushful, loud-voiced, self-indulgent type who wears extremely fashionable clothes and has far less sense of human and family obligation than has the geisha.

Moreover, the Japanese man has long since learned that the Western man rarely measures up to his pretensions of business or domestic morality. If challenged to explain his belated attitude concerning woman, the Japanese man is apt to reply that his people have never considered women the equals of men; but that in spite of the romantic and domestic indulgences permitted to the Western woman, she is by no means treated as man's equal. The double standard of morality, with the terrible penalties inflicted mainly upon the woman, furnishes him with one of his most convincing arguments. The fact that in only a few localities are women allowed the franchise constitutes another argument. Still another is that in the evangelical churches women do most of the work, earn and collect much of the money for defraying the expenses, yet the control, honors and emoluments are practically all in the hands of the men. In this manner the Japanese man will continue to enumerate the undoubted evidences upholding his criticism, and with considerable justice.

Unquestionably, from the larger world of ideas and social intercourse the Japanese woman is far

more completely debarred than is the Western woman; and should she have ideas or opinions of her own, it behooves her not to express them in public.

Mr. Gulick, in his interesting work entitled *Evolution of the Japanese,* gives a quotation upon this subject from Captain Brinkely, the editor of *The Japanese Mail,* who was himself married to a Japanese woman and was strongly pro-Japanese. This statement appears to typify the common opinion of foreign critics as to the attitude of the average Japanese man toward woman.

"The woman of Japan is a charming personage in many ways,—gracious, refined, womanly before everything, sweet-tempered, unselfish, virtuous, a splendid mother, and an ideal wife from the point of view of the master. But she is virtually excluded from the whole intellectual life of the nation. Politics, art, literature, science, are closed books to her. She cannot think logically about any of these subjects, express herself clearly with reference to them, or take an intellectual part in conversations relating to them. She is, in fact, totally disqualified to be her husband's intellectual companion, and the inevitable result is that he despises her."

An incident illustrating how crystallized is the old point of view was related to us by a Japanese lady who, after having lived five years in the States, returned with her husband to Japan on a visit. A friend wished to give them an entertainment, but the husband stipulated that his wife should attend only on condition that the wives of the other guests

would also attend. On the evening of the gathering there were a number of geisha invited in as entertainers. Along one side of the room sat the wives who on arriving exchanged formal courtesies with one another, after which they settled in silence to listen to the entertainment and to watch their husbands amusing themselves with the geisha in the intervals of the program.

After the Americanized couple returned home, the husband reproached his wife: "Why did you sit like a mummy during the entire evening and say nothing?"

"Did you wish me to appear immodest and unwomanly in the eyes of all your old friends?" was her response. "I have not forgotten that a Japanese woman must be silent in public if she wishes to be respected."

II

Perhaps nowhere among advanced nations is the thin switch of public opinion—particularly concerning woman—more stinging than in Japan. Individuals dare not venture far in pursuing their personal inclinations. No matter how enlightened or emancipated in her own mind a Japanese woman may be, she dare not follow out her own convictions. Before all she must "save face" for her husband, for his family and for her own family. If a progressive woman ventured a little too far beyond the

accepted proprieties, she would soon find herself hampered at every turn, severely ostracized perhaps if she attempted to introduce any radical social or intellectual innovations for her fellow sisters. Like the forerunners of all great movements, such women in Japan are apt to be considered freakish or unbalanced. So if they wish to succeed they must move slowly and warily and not far in advance of public opinion. It is a notable fact that the majority of Japanese women who have been educated abroad and have had the best opportunities for liberal training, return home, settle to quiet teaching and conform pretty closely to the old conservative standards of silence and repression. Very few have been able to assert themselves in any prominent way and become real progressive leaders. Yet there are isolated evidences of positive agitation, even of revolt, among certain groups of women in the larger centers of Japan.

Naturally, readjustment of a radical new order to the conservative old order begets many points of friction or conflict, so among the various groups of radical women there appear many points of difference. But while these new women's movements have made no very appreciable progress in their direct propaganda, they have come into prominence through the newspapers and magazines which have given liberal discussion and criticism to their ideas. These ideas have been drawn largely from Suderman, Shaw, Ellen Key, Ibsen and kindred

modern Western writers, and the public discussions of these writers have doubtless influenced educated people considerably. It is not so much for political enfranchisement that these progressive women are asking as for participation in a larger social and intellectual life—a chance for development of personality. Self-conscious expression appears to be the keynote to their demands.

The most conspicuous of these organized groups of women is the "Blue Stocking Society" headed by Miss Hiratsuka. The ideas advanced by this organization are somewhat similar to those advocated by the eighteenth century French writers. Some of the leaders have defied custom and dared to indulge openly in social liberties which are wholly antagonistic to all the old accepted Japanese standards of womanhood. Consequently, the Blue Stocking group have stirred up no little adverse criticism and agitation against themselves and their propaganda.

As a counter-irritant to the "Blue Stockings," the "True New Woman's Society," led by Mrs. Nishikawa, Mrs. Kimura, Mrs. Miyazaki and others, has sprung up. This body has been active both through the press and on the platform, though it has also been denounced and contemptuously criticized. However, its members appear to be thoroughly sane, well-balanced women, asking and aspiring for no more than are advanced Western women who are determined to have a fuller, larger share in the big things of life. These Japanese women are un-

willing to have woman remain subject to unreasonable customs and morals formulated entirely by man to suit his own convenience, thereby giving to the man freedom of conduct and action while the woman is kept in subjection to him.

III

But while there have arisen representative groups who have been brave enough to demand fuller emancipation and freedom for women, the great mass of the people are still unmoved and untouched by any ambitions for radical change of the old feudal-patriarchal standards. On the other hand, there are many who urge that the best and quickest medium for wedging in opportunity for woman is through the child. Japanese men will turn a deaf ear to a direct appeal for widened social and intellectual opportunity as such for women, but they are always open to conviction on possibilities for improved motherhood because these imply improved children and eventual race betterment.

In fact, such opportunities of education as have been opened to women in Japan are motived by a desire to improve wifehood and motherhood, with little or no thought of mere personal or individual development. And while there are a few openings for a fairly liberal education for women, such openings are by no means commensurate with the other lines of advancement by the nation or with the

spread of similar opportunities for men. Yet progressive Japanese are coming more and more to realize that in the wake of the breaking up of the old social and political ideals must eventually follow the passing of the old belated conventions concerning women and the family.

As is commonly the case elsewhere among less conventionalized peoples, the women themselves are often most conservative, particularly the women of the upper classes, who are still almost exclusively ornamental and dependent, and live largely in Oriental aloofness and seclusion. To be sure, Japanese women have always been the least restricted among Oriental peoples, yet the education of the upper class of women has been and still is formal and ornamental. It comprises the Chinese classics and poetic art, Japanese music, etiquette of arranging flowers, the tea ceremony, writing a beautiful hand, and flower painting. Besides this, education includes training in the etiquette of formal conduct, such as sitting down properly, the various forms of bowing, serving tea, and so forth. All such instruction has value and significance, but one may become proficient in this sort of knowledge and still be hopelessly ignorant of the larger, more vital things of life.

Education among the lower classes is still very rudimentary, and traditional superstition still holds powerful sway over the people. In the rural districts where women constitute a strong factor in

the direct economic life, that is, are engaged in such occupations as packing tea, raising the silk-worm, helping in the labor of agriculture or other productive activity, they enjoy more social freedom and are less subject to their husbands. But while social equality is more nearly attained in the lower classes, as has always been the case, progress, innovations and non-conformity have been first developed among the middle class. Many educated Japanese men of this class have in theory accepted the abstract principle of equality for men and women, yet they have formulated the narrowest curriculum for women's education, clearly from the old patriarchal viewpoint that woman is essentially merely a medium for breeding and housekeeping. Most Japanese still find it impossible to think respectfully of women engaged in any social activity outside of the home. A most hopeful sign, however, lies in the fact that not only are the educated women of Japan dissatisfied with conditions, but it is said that there is considerable unrest even among the masses of women to whom only a little opportunity has been given; that while Japanese women are masters at repressing their real feelings and are able always to appear meek, cheerful and amiable, there are, nevertheless, evidences on every hand of considerable dissatisfaction with their narrow, restricted lives. This is, of course, the first essential to progress.

One prominent writer has said: "The tragedy of a Japanese woman's life is not in its amiableness.

This is its most attractive feature. But the pathos is in its dumbness, its narrow outlook, its voiceless uncomplaining submission. What is desirable is not something to take the place of amiable qualities but the docility of awakened, active, all-round character and life."

This probably expresses what the great mass of Japanese women down in their innermost souls have begun to feel. To be sure, the difficulties of social and family readjustment for Japanese women will be many and great. Imagine, for instance, a trained, scientifically educated woman trying to fulfil the duties of wifehood and motherhood in an ordinary Japanese household. Next to her obligations to her husband are those to the will and teachings of the mother-in-law, who, in turn, is in duty bound to instruct her. Ordinarily this would mean that the children must be reared under the old and often harmful and superstitious standards of health, hygiene and morality which are apt to be entirely contrary to the teachings of modern science and reason. But young couples to-day are beginning to break away from the old system by having separate establishments when they can afford it. And again we are told that many families are now seeking to marry their daughters to the younger sons of families rather than to the eldest sons, although the position of the eldest son is of most importance and significance in the family. The reason for this is that the duties and obligations of the wives of

first sons are so heavy, and often burdensome, that parents prefer to have their daughters hold a secondary position in the families into which they marry rather than subject them to the heavy responsibilities of marriage with the eldest son or head of a family.

A gifted widow of our acquaintance was appointed guardian of her own children. This woman was educated, progressive and even radical in some of her convictions, yet she dared not in any open way express her opinions. Not only would such daring have reacted upon her own head but, as she explained, it would have reacted also upon her children, spoiled her daughters' chances for favorable marriage, alienated her own and her husband's family, and social penalties would have been visited upon herself and upon all those closely connected with her. Consequently, this wise little woman cautiously checked her rebellious tendencies, though she had found secret methods of expression in writing unsigned articles and by translating articles expressing her views.

IV

Other beliefs common among the Japanese people are that widened social privileges for women increase immorality and that educated women make poor housewives.

To the bird habituated to the cage and its de-

moralizing restrictions sudden liberty would almost certainly mean immediate or gradual destruction, and sudden unguided or unrestricted liberty would doubtless lead to a similar result among Japanese women. Parents, particularly mothers who have wished to let down the bars for their daughters, having no background of experience themselves, lose all perspective of what may or may not be ventured. Consequently, the result of giving liberties to young girls has in many cases been unsatisfactory and even disastrous. It is generally conceded that much clandestinism between young school boys and girls has resulted from the new and unadjusted freedom.

Given a third of the social liberty which the American girl takes as a matter of course, the Japanese girl would fall an almost certain victim to moral disaster. It does not follow that the Japanese girl is inherently weaker or less moral than the American girl. The moral training of the American girl has been focused largely about sex morality—on watchfulness and resistance to the male. She is taught that the direst social penalties will be inflicted upon her who fails to be watchful.

The moral teaching of the Japanese girl on the other hand centers about obedience and subserviency to the male. Until she is given over in marriage she has few contacts with the male outside of her own home, and society has as yet made almost no provision for such contacts. Naturally, clandestinism will result until a franker relationship between

the sexes is established and society arranges for more normal opportunities of communication and association. Before all else the Japanese woman will have to be taught how to use social liberty, and the Japanese man how to respect such liberty. The old domestic morality of obedience for women must be revised and re-leavened with resistance and self-assertion; and methods of co-operation and co-ordination with men must be taught in place of subserviency to them.

As for educated women making poor housewives, it appears that a few years ago a wave of reactionary alarm was spread broadcast in Japan caused by the writings of an eminent German professor employed at the Imperial University. It seems a pity that the Japanese should have been influenced by the German point of view on this subject, since the mass of German people are also belated on questions concerning women, are still wedded to the old standards of *"Kinder, Kirche und Kochen,"* and in problems of women's education have progressed little beyond the Japanese.

To be sure, when one reflects upon how little widened opportunity, so-called education, social intercourse, and independent action, has achieved for the Western women, particularly the American woman; how lacking are many in stability, sense of obligation to society and often even to their own families; how pampered, frivolous and pettish are many, particularly of the comfortable class; how unques-

tionably superior, on the other hand, are the Japanese women in certain qualities that make for stability and character under their code of suppression and self-sacrifice, one is almost ready to question whether a reversion to suppression and subserviency would not be well for our women. And when one hears the oft-repeated question: "Are not Japanese women good, faithful, docile, patient and industrious; are they not loyal wives and devoted mothers, then why change, why disturb them?" one reflects before answering.

But widened privilege in the West is not responsible for the great number of futile, restless women; but rather social, economic and domestic conditions which still prevent the great mass of fairly well educated women of the comfortable class from finding satisfactory self-expression and a worthy outlet for their ambitions and abilities. Consequently, we see scores of them running hopelessly amuck with ornamental frivolities like dress, teas, cards and social dissipations of all sorts. But this is a problem quite apart from that of the present-day Japanese woman.

V

Progressive Japan, like the rest of the civilized world, is not so much in need of devoted mothers as of wise, trained and intelligent mothers; not so much in need of industrious housewives as of scientific, businesslike, household managers who know

the food values of fish, rice and potatoes and how to combine these food values so as to bring the best results in bone, muscle and bodily strength to the family.

In traveling about Japan the casual observer is everywhere impressed with the vast number of children afflicted with sore eyes, scabby heads and, during the colder months, with almost continuously running noses, which ultimately must breed catarrh, adenoids, and ear and throat affections of every variety. Indeed, one can scarcely imagine a more nauseating sight than a group of these otherwise charming children, almost every one with a running nose and no effort made to correct it, since children are taught never to snuff or to blow their noses in the presence of guests. There are admirers of the Japanese people who maintain that such neglect of the children is the worst blot upon their present-day civilization. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in a very able and sympathetic study of modern conditions in Japan, testify in no sparing terms on this subject:

"There is no general provision for the prevention and treatment of disease, and in spite of apparently endless charity on the part of the very poorly remunerated doctors, and various 'charity hospitals' (as they are called) the death-rate is half as much again as in England; with tuberculosis and infantile disorders fatally prevalent; and with the children growing up, untreated, with all sorts of eventually disabling complaints.

"The amount of preventable disease, of unnecessary disablement and of premature old age and death is costing Japan today more even than its gigantic naval expenditure or its war debt. . . . . A large proportion of the children of Japan are suffering severely from the want of the necessaries of healthy child life. There is very little public provision for orphans or abandoned children; in the absence of any supervision of child birth and infancy, the infantile death-rate (in spite of universal breast feeding) is very high, implying much infantile disease."

Certain it is that the great body of Japanese children are not suffering from want or neglect, or lack of affection, but chiefly from poverty and from lack of trained, efficient motherhood which would doubtless in a very large measure reduce these evils.

Moreover, the education of the children during the most impressionable and absorbing period of their lives is almost entirely in the hands of the women. Many critics of Japan maintain that until the women of Japan are raised to a higher level of training and are permitted to share in and contribute to the world of ideas and to aid in the solution of present-day social and domestic problems, the higher, social and ethical progress of the whole nation is bound to be retarded.

CHAPTER V

THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF JAPAN

I

THE modern educational system of Japan may be said to have been inaugurated in 1871 when the *Mumbusho* or Department of Education was established. The year following a comprehensive educational code was promulgated. The keynote of the system had already been sounded in the last of the five articles of the famous Charter or Imperial Oath of 1869 which also promised deliberative assemblies and government by public opinion. The articles provided:

"Knowledge shall be sought for throughout the world, so that the welfare of the Empire may be promoted."

The principles underlying this code of education are more important than the code itself, which has undergone frequent changes and revisions. These principles are thus set forth in the preamble:

"It is intended that henceforth universally (without any distinction of class or sex), *in a village*

there shall be no house without learning, and in a house no individual without learning. Fathers or elder brothers must take note of this intention,' and bringing up their children or younger brothers with warm feeling of love must not fail to let them acquire learning. (As for higher learning, that depends upon the capacity of individuals.)"*

It is characteristic of the Japanese that special emphasis is placed upon the utilitarian advantages of an education.

"The only way in which an individual can raise himself, manage his property and prosper in his business and so accomplish his career, is by cultivating his morals, improving his intellect, and becoming proficient in arts; the cultivation of morals, the improvement of intellect and proficiency in arts cannot be attained except through learning. This is the reason why schools are established. . . . . Every man only after learning diligently each according to his capacity will be able to increase his property and prosper in his business. Hence knowledge may be regarded as the capital for raising one's self; who then can do without learning? Those who wander about homeless, suffer from hunger, break up their houses, and ruin themselves, come to such a pass, because they are without learning."

It can hardly be said that the educational system of Japan in its present form was fully established prior to the reforms of Mari Yurei, a Minister of

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* From Kukuchi's translation in his *Japanese Education*, pages 68, 69.

Education who issued a new or thoroughly revised code of education in 1886. In 1890 there was issued the famous Imperial Rescript on Education which may be said to form the basis of Japanese education, at least in its moral and political aspects. This document, being a sort of Japanese Bible, is of such interest and importance that no apology is needed for its insertion in full:

"Know ye, Our subjects:

"Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

"The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be ob-

served alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all attain to the same virtue."

In commenting upon this Rescript, Baron Kukuchi says: "Our whole moral and civic education consists in so imbuing our children with the spirit of the Rescript that it forms a part of our national life." He also tells us: "A copy of this Rescript is distributed from the Department of Education to every school in the Empire, whether governmental, public, or private, of any grade whatsoever; those given to governmental schools are actually signed by the Emperor."

The Rescript is essentially Confucian in its content and teaching. Loyalty to the Emperor, which includes patriotism to the country and filial piety, are emphasized as the two cardinal virtues. Portraits of the Emperor and Empress are distributed to every school, and these and a copy of the Rescript are kept in a special place; and on public occasions the same respect must be paid to these portraits as if their Majesties themselves were present in person; in other words, they are actually worshipped. Thus it will be seen that the Imperial Rescript in a very real sense forms the basis of the religion as well as the education of the Japanese nation, and must necessarily influence tremendously the national, educational and ethical outlook of the entire people.

II

Education in Japan is entirely under the control or supervision of the Government. The administration is determined by Imperial ordinance rather than by laws submitted to the Diet. The agencies of control are of two kinds—central and local. The central agency is the Department of Education headed by the Minister who sits in the Cabinet. There is also a higher Council of Education with merely advisory but important powers. For purposes of control, the whole country is divided into seven administrative divisions, with an inspector for each division.

For administrative purposes (including education), Japan proper is divided into three *Fu* and forty-three *Ken,** whose governors† or prefects have charge of matters educational in their respective provinces or prefectures. Each prefecture, exclusive of the *Shi* or cities, is subdivided into *Gun* or sub-prefectures. Alongside the sub-prefectures are the *Shi* (cities or towns), and underneath the sub-prefectures are the *Cho* and *Son* (villages). These various

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*The distinction between a *fu* and *ken* is one of name only.

†These officers are appointed by the Emperor on the recommendation of the Cabinet. Like the French prefects of whom they are a copy, they serve in a double capacity as State officials charged with a part of the general administration of the State, and as local representatives or heads of the prefectural administration and interests.

units or bodies have elected assemblies with certain powers of self-government. Subject to the control, supervision and inspection of the Central Government, they exercise certain rights, privileges and duties in connection with the schools. Thus there are schools and colleges established and maintained by the prefectures and (in fewer number) even by the sub-prefectures. But the expense of elementary schools is for the most part borne by cities, towns or villages or by unions of these. This naturally involves a certain amount of local control. Some higher and special schools are directly maintained and controlled by the Central Government, while a number of private schools are under more or less government supervision.

The public schools of Japan are supported by taxation, endowments and tuition fees. Tuition fees were charged in all schools until the year 1900 when, in accordance with the principle of obligatory attendance then introduced, it was ordered that elementary education should be free wherever possible. By 1906 only about five per cent. of the ordinary elementary schools collected slight fees from less than ten per cent. of the pupils of these schools.* In the higher elementary schools tuition fees are still collected in the majority of cases. In middle schools they are the rule rather than the exception.

*Kukuchi, *Japanese Education,* page 145. About the same percentages still held in 1910-11. See table in *38th Annual Report* of the Minister of Education, page 75.

Attempts to create endowment funds for school purposes have not been very successful in Japan. Such funds have been created by local governments in some instances and there is a fund of several million dollars for additional allowances to common school-teachers. But the main endowment has been the Educational Stock Fund which was created in 1899 by setting apart for educational purposes the sum of ten million yen or five million dollars out of the Chinese indemnity. This fund was unfortunately appropriated by the War Chest during the Russo-Japanese War, though since 1900-01 there is a National Education Fund, consisting of contributions from both the treasury and the provinces, created as supplementary to the Stock Fund. The total amount of this fund in 1911-12 was $1,689,937 of which over $1,000,000 was granted as loans to cities, towns and villages.

Japan probably spends less money for educational purposes than any country in the world having an efficient school system. The total expenditure for public schools paid out by provincial and communal treasuries in 1911-12 was almost $40,000,000 of which nearly three-fourths or $29,000,000 went to the support of common schools. The total amount expended by the Department of Education in 1910-11 was $4,500,000. The two main items in this expenditure were $750,000 for general education and $2,434,814 for the Imperial universities and other institutions.

III

There are three main grades or kinds of primary and secondary schools in Japan: the elementary, middle and high schools.

At the base of the educational system are the elementary schools. The purpose of these is described in the Imperial Ordinance of 1900:

"Elementary schools are expected to give children the rudiments of moral education and of civic education,* together with such general knowledge and skill as are necessary for life, while due attention is paid to their bodily development."

Elementary schools are divided into ordinary and higher elementary schools, though the two may be combined into one school. Since 1907 the course of an ordinary elementary school extends over six years and is compulsory. The main subjects taught in the schools during the first four years are morals, language, arithmetic and gymnastics; to which may be added drawing, singing and manual work and sewing for girls. In recent years geography and science were added, as well as military drill for boys.

The higher elementary schools (which are not compulsory) are for those children who, having completed the course of six years, wish to receive

*By civic education is meant "education specially adapted to make the child a good subject of the Emperor and a useful member of the community."—Kukuchi, page 115.

a higher general education, though not intending to enter the middle school for boys or a high school for girls. The course of these higher elementary schools usually extends over two years, though it may be extended to three or even four years. The subjects taught are morals, language, arithmetic, Japanese history, geography, science, drawing, singing and gymnastics, with sewing for girls and military drill for boys. To these may be added manual work, agriculture or commerce for boys, and manual work for girls. Provision may also be made for teaching English.

After a Japanese boy has completed the six years compulsory course of an ordinary elementary school, he may leave school altogether, continue his studies in a higher elementary school or enter a middle school (theoretically, at least), or certain local agricultural, commercial or apprentice schools. If he has completed two years of the higher elementary course, he may possibly enter a normal school or one of the considerable number of the city agricultural, industrial or commercial schools provided by a ken or city.

As stated in an Imperial ordinance, the object of middle schools is "to give a higher general education necessary for men," or, as explained by a leading authority,* "a general education or liberal culture necessary for those who are to be of middle or

*Baron Kukuchi, *op. cit.*, page 205.

higher social standing." But really the middle school is used mainly by those who are desirous of obtaining the instruction needed for entering a college or university. So they have largely become mere preparatory schools.

The course of a middle school, which corresponds to our high school, extends over five years. The subjects taught are morals, the Japanese language and Chinese classics, one of three foreign languages (English, French or German), history, geography, mathematics, natural history, physics and chemistry, law and economics, drawing, singing and gymnastics.* Most emphasis is placed upon the Japanese and foreign languages. Of the foreign languages, English is almost exclusively taught, though the results are far from satisfactory.

After her completion of the six years' compulsory course in the ordinary elementary school, the average Japanese girl has comparatively little opportunity for further study. During recent years, however, great progress has been made in providing for girls the means of secondary education. There are now a considerable number of so-called high schools† and normal schools for girls, and of other institu-

*Foreign languages or history and geography may be substituted for law and economics, and drawing for singing.

†It is gratifying to note that the number of public and private high schools for girls increased from 192 in 1910-11 to 297 in 1912-13. The number of pupils increased from 55,882 to 74,316. The number of graduates in 1912-13 was 16,396. See *Japan Year Book* for 1915, page 258.

tions which offer better opportunities for technical, professional and industrial training.

The object of high schools for girls, as stated in an Imperial ordinance, is "to give higher general education necessary for women;" or, as explained by Baron Kukuchi,* "general education and culture necessary for those who are to be of middle or higher social standing." The course usually extends over four years, though a fifth year may be added. The subjects taught are the inevitable morals, the Japanese language, a foreign language (either English or French), history and geography, mathematics, science, drawing, domestic management, sewing, music and gymnastics."†

If the Japanese youth who has completed his five-year course in the middle school desires to enter an Imperial university, he attempts to secure admission to one of the eight high schools provided for this purpose. Or if he has had the necessary training, he may enter a higher normal school or prepare for an industrial or professional career at one of the higher technical schools, a college of commerce, a

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Op. cit., page 273.

†Foreign language may be omitted or made optional, while drawing and music may be dispensed with entirely. Education and manual work or any subject approved by the local authorities may be added, provided the hours of instruction are not increased more than six hours per week. In connection with morals, special attention is paid to deportment and manners; in domestic management, to nursing and the care of the aged and of children.

medical college or such an institution as the Sapporo Agricultural College. For the young Japanese women there are few such opportunities.

The high schools (formerly known as high middle schools) were originally designed to give special or professional education, as well as preparatory instruction necessary for entering the universities; but their primary purpose seems to have been lost sight of, and they are now almost wholly used as institutions or colleges preparatory to a university career. There are eight such high schools maintained by the Government. These schools have each three sections or departments, the course in all cases extending over three years. The first section is for those wishing to enter the college (in the university) of law or literature; the second is for those intending to enter the college of science, engineering or agriculture; the third for those wishing to enter the college of medicine. In the first section emphasis is naturally placed upon such subjects as logic, elementary law and elementary political economy; in the second and third sections upon mathematics and the appropriate sciences. In all sections are taught ethics, Japanese language and gymnastics, and until recently (1911) two of the three leading Western languages were required.*

*The languages usually studied are English, French and German. In some fields, as in medicine, German is required. In 1911 it was arranged to make one language compulsory and the other optional.

IV

There is in Japan a very ample* provision of normal schools designed to train teachers. They are divided into ordinary and higher normal schools with separate schools or classes for either sex.

The course of study in the ordinary normal school extends over four years† in the case of male and three years in the case of female pupils, usually preceded by one year's preparatory course. Those eligible for admission have completed the second year of a higher elementary school or its equivalent. The subjects taught are pretty much the same as in the middle schools with the addition of pedagogy (theory and practice).

Applicants for admission to a Japanese normal school must be of good moral character and have a strong healthy physique. To this end they are subjected to a strict medical examination and a most searching inquiry. The regulations prescribe that those admitted shall be furnished with the cost of their board and clothing, while tuition is free. The

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*Each prefecture is obliged to maintain at least one normal school with an elementary school attached. Since 1897 the Government has encouraged the establishment of at least two schools, one each for male and female pupils. In 1907 there were 69 normal schools, of which 27 were for male and 19 for female pupils, while there were 23 schools for both sexes.

†There is also provision for a one-year course for graduates of middle schools or of girls' high schools.

students are lodged in dormitories and subject to strict discipline. A special effort is made to inculcate a spirit of loyalty and patriotism. In return for these privileges they are required after graduation to serve for a certain period as elementary school-teachers in the locality in which they graduated.

In addition to the ordinary normal schools there are at Tokyo and Hiroshima two higher normal schools which train male teachers for normal schools, middle schools and high schools for girls; also two higher normal schools for girls in Tokyo and Nara.

Of late years, more especially since the Russo-Japanese War, there has been in Japan a tremendous impetus in the direction of technical, industrial and professional education. There are now many technical, agricultural and commercial schools, primary and secondary grades, including numerous supplementary technical schools, as also a number of special technical schools or colleges. Among these may be especially noted the Marioka higher school of Agriculture and Forestry, the five higher commercial schools at Tokyo, Kobe and elsewhere, seven higher technical schools, the Tokyo Fishery Institute, the Mining School at Akita, the Sericulture School at Uyeda, six special schools of medicine, the Tokyo Foreign Language School, the Tokyo Fine Art Academy and the Tokyo Academy of Music.

V.

At the head of the public educational system of Japan are the four Imperial universities.

First in rank and importance is the Imperial University of Tokyo consisting of a university hall and six colleges, viz.: law, medicine, engineering, literature, science and agriculture. These last are not colleges in either the English or American sense. They rather correspond to the German faculties of philosophy, jurisprudence, medicine and theology. The university hall is a post-graduate institution designed for purposes of research. At the end of five years post-graduate students who have presented a satisfactory thesis receive the degree of Hakushi (Doctor).

The college of law has by far the greatest number of students.* It is divided into three sections—law, politics and economics; the subjects of study in each section being divided into compulsory and elective. The course of study for law has recently been reduced from four to three years. At the same time the privilege which university graduates formerly enjoyed of entering the bench or bar on diploma was withdrawn.

*Out of 5,240 students enrolled in December, 1913, 2,422 were registered in the college of law; 846 in that of medicine; 663 in engineering; 414 in literature; 158 in science; and 740 in agriculture. There were 271 post-graduate students in university hall. See *Japan Year Book* for 1915, pages 261-262.

In the college of medicine there are two sections—medicine and pharmacy, with courses of four and three years respectively. The college of engineering has nine sections with three-year courses. In the college of literature there are three sections —philosophy, history and literature, each with a course of three years.

The Imperial University of Kyoto is similarly organized except that there are only four colleges, namely, of law, medicine, literature, and science and engineering.

The Imperial University of Tohoku at Sendai (established in 1901) has a college of science, a school of agriculture (at Sapporo), a medical course and an English course. It distinguished itself from the others (in 1913) by admitting three women to a special course by examination—a notable and promising innovation in the history of the higher education of Japanese women.

The Imperial University of Kyushu at Fukuoka (established in 1910) consists thus far of but two colleges, namely, of medicine and engineering.

For the maintenance of the universities of Tokyo and Kyoto the Government makes an annual appropriation of about six hundred and fifty thousand dollars and five hundred thousand dollars respectively. The presidents are appointed by the Emperor on the recommendation of the Cabinet. At the head of each college is a director appointed from among the professors by the Minister of Education.

The supreme deliberative body of the university is the senate presided over by the president and consisting of the directors and a professor from each college chosen by his colleagues. In each college there is a faculty meeting presided over by the director. But the senate and faculty meetings are mere advisory bodies, the final decision and responsibility resting with the directors, the president or the Minister of Education.

Professors are appointed by the Emperor on the recommendation of the Minister of Education, though the initiative in respect to appointment or promotion is taken by the president after consulting the faculty. That the system does not always work without friction is shown by the crisis at Kyoto University in 1914. In consequence of the arbitrary dismissal of seven professors by the president, a number of professors of the law college, who claimed the right of being consulted in the matter of appointments and dismissals, resigned. The difficulty appears to have been adjusted by an understanding that the faculty should be taken into the confidence of the president with regard to such matters. The *Japan Mail* called this an "unconditional surrender" on the part of the professors.

In engaging foreign professors, who were formerly in the majority, the consent of the Diet is necessary. But the services of foreign scholars have been gradually dispensed with until there are now only about a dozen left in the University of Tokyo.

VI

In addition to the public schools of Japan, there are a considerable number of private institutions. These are mainly mission schools, the missionaries having been pioneers in the field of education in Japan.

Among private institutions for higher education, the most important are unquestionably the Keio-gijuku, Waseda and Doshisha Universities. These and other similar institutions are largely reservoirs for students failing to enter the Imperial University or not prepared to do so.

The Keio-gijuku in Tokyo was founded as early as 1895 by the famous Fukuzawa, sometimes referred to as the Benjamin Franklin of Japan, a great educator, scholar and philosopher on Western lines, who contributed much to the awakening of modern Japan. The university proper is divided into four departments, namely, of economics, law, political science and literature. In accordance with the moral code of its illustrious founder, a special attempt is made to inculcate a sense of independence and self-respect—virtues, so it is claimed by many Japanese critics, too much neglected in the public and government schools. Keio University boasts of five thousand graduates, and in 1912 there were enrolled in the university department 2,492 students.

Waseda University was founded at Tokyo in 1882 by Count Okuma to encourage freedom of inves-

tigation and "provide young men with an easy means of attaining advanced knowledge." The university department comprises colleges of politics and economics, literature, commerce, and science and engineering. The institution boasts of over ten thousand graduates and a total enrollment of 6,622 students in 1913, of whom 2,035 were registered in the various colleges, 500 in the academies, 358 in the higher normal school and 2,313 in the higher preparatory school.

The above institutions, it is claimed, are especially adapted to the training of public spirited and independent citizens, free from governmental and bureaucratic influences so fatal to initiative, originality and progress.

The Doshisha University was founded at Kyoto in 1875 under Christian auspices by the celebrated educator Dr. Nishima. It comprises academic, collegiate and theological departments in addition to a girls' school. It claims eighteen hundred alumni and an enrollment of 840 students. This school is largely indebted to the United States both for teachers and financial support, and is acknowledged to be one of the best institutions in Japan.

Another promising institution is the Meiji Semmon Gakko founded in Kiushiu in 1909 by Mr. Yasukawa who furnished an endowment of $1,650,000—the most notable instance of a private endowment of an educational institution in Japan. Courses extending over four years are provided in mining,

metallurgy, mechanical and electrical engineering and applied chemistry.

Except for the two higher normal schools for girls at Tokyo and Nara, the Japanese Government has failed to make any provision for the higher education of women. Since 1900 Miss Tsuda has conducted an excellent higher school for girls in Tokyo called the Women's English Institute. It admits to its three years' course only those possessing scholarship equal to that of graduates of a girls' high school. In 1914 it had 146 students and 163 alumni.

More important and promising for the future is the so-called Japanese Women's University founded in 1901 at Tokyo by Mr. Naruse, who believes that the education of women should be guided by three principles. They shall be educated (1) as human beings, (2) as women and (3) as members of the community. To this end emphasis is placed upon the three principles of (1) self-activity or self-help, (2) the psycho-physical principle or co-operation between soul and body and (3) the socio-individualistic principle of the relation between society and the individual. Self-respect and service are believed to be the most important special female virtures for the development of which the founder has instituted various organizations for self-training and self-government, such as moral tendency, experiment study, health, order, economy, cooking, committees and the cherry-maple associations.

Three-year courses in domestic science, literature, English and education are provided to which students are admitted who have had the equivalent of a five years' course in a girls' high school. Besides the attached schools, there is also to be a three years' post-graduate course, and the university is looking forward to the establishment of medical, musical, fine arts and other departments. It is admitted that the standards are not sufficiently high to merit the name of university, but it is hoped that these may be gradually raised as conditions permit. In 1912 the Women's University had 1,277 graduates, and a total of 529 students in the university proper.

VII

In viewing the Japanese educational system as a whole, it will be noted that the Japanese do not believe in co-education. They do not object to it in the elementary schools where boys and girls are usually taught in the same schools and often in the some classes, though even here they are separated whenever practicable. This is due to the old established custom of bringing up the sexes separately.

Even primary education is not wholly free and is only compulsory for six years, though it extends to both sexes. During these years there is a very high percentage of attendance, but there is some reason for thinking that, owing to the method of computation, Japanese statistics on this head are not wholly

reliable. According to the statistics furnished by the Department of Education, the ratio of attendance in 1912-13 was 98.80 per cent. for boys and 97.62 per cent. for girls, an average of 98.23 per cent. There were 25,673 elementary schools, with 7,037,430 pupils and 158,601 teachers—an average of about 45 pupils to one teacher.* The majority of teachers (five-sevenths) are men, though the number of women teachers is constantly increasing.

The salaries of teachers in elementary schools range from four or five dollars to twenty-five or thirty-five dollars per month. The minimum as fixed by the law of 1907 is five dollars for men and four dollars for women. The average in 1911-12 was a trifle over nine dollars. In criticizing these wages, account should of course be taken of the low cost of living in Japan, but the salaries, nevertheless, seem pitifully small. Some compensation may perhaps be found in the good social position and prestige of members of the teaching profession among a deferential people, and in a pension system which grants a retiring allowance ranging from one-fourth to one-half the regular salary after a service of from fifteen to forty years.

The Japanese school boy or girl has longer hours and shorter vacations than the American child. Summer vacation is much shorter, usually lasting

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*For criticism of these figures see Pieters in the *Christian Movement in Japan* for 1906, page 57.

only four or five weeks in July and August; and, though there is no school on Sundays, Saturday is a school day in Japan, and the number of holidays, exclusive of Sundays, must not exceed ninety in any one year. The number of school days each year is therefore between 220 and 240 as compared with about 147 in the United States. The number of hours per diem is also probably greater. In elementary schools it ranges from twenty-one to thirty hours per week. In the secondary schools and technical schools it is often still greater.

In consequence of certain abuses and scandals which had arisen in connection with the use of text-books, the rules regulating their compilation and adoption were revised by Imperial ordinance in 1903. According to these new rules all readers and elementary text-books on morals, Japanese history and geography must be uniform and copyrighted by the Department of Education. All other text-books used in elementary schools must be approved by the Department or compiled under its direction. The publication and sale of these texts is subject to the strictest supervision and control. The result has been a great reduction in the price of these books, amounting in some cases to as much as seventy per cent., and great improvement in their quality, at least as regards binding and paper. On the other hand, such control does not permit any questioning of certain old traditions which the more enlightened public can no longer accept as facts.

VIII

Perhaps the most unique and interesting feature of Japanese education is its insistence on the teaching of morals and patriotism in all primary and secondary schools. In the departmental regulations governing elementary education, the following directions are given with reference to morals:

"The teaching of Morals must be based on the Imperial Rescript on Education, and its aim should be to cultivate the moral nature of children and to guide them in practice of virtues.

"In the ordinary elementary course, easy precepts appropriate for practice concerning such virtues as filial piety and obedience to elders, affection and friendship, frugality and industry, modesty, fidelity, courage, etc., should be given, and then some of the duties towards the State and society, with a view to elevate their moral character, strengthen their will, increase their spirit of enterprise, make them value public virtues and foster the spirit of loyalty and patriotism.

"In the higher elementary course, the above must be further extended and the training given made still more solid.

"In the teaching of girls, special stress must be laid on the virtues of chastity and modesty.

"Encouragement and admonition should be given by means of wise sayings and proverbs and by tales of good deeds, so that children may lay them to heart."*

*Kukuchi, *Japanese Education*, page 150; *cf.*, pages 217 *ff.*

In all the elementary schools, as also in the girls' high schools, two hours per week are devoted to this subject and one hour in the middle schools. Normal school students receive from one to two hours' instruction in ethics. In the elementary schools at least, a great effort is made to present the subject in as attractive and concrete a way as possible.* Thus the first lesson deals with "The School." There follow lessons on such subjects as "The Teacher," "Punctuality," "Be Studious," "Play," "Father and Mother," "Friends," "His Majesty," "The Body," "Manners," "Neighbors," "Good Children," "Honesty" (illustrated by Washington and the cherry tree), "Loyalty" and "Good Japanese."

There is, however, much dissatisfaction with the results of this boasted system of moral instruction. Some complain that the teachers, having lost faith in the old system of Confucian ethics, are unable to teach, by precept or example, a living morality. Others find fault with the method. They say that moral instruction should permeate all teaching and not be relegated to special hours. The missionaries criticize the attempt to separate morality and religion and the effort to secularize moral education. One critic says: "The moral teaching does little

*The interested reader will find the whole system of elementary education in morals amply treated in Kukuchi, chapter 11. For the teaching of morals in the middle schools, see *Ibid*, chapter 16.

good. The teachers do not command respect." Some point to the laxity of sexual and commercial relations in Japan as evidence of the failure of the system.

By way of partial reply to some of the above criticisms, it might be urged that apparently there is little stress laid in this teaching upon sexual morality (except for women), and that the Japanese are making a real and sincere effort to cure their commercial vices. In one respect at least the system appears to be successful. It does succeed in inculcating a spirit of loyalty, obedience and national patriotism which is unexcelled, except perhaps in Germany. To be sure, this spirit may have the defects of its virtues and may be dangerous in its ultimate efforts both upon Japan and the rest of the world, as in the case of Germany. It may raise more demons than it can exorcise. Of real political education or practical training for the higher duties of citizenship, there is very little evidence.

One of the most serious defects of the Japanese educational system is the inadequacy of financial support and the failure to make ample provision for secondary and higher education or to provide sufficient accommodations for the aspiring youth of Japan. Dr. Nitobe remarks on this head:*

"I believe there is nothing that chills the genial current of the youthful soul more than the inade-

*_The Japanese Nation_, page 190.

quate number of collegiate institutions in our country. Thousands of young men in the most ardent and aspiring period of life feel the very door of hope slammed in their face. . . . . It hurts me to confess how sadly our Government fails to meet the educational demands of young Japan."

Though theoretically all boys who have completed the ordinary elementary course are qualified to enter a middle school, the accommodations in these schools are so limited that competitive examinations are necessary at most schools, resulting in the rejection of nearly forty per cent. of the applicants. The number of such schools is also insufficient. In 1911-12 there were but three hundred and twelve public and private middle schools with nearly six thousand instructors and almost one hundred and twenty-five thousand pupils. The case is even worse in the high schools (university preparatory), normal schools, Imperial universities and government technical and professional schools, where the rejections run from sixty-five to eighty-five per cent. Indeed, it might be said that some of the single states of the American Union compare favorably with the Japanese Empire in making provision for secondary and higher education.

Perhaps no comments upon Japanese education have aroused so much interest and controversy as Dr. Eliot's* criticism of the system as being too

*See Eliot, *Some Roads Towards Peace,* published by the Carnegie Peace Endowment (1914), page 50.

uniform and stereotyped. Some of the Japanese critics are disposed to admit the justice of this criticism, while others either deny or justify the conditions which prevail.

There can be little question of the justice of Dr. Eliot's criticism in so far as the secondary schools are concerned. The system is too rigid and mechanical, the curriculum is too crowded, the teachers and pupils are overtaxed, the knowledge taught and acquired is often superficial, there is too much cramming for needless examinations, and the teachers are frequently untrained and inexperienced. The Imperial universities especially are sometimes designated as official factories for the training of bureaucratic officials, and there is much dissatisfaction with the lack of initiative and fondness for abstract theories which are said to characterize professors and students alike at these institutions, tendencies encouraged, it is said, by the *Mumbusho* or Department of Education. In short, it would seem that in Japan, as elsewhere, and especially in America, mere instruction has been mistaken for education, with the result that growth is often impeded rather than developed by the system. The product tends toward uniformity, mediocrity and superficiality. The individual is adapted to the system rather than the system to the individual. Intellectual initiative and independent thinking are not common and not encouraged. Utilitarian ideals prevail and absorb most of the trained energy of the nation.

IX

One of the main impediments to real educational progress in Japan is the use of Chinese ideographs to represent sounds as well as words in the *kana* of the Japanese alphabet, and the adoption of Chinese words and Chinese ideographs into the Japanese language. A Japanese scholar is supposed to be familiar with some six thousand out of nearly fifty thousand Chinese characters, of which about three thousand are commonly used and one thousand three hundred and sixty may be employed in the elementary schools. This involves a knowledge of possibly several distinct sounds and different meanings in the case of each character and the ability to write them in several styles. Chinese literature forms an almost integral part of Japanese literature, and consequently the study of the Chinese classics is deemed an essential part of the education of a Japanese student just as Latin and Greek were formerly considered a necessary part of the education of a Western scholar or gentleman.

Some twenty-five years ago two associations were formed—one for the exclusive use of Japanese *kana*, and the other for the introduction of Roman letters; but, being in advance of their time, they gradually declined and finally disappeared. More recently a new association has been formed for the purpose of substituting Roman letters for the *kana* as well as for Chinese ideographs. This movement

promises to be more successful, but the pathway to this desirable and, it would seem, almost necessary reform, will probably prove long and difficult; for there are a vast number of stupid conservatives in Japan as well as in other countries.

The difficulties of acquiring a reading and writing knowledge of the Japanese language, not to speak of Chinese ideographs, are so great that a study of their school statistics would make the Japanese appear to be much more literate than they really are. It is said that at the most only about fifty per cent. of the Japanese, having received an ordinary elementary education, could possibly read a simple religious tract or newspaper in their own language, and that comparatively few could read a political pamphlet or editorial. Many have lost their former ability to read. A graduate of a middle school eighteen years of age has not, it is said, mastered Japanese sufficiently well to be able to understand an essay or leading article.

In their intense pursuit of practical and abstract knowledge Japanese educators for a time neglected the needs of the body. But this defect has been largely remedied, and gymnastics form an important part of the curriculum in all elementary and secondary schools. English and American games, such as lawn tennis, boating, baseball and even football, are becoming increasingly popular. The numerous excursions for mixed purposes of pleasure, exercise and knowledge, which are undertaken un-

der the guidance of the instructors, form a pleasing and prominent feature of Japanese school life.

One very pronounced aspect of Japanese education is its utilitarian and increasingly practical or vocational character. As in the United States, education is commonly regarded as a means rather than as an end and, while idealistic and altruistic aims are not wholly lacking, even more than in America the prevailing purpose appears to be a desire to get on in the world, to acquire wealth, fame or position, and to succeed or gain substantial rewards in the struggle for existence.

But it must be admitted that in spite of disadvantages and many drawbacks, such as poverty and inexperience, the educational progress of the Japanese has been most remarkable. The Japanese youth is extremely aspiring, energetic and ambitious, and he is usually determined to make the best of his opportunities. Indeed, he frequently overworks and succumbs in the fierce competition for entrance to the secondary schools or universities. His teachers, however untrained and ill qualified for their task, are usually devoted and self-sacrificing to an extraordinary degree. For example, many university professors devote a considerable proportion of their meager salaries to the lodging and "entertainment" of needy and worthy students. The school-teacher is the person most respected in an average Japanese village, and the scholar occupies a highly honorable place in Japanese society.

At a Japanese university there is much which might be criticized in the way of a general lack of hotels or dormitories, the existence of bad living conditions and the want of proper provision for the care and welfare of students; there is nevertheless an admirable spirit of fraternity and democracy and a praiseworthy absence of display of wealth, snobbishness or family and class distinction. In Japanese educational institutions the mode of life is, in fact, almost Spartan in its economy and simplicity, and intellectual superiority is the only recognized passport to distinction or success. Would that this could be said for American universities!

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION IN JAPAN—SHINTOISM, BUDDHISM AND CONFUCIANISM

I

THE three fundamental religions of Japan are Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism.

The oldest of these religions is Shinto, the "Way of the Gods," or, more properly speaking, of the *kami*.* It is a native cult and seems to have arisen in remote antiquity. In its earlier or more archaic form it consisted of the legends and myths of Old Japan and constituted a species of nature- and ancestor-worship of families and clans or village communities somewhat similar to the early religions of Greece and Rome. After the introduction during the early centuries of the Christian era of Chinese literature and philosophy, the whole mass of legends, myths and superstitions was organized into a system for a political purpose—support of Imperial power.

*The term *kami* was thus explained by Motoöri, one of the great expositors of Shinto, writing during the latter part of the eighteenth century: "The term *kami* is applied in the first place to the various deities of Heaven and Earth who are mentioned in the ancient records, as well as to their spirits which reside in the shrines where they are worshipped. Moreover, not only human beings, but birds, beasts, plants and trees, seas and mountains, and all other things whatso-

By some critics Shinto is hardly accounted a religion at all in the true sense, since it is without creed, scripture, dogma or moral code. Native commentators have explained the absence of an ethical system* as being due to the innate perfection of Japanese humanity which needed not the ministrations of Chinese sages or Western missionaries. But the unethical character of Shintoism is in all probability due to historical rather than to psychological

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ever which deserve to be dreaded and revered for the extraordinary and preeminent powers which they possess, are called *kami*. . . . Among *kami* who are human beings I need hardly mention first of all the successive Mikados — with reverence be it spoken. . . . Then there have been numerous examples of divine human beings both in ancient and modern times who, although not accepted by the nation generally, are treated as Gods, each as his several dignity, in a single province, village or family. . . . Amongst *kami* who are not human beings I need hardly mention Thunder. There are also the Dragon, the Echo, and the Fox, who are *kami* by reason of their uncanny and fearful natures. The term *kami* is applied in the *Nihongi* and *Manyōshiu* to the tiger and wolf. . . . There are many cases of seas and mountains, being called *kami*. It is not their spirits which are meant. The word was applied directly to the seas or mountains themselves as being very awful things." Ashton's *Shinto*, pages 6-7. *Cf.* Knox, *The Development of Religion in Japan*, pages 28-29.

"*Kami* is simply that which is above us, so that the word may even now be applied to the Government and to all superior objects which excite the feelings of awe and reverence."—Knox, *op. cit.*, pages 29-30.

*According to Professor Kumé, one of the leading modern authorities on Shinto, the ethical teaching of Shinto may be summed up in one word—*makato* or Truth. "'Be true,' was the sum of Shinto morals. . . . A Japanese of the masses,

causes. However this may be, religion need have no moral basis other than custom, and the relationship between religion and ethics appears at all times and in all places to be very uncertain. Certainly in the universal sense of religion as characterizing the attitude of the human mind toward supposed superior, mysterious or infinite powers, Shinto may be regarded as one of the most interesting and important, if undeveloped, religions of the Orient.

The practical teaching of Shinto may perhaps be summed up in two single commands: "Fear the Gods and obey the Emperor," and "Be pure (or clean) in heart and body."* While its emphasis

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even in these days, has little fancy for the high-sounding names, 'humanity,' 'justice,' and so forth. . . . The precept of all precepts, the foundation of moral teachings, the ultimate end of Shinto purifications by wind and by water, can be implied in that one word—*makato*. . . ." He cites the following poetic aphorism of a famous Japanese poet-patriot:

"The *kami blesseth,*
Not him who prayeth,
But him whose heart strayeth
Not from the way of *makato.*"

See Okuma's *Fifty Years of Japan,* volume II, page 37.

*Professor Kumé cites the following hymn as expressing the true meaning of Japanese purification:

"Pure be heaven.
Pure be earth.
Pure be within, without,
And the six roots;"

the six roots signifying the five sense organs and the heart, the organ of feeling. See Okuma, *op. cit.,* page 27.

upon cleanliness is largely ceremonial in origin and character and the idea of purity implies no corresponding conception of moral impurity or sin, these ideals have not been without profound influence upon Japanese habits, character and disposition. And the value of Shintoism in developing the sentiments of loyalty and patriotism can scarcely be overestimated.

Chamberlain* distinguishes three periods in the evolution of Shinto. During the first period—down to about A. D. 550—the Japanese seemingly had no notion of religion as a separate institution. They worshipped the living Mikado and paid homage to the gods; that is, to deceased members of the Imperial family and to the names of other great men. They offered prayers to the god of fire, the wind-gods, the god of pestilence, the goddess of food and to deities presiding over the gate, the cauldron, the sauce-pan and the kitchen. They also had a system of purifications for wrong-doing or for bodily defilement, the purifying element being water. They had no idea of a code of ethics and had made no effort to systematize the simple notions of the people regarding things unseen. "There was neither heaven nor hell,—only a kind of neutral-tinted Hades. . . . Shinto may be said, in this first phase, to have been a set of ceremonies as much political as religious."

*_Things Japanese_, page 419 ff., from which the above passage is condensed.

The introduction of Buddhism in the middle of the sixth century of the present era inaugurated the second period of Shintoism, which lasted to about the close of the seventeenth century. The exalted moral code, gorgeous ritual and profound metaphysics of Buddhism proved too much for the puny fabric of Shintoism, and further growth of that faith in the direction of a formal religion was stopped. "All that there was of religious feeling in the nation went over to the enemy. The Buddhist priesthood diplomatically received the native Shinto gods in their pantheon as avatars of ancient Buddhas."

The third period in the history of Shintoism began about 1700 and continues down to the present time. Under the peaceful rule of the Tokugawa dynasty of Shoguns, "the literati of Japan turned their eyes backward on their country's past. Old manuscripts were disinterred, old histories and poems were put in print, the old language was studied and imitated. Soon the movement became religious and political, not to say chauvinistic. The Shogunate was frowned on, because it had supplanted the autocracy of the heaven-descended Mikados. Buddhism and Confucianism were sneered at because of their foreign origin. Shinto gained by all this. The great scholars Mabuchi (1697-1769), Motoöri (1730-1801), and Hirata (1776-1843) devoted themselves to a religious propaganda. . . . . This order of ideals triumphed for a mo-

ment in the revolution of 1868. Buddhism was disestablished and disendowed and Shinto was installed as the only State religion. . . . At the same time thousands of temples, formerly Buddhist or *Ryobu-Shinto* [mixed Buddhist and Shinto] were, as the phrase went, 'purified'; that is, stripped of their Buddhist ornaments, and handed over to Shinto keeping. But as Shinto had no root in itself,—being a thing too empty and jejune to influence the hearts of men,—Buddhism soon rallied. . . . The whole thing is now a mere shadow, though Shinto is still in so far the official cult that certain temples are maintained out of public moneys, and that the attendance of certain officials is required from time to time at ceremonies of a semi-religious, semi-courtly nature."

Nevertheless Shinto is still a living religion in Japan. It is the religion of the reigning dynasty and the Court, and the majority of Japanese are still probably Shinto-Buddhist at heart. The god-shelf is still found in most Japanese homes. In one sense all patriotic Japanese, including professing Christians, are Shintoist, for they practically all join in certain Shinto ceremonies on occasion, and all pay homage to the Emperor. Most of them continue to perform acts of devotion to their ancestors. If they did not such neglect would be offensive to the whole family.

In 1912 Japan still contained 127,076 Shinto shrines with 14,352 priests or ministers divided be-

tween thirteen officially recognized sects.* The great national shrine at Ise has acquired renewed prestige since the Russo-Japanese War in consequence of visits by the late Emperor and other distinguished men. There have also been attempts to breathe new life into Shintoism on the part of several Japanese scholars, Dr. Inoye Tetsujiro, for example. A considerable measure of success has attended the establishment of two new quasi-Shinto sects by two peasant women, though their practices are said to savor greatly of superstition and licentiousness. In general, Shinto priests do not enjoy a particularly good reputation for learning or ability. There are no regular rules for ordination, and only a relative few are well qualified for their work. There are still in Japan many forms of animism, fetichism, divination and various other kinds of magic fostered and sheltered by Shinto as well as Buddhist priests.

"Yet Shinto," says Knox, "is more than a code of ceremonies, for in a true sense it embodies the religion of the people. Its stories of the gods are little more than fairy tales; the laborious works of the great scholars who attempted to maintain its inerrant truthfulness, their exegesis, apologetics, and reconciliations, merely encumber the shelves of antiquarian scholars; but, none the less, perhaps all the more, Shinto holds a large place in the people's hearts. . . . The legends, cosmology, and pseudo-history are not the religion, and its power is not in dogmas nor in forms of worship;

Japan Year Book (1915), pages 221-222.

it is a spirit, the spirit of Old Japan, *Yamato damashii.*

"The essential fact in Shinto is the religious patriotism of the people. To them Japan is a divine land, and their devotion expresses itself in loyalty to the Emperor. With this loyalty combines a faith in the continued existence of the heroes of the past, and their inspiration of the nation in its toils and aspirations. The Emperor is not a god, in our modern sense, nor is the land an abode of supernatural beings, but, true to the ancient meaning, 'divine' signifies superior, worshipful, that to which one bows in adoration and gives himself in consecrated service. The belief in the continued power and inspiration of the spirits of the past, though taken over from the Chinese, has become essential, yet rests on no argument and is embodied in no dogma. It has no clear vision of a heaven or hell, or of any state of rewards and punishments. In emotional content it can scarcely be distinguished from our Western reverence for the saintly and heroic dead, while its influence on the living is akin to the patriotic feelings excited by our recognition of a precious inheritance in the patriots of ages past. Thus Shinto is witness to an abiding reality. Though its forms perish, its substance remains beyond the reach of hostile criticism and argument. If its doctrine be vague, and its emotions with difficulty described, this is because it belongs to those powerful feelings which are only partly differentiated, and in this it remains a true representative of primitive religion, of the simple feelings which persist, their interpretation being restated with man's progress in knowledge. Shinto will survive—not in its dates, nor its genealogies, not in its theory of the descent of its sov-

ereign from Ame-terasu-no-Mikoto, nor in its legends and cosmology, but in the affections of the people, their trust in the national powers and destiny, and their confidence that there is a something more than their present strength and wisdom which directs and aids and on which they may rely. The 'something more' may receive new names, but the faith will abide while Japan works out a future greater and more glorious than the fabled Age of the Gods."*

II

As stated above, Buddhism, or the "Way of the Buddhas," was introduced into Japan by way of Korea during the middle of the sixth century A. D., when it effected that wonderful transformation of Japanese art and civilization which may be compared with the recent revolution wrought by the introduction of Western scientific knowledge and machinery during the Meiji era of enlightenment.

The Buddhism which entered Japan was that of the Greater Vehicle from northern India and China as distinguished from the Lesser Vehicle of Ceylon and Southern India.

In its long historical development of over a thousand years in India and China, Buddhism had undergone a tremendous transformation, having gathered unto itself many new doctrines and strange deities.

*Knox, *Religion in Japan*, pages 77-79.

It had, in fact, expanded into a system which was, in many respects, diametrically opposed to the teachings of Gautama, the founder of Buddhism.

According to Rhys-Davids, one of the greatest authorities on Buddhism, the essential doctrines of Buddhism are: (1) the *impermanence* of all things human or divine; (2) that sorrow or pain is the result of the great delusion of individuality, separateness, or self; or, in other words, all evil is due to the erroneous illusion expressed in the sayings, "This is I," "This is mine"; (3) the doctrine of the *karma,* or the fate which makes us temporary links in a long chain of cause and effect, thus binding us for countless ages to an endless series of past and future existences.

From this apparently endless chain of existence (itself assumed to be an evil) in various and manifold forms, Gautama provided a means of escape or salvation in the present life through which peace or perfect rest (*Nirvana*) might be attained. This was by following the Middle Way of the Noble Eightfold Path, consisting of Right Views (free from superstition or delusion), Right Aspiration (high and worthy of the intelligent, worthy man), Right Speech (kindly, open, truthful), Right Conduct (peaceful, honest, pure), Right Livelihood (bringing hurt or danger to no living thing), Right Effort (in self-training and in self-control), Right Mindedness (the active, watchful mind), and Right Rapture (in deep meditation of the realities of life).

In the Greater Vehicle this relatively simple body of teaching is obscured, perverted or overlaid with no end of superstitions and metaphysical conceptions. "Buddha is no longer the historical Gautama, nor is the truth identical with his system. As simultaneously he was visible to men and Gods in a human body under the Bo tree, and was present in eternal, unchangeable, spiritual communion with the Absolute, so Buddha is at once the historical personages who have taught successively the truth to men, and the Absolute itself. . . . . The historical Gautama occupies a subordinate place since a way is opened for belief in many Buddhas, and salvation in Nirvana is replaced by the desire for the attainment of Buddhahood and absorption in the Absolute."*

"The two Vehicles indeed have many points of difference," says Knox. "The 'Little' has to do with only one Buddha, the historic Gautama, while the Greater Vehicle obscures his importance in a multitude of mythical Buddhas past and present and to come; the Little Vehicle sets forth Nirvana as the object of attainment, the Greater strives after Buddhahood, and teaches that each disciple may become like the Master and aid in the salvation of others; the Little Vehicle refuses to speak of the ultimate questions, and is a religion without a God or a soul, the Greater is metaphysical through and through, and sets up again these ontological entities. But

*Knox, *The Development of Religion in Japan,* page 97.

the chief difference, that in which all the rest converge, is in the doctrine of the Absolute. Gautama is represented as dissuading his disciples from seeking it, while in the Greater Vehicle its understanding is the end of endeavor, and believers are ever mindful of its presence behind the phenomenal world."*

The following is an old Buddhistic hymn descriptive of the bliss of one who has attained the state of Nirvana or Right Rapture:

"Blessed are we who hate not those who hate us;
Who among men full of hate, continue void of hate.
Blessed are we who dwell in health among the ailing;
Who among men weary and sick, continue well.
Blessed are we who dwell free from care among the care-worn,
Who among men full of worries continue calm.
Blessed indeed are we who have no hindrances,
Who shall become feeders on joy, like the Gods in their shrine of splendour."†

The new religion made rapid progress soon after its introduction into Japan. It brought with it the arts, handicrafts and vastly superior civilization of China. It built magnificent temples, introduced medicine, created dramatic poetry, imported an army of artists and skilled workmen of all sorts, and so

*Knox, *op. cit.*, pages 101-2.

†Cf. Nitobe, *The Japanese Nation*, page 148, and Rhys-Davids, *Buddhism*, page 171.

lifted the hitherto crude and semi-barbarous Japanese to a much higher stage of culture than they had ever dreamed of. By the year 621 many temples had already been built through the work of missionaries encouraged by the regent Shotuku. In 710 was founded the great monastery at Nara. In 754 the reigning Mikado and the Court were converted.

But there still remained the conversion of the great masses of the common people who clung to their native Shinto cult. This was accomplished by the priestly craft of the brilliant and learned monk Kobo Daishi, who also invented the Japanese *kana* or phonetic syllabary of forty-seven letters. Kobo obtained from the great goddess at Ise a revelation to the effect that all Shinto deities or *kami* are incarnations of Buddha. There was thus introduced into Japan early in the ninth century that form of Shinto or Mixed Buddhism known as *Riyobu,* which may be said to be the popular religion of Japan down to the present day. Except in a few places Shinto, as a religion, almost disappeared, and for almost a thousand years was little more than a mere mythology or "the shadow of a mythology."* Yet its soul or spirit survived, and it is difficult to say whether in the fusion process Buddhism was Shintoized or Shinto Buddhaized. The average Japanese appears to have given this matter no consideration, for he

*Griffis, *The Religion of Japan,* page 211.

continues to lead a double religious life without thought or fear of consequences.

However, there have been in Japan a number of revivals of Buddhism which have resulted in the formation of new schools or sects. As a result of the first of these movements, early in the ninth century, there were founded two great sects—the powerful Shingon Shu or Sect of the True Word, and the famous Tendai Sect. Though of Chinese origin, each represented a hospitable form of Japanized Buddhism, both accepting the Shinto deities as incarnations of Buddha.

The Shingon Sect, which is still one of the most popular, was introduced by Kobo Daishi in 806. "His system shows Buddha is the center of a world of ideas which exists behind and within the unreal world of appearances. The center of the world of ideas is Dai Nichi, identified by the common people with the sun, and around him are the four Buddhas of contemplation representing the highest abstractions, and around these group after group significant of genera and species, until the individual is reached. This is the 'diamond' world, unchanging and real, while the phenomenal world is also grouped around Dai Nichi, who is represented not now as the sun surrounded by four planets, but as the center of the lotus with eight Buddhas about him as petals. Thus he, or better IT, is the center of all things, real and phenomenal, and correspondingly there are two ways of salvation, by meditation and knowl-

edge, and by a righteous life. The end of the 'Way' is reached when perfect knowledge is attained and the individual is absorbed in the Infinite. In popular language we become Buddha. Thus was the historic Buddha himself absorbed, and as his individuality disappeared so has his distinctive teaching and glory, for he remains in the system only as one of the four Buddhas of contemplation, a symbol of the highest abstraction, one of the last ideas which remain before all is swallowed up in the Absolute."*

The Tendai Sect, parent of many sects, introduced by Dengyo in 805, is eclectic and highly metaphysical and combines various ways of salvation. It is no longer very numerous, continuing to live in its branches rather than in the parent stock. Its teachers have been called the Jesuits of Buddhism.

The Zen Sect, introduced in the twelfth century, the members of which have been referred to as the Quakers of Japanese Buddhism, is also highly metaphysical and contemplative. It seeks salvation mainly through meditation and suggestion. Its chief tenet reminds one strongly of one of the fundamental sayings of Christ: "Look carefully within and there you will find the Buddha." Though not numerous, the Zen priests and philosophers have exercised a great influence on Japanese thought and practical life, more particularly on the military class or Samurai, who practised *Bushido*.

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*Knox, *op. cit.*, page 99.

The great period of religious reformation in Japan was the twelfth century. In 1175 Honen founded the important Jodo or Pure Land Sect. In the midst of the mazes of Buddhistic sutras* and their eighty-four thousand doctrines, Honen discovered a new and simple path leading to the Western Paradise so ardently desired by many northern Buddhists to whom the Nirvana did not greatly appeal. According to the new teaching, metaphysical speculation and doctrinal controversy are unnecessary for salvation, which is obtained through the merits of Amida Buddha. There was thus introduced a Buddhistic doctrine of justification by faith somewhat analogous to that emphasized by Luther in Christian Europe.

There also appeared in the twelfth century perhaps the greatest of the Japanese religious reformers, Shinran, who founded the Shin Shu or True Sect of the Pure Land. This Japanese Luther was a radical who taught an extreme form of Buddhistic Protestantism both in theory and practice. He not only emphasized the doctrine of justification by faith through belief in Amida alone, but his followers, who have been called the Methodists of Buddhism, believe in sudden conversion and sanctifica-

*Near the large Japanese temples there may be found a large wooden bookcase which contains the 6,771 books of the Buddhistic canon. In lieu of reading these volumes, one may acquire merit by turning this case which revolves on a pivot—a device still simpler than Honen's discovery.

tion. They do not believe in fasts, pilgrimages, charms or other forms of religious magic so freely practised by most Buddhists. Like Luther, Shinran himself set the example of marriage for the clergy. Shin Shu is to-day the largest, most influential and active sect of Japanese Buddhism.*

In the thirteenth century was founded the Nichiren Sect by way of protest or reaction against the Shin and Jodo Sects. Nichiren was an ultra-patriotic and democratic saint who incorporated all possible Buddhistic superstitions and idolatries into his system. In contrast to the Pure Land Sects, he emphasized the importance of salvation by works, and his followers are for the most part very narrow and sectarian, refusing to intermarry with members of other sects and regarding themselves as the only true Buddhists. They are very noisy, superstitious and much given to pilgrimages. They have been called the Salvation Army or Ranters of Buddhism.

Within recent years there has developed a recrudescence of Buddhistic thought and activity, particularly among those of the Shin Sect. Opinions differ as to the value of this movement known as the New Buddhism, which seems to have been inspired by modern science and Christian activities. Dr. Sawayanaga, for example, thinks that, though

*In 1912 it had 19,620 temples and 15,781 priests as compared with 14,225 temples and 10,452 priests of the Soto or sub-Jodo Sect. See tables on page 225 of *Japan Year Book* for 1915.

founded on the idea of progress, it has failed to make much progress along social lines. The young men, even if educated at the universities, are not equal to the old priests. Buddhism has been crowded out by the higher education. This is perhaps the opinion of a conservative. Dr. Takakusa is more optimistic. He considers the new religion ethical, practical and philosophical as compared with the formalism, superstition, idle speculation and theological dogmatism of the orthodox Buddhism. Dr. Murakana complains that the new Buddhists have no message for the old, ignorant and the weary-laden.* Dr. Kato is pessimistic. His finding is that Buddhism is in a pitiable condition and that within recent years it has gone from bad to worse. The fault is not, he says, with Buddhism, which as a religion is superior to Christianity, but with its priests, who are greatly inferior to Christian pastors. Dr. Inoue represents the new sect as a powerful body doing good work; and, like the new Christianity, is engaged in preaching ethics, charity and various kinds of social reform.

On the whole, it may be said that Japanese Buddhism, though considerably weakened by its contact with modern science and Christianity, is by no means moribund or hopelessly debased, as seems to be the case in China. In its purer or mixed forms, it is

*These opinions are gathered from the Religious Summaries in the *Japan Mail* (weekly) for 1910-12.

still the predominant religion of the middle and lower classes, and the Shin Sect in particular is showing signs of increasing regeneration and activity. For some years Buddhist priests have taken an active interest in education and social reforms, more especially in charity and prison reform. Vast sums have been collected for temple building, though it might be supposed that the publicity given to the Hangwanji temple scandal of 1914* would tend to discourage such contributions. There have also been recent attempts to revive Buddhistic propaganda in Thibet, Central Asia and China.†

Buddhistic services are conducted in the army, at factories and among the poor; while associations in imitation of such organizations as the Y. M. C. A. are being organized. Buddhists have also established Sunday-schools, temperance and reform societies, orphan asylums, deaf and dumb schools, hospitals, prisoners'-aid-societies and free lodging houses. They have also founded mission schools, even for women and young girls; they are educating many of their young priests in Western science

*For the main facts of this disgraceful scandal, see *Japan Year Book* for 1915, page 225.

†In its weekly issue dated July 17, 1915, the *Japan Mail* reports that some thirty representatives of the various Buddhistic sects of Japan were shortly to visit China under the auspices of the Buddhist Club for the purpose of promoting a complete understanding between the Buddhists of the two countries. The Japanese demands on China in May, 1915, included a provision for Buddhistic propaganda.

and philosophy and at the universities; they are publishing and distributing many pamphlets and magazines, not to mention translations of their own sacred writings. We have been told that they have even appropriated the Sermon on the Mount and other Christian writings, as well as imitated such forms of Christian activities as sermons, revivals and so forth. We may yet see a form of Christianized Buddhism or Buddhaized Christianity.*

III

Confucianism† appears to have entered Japan through Korea at about the end of the fourth century, A. D., though it does not seem to have exerted

*For many of these facts, we are indebted to Rev. A. K. Reischauer, a profound student of Japanese Buddhism.

†Confucianism is usually referred to as an ethical system rather than a religion. This is true in one sense, yet it is also true that this ethical system has some of the characteristics of religion. In most religions (including many forms of Christianity) worship plays the leading rôle, and ethics is relegated to a more or less subordinate place. In Confucianism this relation is reversed. Confucius and his followers were indifferent to worship, but recognized the existence of dieties and demons who were to be reverenced, though kept at a distance. But Confucius accepted and encouraged the worship of ancestors. The religious character of Confucianism is, however, especially shown by its attitude toward Heaven which plays the rôle of a Providence like the Christian God, the German Emperor or the Japanese Mikado. See Knox, *op. cit.*, lecture 6.

a great influence prior to the seventh century, when a Central University was established at Kyoto, together with schools in the provinces where Chinese text-books were used. During the seventh, eighth and ninth centuries there were direct and continuous communications with China, and numerous scholars wrote Chinese verse and prose or lectured on the Confucian classics; but, owing to the subsequent cessation of official relations, Chinese learning and civilization in Japan suffered a decline during and after the tenth century.

However, these blessings were revived during the thirteenth century through the introduction, by priests of the Zen Sect and others, of the so-called Sung school* of Confucian learning which arose in

*"This branch of Confucianism is a system of thought founded by the Ch'ing brothers and Chutsze and other scholars of the Sung dynasty. It is elaborated on the dualistic basis of *ri* and *ki* (the former indicating the naturally existent idealistic principle and the latter the materialistic principle). In this respect its scope of study is far removed from that of the original Confucianism. . . . During the Sui and Tang dynasties, Buddhism predominated throughout the Chinese Empire, and eventually almost stifled Confucianism. . . . Among a great many Confucianists of the Sung dynasty, Chutsze (1130-1200), above all, grasped the spirit of Buddhism, and using it as a framework, clothed it with the flesh and blood of Confucianism, and thus evolved the theory of the dualism of *ri* and *ki* above referred to. It was largely due to his strenuous efforts that vitality was restored once again to decadent Confucianism. . . . This Sung school of learning, introduced into Japan . . . brought vitality to the Confucianism of the day, and qualified it to be taken for a standard of

China during the twelfth century and exerted a powerful influence upon subsequent Chinese and Japanese cultural development. It was particularly that form of revived Chinese Confucianism known as the Shushi philosophy which attracted Iyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate during the early part of the seventeenth century, who made it the authorized system of education.*

Iyeyasu's attraction for the Shushi philosophy seems to have been due to its emphasis upon the virtue of obedience. Yet he was himself a good deal of a philosopher, as shown by the following oft-quoted passage from his pithy sayings:

"Life is like unto a long journey with a heavy burden. Let thy step be slow and steady, that thou stumble not. Persuade thyself that imperfection and inconvenience is the nature of mortals, and there will be no room for discontent, neither for despair. When ambitious desires arise in the heart recall the days of extremity thou last passed through. Forbearance is the root of quietness and assurance forever. Look upon wrath as thy enemy. If thou

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moral conduct."—Prof. Inouye, in Okuma's *Fifty Years of Japan*, volume II, pages 46-47.

*"The system he [Iyeyasu] encouraged was established by Shushi (Choo He), a Chinese, who was born in 1130 and died in 1200. Shushi was also a statesman, an historian, and a philosopher. He succeeded in organizing a system of thought which claimed to be Confucian, but was in reality a new system based on the teachings of the Confucian classics and influenced by Buddhism and Taoism." Armstrong, *Light from the East*, page 35.

knowest only what it is to conquer, and knowest not what it is to be defeated, woe unto thee; it will fare ill with thee. Find fault with thyself rather than with others."

It was during the period of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867) that Confucianism reached its highest point of development and exercised its most powerful influence in Japan. The principles of the various schools of the Sung learning, as taught by a long line of able scholars and educators, were generally accepted by the upper classes of Japanese society. Confucian education formed the character of the ruling and warrior classes of this period, the *Bushido* practised by the Samurai being essentially a modified form of Confucianism; and, though this ethical and religious system has suffered a great decline during the Meiji period of Enlightenment, the majority of the creators of New Japan were Confucianists. Consequently the soul or spirit of Confucianism still largely permeates the educational system of Japan, influences the outlook of the Japanese mind and controls the habits of the people, more especially within the domain of domestic or family life.

IV

Bushido, meaning literally Military-Knight-Ways, is a form of Oriental stoicism. It has been defined as "a code of morals which enjoins loyalty, courage, self-control, honor, moderation, a sense of jus-

tice and shame, politeness, sincerity and benevolence." Like European chivalry, it was a product of feudalism, but it lacked the individualistic tendencies and chivalrous attitude toward women of its Western counterpart. Its central principles were a sense of honor and loyalty to superiors. Though *Bushido* was formerly the particular possession of the Samurai class, it has, doubtless in a form greatly attenuated, become the property of the whole nation. It still exerts a powerful influence, especially in the form of loyalty to the reigning dynasty.

In the process of acclimatization into Japan, Chinese Confucianism, like all things foreign, underwent considerable modification, yet retained its essential characteristics.

The fundamental social teaching of Confucius and his followers is that of the five relationships and the resulting five essential virtues. These virtues are humanity or benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and sincerity. The five relationships are the relation between ruler and ruled, involving loyalty; that of parent and child, enjoining filial piety; that of husband and wife implying a reciprocal observance of the duties of benevolence and obedience; that between the elder and younger brother, and the relation between friends, necessitating mutual fidelity.

In the Chinese system the paramount relation is that between parent and child, involving the practice of humanity or benevolence and filial piety.

"The great precept of humanity is 'Subdue thyself and return to propriety.' It is to behave abroad as if receiving a guest, to employ the people as if assisting at a great sacrifice, not to do to others as you would not have them do to you, and to have no murmuring against you in the country or in the family. Thus loyalty is the chief expression of humanity, though it may be practised towards inferiors and friends and generally in the service of others. It includes dignity, reverence, indulgence, sincerity, earnestness and kindness. The superior man never forsakes it, but obtains his name by it, and in all emergencies cleaves to it. But no inferior man possesses it."*

In Japan, on the other hand, the loyalty which was emphasized was that of obedience to superiors. Filial piety or obedience to and reverence for parents is also emphasized, but is subordinated in the Samurai code of *Bushido* to loyalty to feudal superiors. Confucius exalted courage, but it was moral courage rather than the martial valor of the warrior. In Japan moral bravery was transmuted into the military virtues desirable in a race of warriors.

Confucianism has practically lost its hold even upon the intellectual classes of Japan, though its humanitarian and ethical principles are deeply implanted in their minds and characters. Some of its spirit and much of its teaching may even be said

*Knox, *Religion in Japan,* page 145.

to have formed a part of Japanese education both in the home and in the school and thus to have permeated the nation at large. Within recent years there has also been a more or less conscious revival of Confucianism through the establishment of Confucian societies, but they have not excited much interest. Many of the intellectuals of Japan still profess Confucianism in a somewhat lukewarm fashion.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGION IN JAPAN—CHRISTIANITY

I

CHRISTIANITY was introduced into Japan in the middle of the sixteenth century* by Jesuits working under Portuguese auspices. Though progress was somewhat slow at the outset, the seed sown did not fall on stony ground. Fertilized by commercial motives, it soon brought forth a good harvest, especially among the daimios and their retainers of Kiushiu. Within a generation, the Jesuits could boast of one hundred and fifty thousand converts, perhaps

*The famous Spanish missionary to the Indies, Francis Xavier, landed at Kagoshimo in August, 1549. He was not very successful in this new field, having made less than one thousand converts, mainly in the southern island of Kiushiu, during his stay of twenty-six months in the country. His journey to Kyoto was wholly fruitless from a religious point of view. He soon discovered that one of the main impediments to the adoption of Christianity by the educated Japanese was that the "Chinese had evidently heard nothing about a personal Creator." He therefore determined upon his futile mission to China under the impression that "if the Chinese adopt the Christian religion the Japanese also will abandon the religions they have introduced from China." He died near Canton on December 2, 1552. The citations are from Murdock's *History of Japan,* volume II, page 64.

one per cent. of the population. The eagerness of the local princelets for the Portuguese trade vastly aided the work of the Jesuit missionaries, who proceeded to convert the rulers and then persuaded them "to proscribe all non-Christian cults within their domains. In some cases only a day's notice was granted for those who would not adopt the foreign religion to quit their ancestral homes, the images of Buddha were hacked to pieces and the native temples given over to the flames."*

At the time of his assassination in 1582 the celebrated Nobunaga, the leading feudal chieftain of Japan, still treated the Jesuits with marked favor. Nobunaga's successor, Hideyoshi (a great ruler who made himself master of Japan before his death in 1598, effected the temporary subjugation of Korea, and even aspired to the conquest of China), also favored the missionaries during the first five years of his reign. But having had his attention called to the fact that the Jesuits were devoting most of their time to the conversion of men of noble birth, he became suspicious, and began to fear that the *"propagation of the faith would be prejudicial to the safety of the Empire."*†

*Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*, page 323. For details, see Murdoch, *op. cit.*, chapter 3.

†This is also the main key to the subsequent persecution of the Christians by Iyeyasu and his successors. The citation in italics is from the missionary Froez's famous *Narrative of the Death of the Twenty-six Crucified*, written in 1597, the year of this tragic event.

Hideyoshi's first "bolt from the blue" came in 1587, when he suddenly issued an edict ordering all foreign priests to leave Japan within twenty days. But the order was not fully executed, and Hideyoshi withheld his hand until 1597, when he ordered the arrest and crucifixion of six Franciscans, three Japanese Jesuits and seventeen Japanese Christians (mostly domestics of the Franciscans), who were conducting a religious propaganda in defiance of his orders and their express pledges.

It is said that this outburst of fury on the part of Hideyoshi was due to an incident which is worth relating because of the light it throws upon the situation. Toward the end of 1596 a richly-laden Spanish galleon called the *San Felipe* had been stranded on the Japanese coast and her valuable cargo confiscated in accordance with Japanese law. In his desire to impress the local authorities, the pilot of the vessel—to quote the ecclesiastical historian Charlevoix, "inflicted a wound on religion which is still bleeding." He produced a map of the world and pointed out the vast extent of the Spanish dominions. On being asked how it was that so many countries had been brought under the rule of one man, he replied:

"Our Kings began by sending into the countries they wanted to conquer priests who induced the people to embrace our religion; and when they have made considerable progress troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our

Kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest."*

Like his great predecessor Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu, founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate, being eager for foreign trade, tolerated the foreign priests during the early years of his rule. But, whether wearied at last by the unseemly squabbles between the Jesuits and Franciscans, who omitted no opportunity to calumniate each other, or whether convinced that the Christians were conspiring against the Government, Iyeyasu instituted a change of policy and early in 1614 ordered the suppression of Christianity and the deportation of all foreign priests.

It should, however, be noted that during Iyeyasu's lifetime, not a single European missionary was executed. The first executions of foreign priests occurred in 1617, i. e., a year after Iyeyasu's death. Iyeyasu was well informed regarding contemporary events in Europe. This we know from his conversations with Will Adams, an English pilot in the Dutch service who was in high favor with the Shogun during the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Iyeyasu is even said to have sent an emissary

*Murdoch, volume II, pages 287-88. Chamberlain, who also relates this incident in briefer form justly observes (*Things Japanese,* page 325 n.): "History repeats itself; for the conduct of Europe towards China in our own day exhibits precisely the same medley of genuine piety on the part of the missionaries, and shameless aggression on the part of the countries which send them out."

to Europe to study the customs and institutions of Christians at home. In view of the conditions in Europe at this time, it can hardly be a matter of surprise that his report was highly unfavorable.

The edict of 1614 marks the beginning of a war to the death between Christianity and the Japanese Government, a struggle which resulted in the practical extinction of Christianity after the Christian Shinabara Revolt of 1637-38 and the exclusion of the Portuguese,* who were suspected of having fomented the revolt. During this period there was placed upon the public notice-boards of Japanese roadsides and villages the following inscription:

"So long as the Sun shall warm the earth let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that the King of Spain himself, or the Christian's God, or the great God of all, if he violates this command shall pay for it with his head."

II

The policy of suppression was officially maintained until 1873, when the prohibition of Christian worship and teaching was revoked, though the prac-

*The Spaniards were excluded in 1624. Three years earlier all Japanese had been forbidden to leave the country. Nearly three hundred thousand Christians were massacred, suffered martyrdom, or were forced to recant; and at the close of this rebellion the ports and coasts of Japan were sealed to all foreigners except to the Chinese and a few Dutch traders who were permitted to reside and trade in semi-captivity on the island of Deshima near Nagasaki.

tice of strict exclusion in matters of trade had been abandoned twenty years earlier (1853-4), when Commodore Perry's squadron had begun to pry open the doors of Japan.

The first Protestant missions were established in 1859 under American auspices and the first modern Catholic mission in 1864. Progress was naturally slow at first, and by 1872 no more than ten converts had been baptized, but the number of converts increased rapidly during the decade from 1878 to 1888. Then set in a period of reaction, due largely to the failure of treaty revision, which considerably retarded the growth of Christianity in Japan. Since then so-called Christian activities have considerably broadened and deepened in scope and intensity, but the results measured by the number of churches and converts can hardly be a source of unmitigated satisfaction to zealous workers and their supporters.*

*The statistics of Christian Churches in Japan for 1913 published in the *Japan Year Book* for 1915 (page 228) give a total of 1,356 churches, 2,255 Japanese and foreign pastors, and 164,054 believers as compared with 1,731 churches, 2,198 native ministers and foreign missionaries (including, in this case, their wives), and 192,573 members in 1909. (See *Japan Year Book* for 1913, page 93.) During this same period the number of Roman Catholic churches had apparently decreased from 232 to 189 and of Russo-Greek from 265 to 131. Of the 164,054 communicants in 1913, 65,615 are registered as Roman Catholic, 14,206 as Russo-Greek, 21,018 as Nippon Kristo, 13,356 as Japan Methodist, etc. There were 1,506 Japanese pastors as compared with 749 foreign missionaries.

There seems also to have been a deterioration in the quality of the native (Japanese) ministry. Galen M. Fisher,

The causes of the retardation or comparative failure of the Christian movement in Japan are many and various. They are probably to be found primarily in the characteristics and institutions of the Japanese people rather than in any lack of devotion or wrong method of propaganda on the part of the missionaries.

In the first place, the present-day Japanese are extremely patriotic—not to say chauvinistic. The "Soul of Japan," the *Yamato Damashi,* still beats strongly in the Japanese breast. Rooted in ancestor- and Mikado-worship and wedded to old or hallowed customs, this old Japan spirit is instinctively hostile to things foreign, more particularly to those of a religious nature. And many of the emphatic issues of Western morality have hitherto been considered of secondary importance in the old code of Japan.

During the early Westernizing period, which lasted, roughly speaking, from 1870 to 1885, Christianity shared in the enthusiasm for things Occidental, which pervaded many Japanese circles. Cer-

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Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. in Japan, sounds the following warning: "A generation ago the Christian ministry was the leader in all departments of progressive thought and activity, but to-day it is but a camp follower. . . . The rising roar of materialistic development and the loud voice of irreligious and anti-Christian thought are threatening to drown out the voice of the Christian pulpit." The *Christian Movement in Japan* for 1913, page 30. *Cf.* D. B. Schneder on "Christian Education in Japan" in the *Christian Movement* for 1912, pages 66-67.

tain leading publicists and educationalists—among them the famous Fukuzawa—even advocated the profession of Christianity as a means of winning the good-will of foreigners. "Granted," said these counselors, "that the Christian dogmas are a bitter pill to swallow, let the pill be swallowed without chewing, for the sake of its after effects."*

III

Religious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution, and the Japanese Government has always wisely insisted that the public schools be free from all sectarian intrusion. It has, to a certain extent, even discouraged the teaching of religion in private schools. On the whole it must be said that the attitude of the Japanese bureaucracy (including that of

*Cited from Walter Dening, *Japanese Modern Literature,* page 171, in the *Transaction of the Asiatic Society of Japan,* volume XLI, part I (1913). Mr. Dening adds: "In giving this advice, Mr. Fukuzawa was careful to let it be known that he himself took no interest in religion whatever. . . . Religion is very much like a garment (to a typical Japanese like Mr. Fukuzawa) to be put on or taken off as expediency dictates." Mr. Dening also cites Dr. Kato, one of Japan's leading philosophers during the Meiji period, as saying: "If asked what are my own views on religion, I reply that I dislike all religions equally and resort to philosophy. Religion is not needed for educated people. But the majority of people are not educated. It is for these that religion is designed." This was said in the course of an argument in favor of the teaching of religion in government schools.

the Department of Education) is decidedly cold toward all religion, and more particularly toward Christianity. This is no mean obstacle to religious propaganda in a country where the people are greatly influenced by the views and temper of the official class. One reason for this attitude is the undoubted suspicion that loyalty to the throne may be undermined and nationalism endangered by Christian teaching.

Another reason for the relative failure of the Christian propaganda has been found in the utilitarian character of the Japanese mind. We frequently hear it said by Japanese themselves that their fellow-countrymen are wanting in enthusiasm for truth for its own sake. Whether this is a racial characteristic or a mere stage in their historical development it is impossible to say, but it seems to be a pure assumption to claim that the possession of such a quality would favor the spread of "Christian truth."

One unquestionable source of confusion to the Japanese seeker after religious "truth" has been the many conflicting voices calling to him from the West. Not only are there more or less conflicting doctrines of the various sects, but the intelligent and diligent inquirer must soon have discovered that the Western nations were not really Christian in theory or practice. It was not merely that the merchants, sailors and tourists with whom he came in contact failed in the practice of the Chris-

tian virtues, but an impartial study of the history of the so-called Christian civilization of the West must have convinced him that, in marked contrast to the printed Gospel, its historical pages were steeped in corruption and bloodshed.

Not merely this, but obviously leaders of Western thought had long since begun to doubt the truth of much that was taught and printed concerning their religious teachings. There were the eighteenth century deists like Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu; the English utilitarians like Hume, Mill and Bentham; the evolutionists like Darwin, Spencer and Huxley; and finally the higher critics like Strauss, Bauer and Renen.

Then there were the materialistic tendencies of the age which turned the energies and interests of men into commercial and industrial channels. There were also the problems of politics and diplomacy which had a superior attraction for the youth of Japan.

Some of the leaders of Japanese thought rallied to the defense of old Japanese ideals and teachings. Dr. Inoue, for example, in the interest of nationalism and conservatism, made several severe attacks on Christianity; Sewayanagi defended the practice of loyalty and filial piety as the true basis of Japanese morality; Dr. Kato applied the doctrine of evolution to Confucian ethics; and Professor Anezaki began to present a new interpretation of Buddhism in supposed harmony with the teachings of

modern science and philosophy. Says Dr. Gulick,* a leading Christian missionary:

"The Christianization of Japan is an enterprise the magnitude of which probably no one adequately appreciates. It involves not only the presentation of the Gospel to the forty or fifty millions who have not as yet heard it,—that were a relatively easy thing to do,—it involves in addition the thoroughgoing discussion of the respective postulates of Buddhist, Confucian, Shinto and Christian faiths. Convincing evidence must be offered of the superiority of Christianity in providing rational foundation for moral and spiritual life. As yet it can not be said that the great debate between Christianity and the other faiths in regard to fundamentals has more than begun. The thoughtful men of the nation, its university professors and political leaders, are saying with practical unanimity that, while Christian morality is excellent in daily life, Christian philosophy and metaphysics are weak and Christian ethical theories insufficiently grounded.

"Although it is beyond question that Western democratic civilization has influenced Japan profoundly and brought her into harmony with Christian principles in many important respects, yet it is also true that the Christian view of the universe and of men is either unknown to, or consciously rejected by, the vast majority of her educated men. They profess either agnosticism, like so many in the West, or Buddhism, which means usually a vague, pantheistic philosophy. To Christianize Japan, her thoughtful leaders must be brought to see the ra-

*Cited in the *Christian Movement* for 1913, pages 165 ff.

tional and moral weakness inherent in Buddhism and the superiority of Christianity in these respects, and also to accept personally the moral and spiritual leadership of Jesus."*

IV

Many of the Japanese Christians seek to free themselves from the influence or control of foreign missionaries; some have backslid; others are merely nominally Christian; many advocate what they call a Japanized or Japanicized Christianity. Naturally we ask what is meant by a Japanized Christianity?

In the first place, what is most ardently desired is apparently a Christianity free from foreign influence or control—a national or independent church. The Japanese have been remarkably free from sectarian differences and hostilities. Even the antipathy which once existed between Buddhists and

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*Dr. Gulick adds: "In the divine Providence, Japan has been brought to a unique place among the non-Christian nations. She first of them all is attempting to establish a civilization practically Christian. But she is attempting this without accepting either the underlying postulates or the conscious faith on which that civilization has been built." This tribute is perhaps unique as coming from a foreign missionary. But the assumption which Dr. Gulick and so many other missionaries make that "constitutional government, popular education, daily press, publishing houses, modern jurisprudence, postal and telegraph systems," etc., are essentially Christian, seems strained, to say the least.

Shintoists on the one hand and Christians on the other has largely disappeared. The Japanese are naturally tolerant and, with the exception of certain sects like the Nicheren, are fairly free from all forms of religious bigotry or fanaticism.

The Japanese attach little importance to matters of creed or doctrinal differences of any sort. They are not strongly attached to fixed beliefs or orthodoxies of any kind. Many of them have accepted what in Western America at least would be regarded as the most radical, if not heretical, teaching. For example, the Reverend Ibuka, principal of the *Meiji Gakiun,** an important Presbyterian college in Tokyo, in speaking of the changes in incentive to mission work, is reported to have said that Japanese Christians had dropped from their vocabularies such words as heaven, hell, the future life, eternity and the soul. For these they have substituted such words as home, character, society, love and social reform. Whereas formerly it was the object of mission work to save men from eternal punishment, its purpose now is to civilize those who are still uncivilized.

The claim is frequently made that just as this people have modified and adapted Buddhism to their spiritual needs, largely ignoring its pessimism, asceticism and spirit of other worldliness; so they

*See *Japan Mail* (weekly) for May 28, 1910. For similar expressions, see Lawton, *The Empires of the East,* volume I, chapter xxiv.

are free to Japanicize Christianity, rejecting the latter's theology, strange doctrines, mysteries and superstitions. Is it not the mission of the Japanese to fuse and harmonize everything—to accept the good and reject the evil in all things?

It is not true, as sometimes claimed, that the Japanese are irreligious or even indifferent in their attitude toward things religious, though it seems to be a fact that in this as in other respects they are, like the Chinese, very pragmatic. Truth and virtue appear to this people primarily as means of national development rather than as ends in themselves. Because of dissatisfaction with moral, social and political conditions, there has been manifest during recent years a desire for a new or improved religion. It is claimed that there are a large number of non-affiliated Christians who have accepted Christ as a sort of moral or spiritual guide and who seek to practise His gospel as embodied in the Sermon on the Mount, much as a Roman of the Stoic School might be supposed to have regarded himself as a follower of Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius. There are many others who try to combine the best of the teachings of Buddha, Christ and Confucius as a source of inspiration or a guide to conduct.

An interesting attempt to aid in "breaking down the barriers of race and nationality," encourage a "better understanding between the East and the West" and "promote the progress of civilization by international co-operation" is that inaugurated by

the *Association Concordia,* formed in 1913, and including in its membership a number of the most eminent publicists and men of action in Japan as well as a few distinguished foreign missionaries. The object of this organization, as explained in the prospectus, is not to fuse the religions of the Orient and Occident or to propagate personal views or particular faiths; "its sole aim is to study the thought of the world, whether ancient or modern, Eastern or Western, in a spirit of fairness and candor, and thus to foster a deeper mutual sympathy and respect on the part of the representatives of the two great civilizations which, as has been said, are destined to flow together in one mighty current."

The first enterprise of the association, so it was announced several years ago, was to have been the publication of a review "devoted to the study of the various problems in the fields of religion, philosophy, ethics, sociology, education, literature, etc." Plans were also formulated to give lecture courses, for the publication of various sorts of literature, for opening the way for the interchange of visits of distinguished scholars representing the best thought of the East and the West, and for international conferences.

V

But we would not wish to be understood as maintaining that the Christian movement in Japan has wholly failed. If it has not been as successful as in

Korea, that has been mainly due to less favorable conditions, such as the greater strength of Buddhism and the spirit of nationalism. But even in Japan the leaven of Christianity, the work of the numerous missions, and the influence of leading missionaries is still a powerful influence for good, more especially in the fields of education and social reform.

The pioneer work of such men as Brown, Hepburn, Verbeck, Williams and Dr. Greene can never be forgotten. The founding of Doshisha University by Dr. Nakamura was particularly important. The educational work of the numerous mission schools, more especially in calling the attention of the Japanese to the importance of education for girls, has been of the highest value. In fact, the modern missionary of the best type in Japan, as, indeed throughout the Orient generally, is essentially an educator —an envoy of the West to the East, representing certain intellectual and spiritual ideals of Western civilization which are largely misrepresented by its commercial and official representatives. This educational rôle of the missionaries is too frequently overlooked by many of those who have little sympathy with, or perhaps appreciation of, some of their purely religious or propagandist activities.

In one field—that of social welfare work—the missionaries have an almost virgin field—an opportunity for cultivation too little appreciated even by themselves or their supporters. The Japanese have

been very slow to see the importance of such work. Until quite recently, for example, lepers have everywhere obtruded themselves upon the public in Japan. It was left for a Christian woman, a Miss Riddell, to begin in 1890 the application of a proper remedy —lepers' hospitals—to this state of affairs. Many other forms of social welfare work, such as orphanages, schools for the blind, deaf and dumb, homes for discharged prisoners, maternity hospitals and kindergartens owe there inception to Christian workers.

The Japanese Y. M. C. A., though not comparable in the extent of its educational and other activities with that of China, is doing excellent work, more especially in establishing much needed student homes or hotels in some of the leading educational centers, including the Imperial University at Tokyo. The Y. W. C. A. is similarly engaged in Bible study and establishing hostels for girls. The W. C. T. U., under Christian auspices, is devoting itself to the reform of abandoned women and many other kinds of social service, as well as to temperance propaganda. The Salvation Army, backed by Christian workers in general, has conducted several vigorous campaigns against the social evil, more particularly against the notoriously disgraceful conditions existing in the Yoshiwara or licensed quarter of Tokyo. Taken as a whole, the Christian workers of Japan are becoming more alive to the importance of social welfare work as well as the salvation of

the individual soul, and are beginning to feel the need of trained social workers in the various fields of activity. Some of them are even turning their attention to the wretched conditions of factory life, and are urging remedial or preventive legislation. In other words, they are beginning to see that in the modern industrial world Christianity of the old individualistic type must be supplemented by a knowledge of social conditions and environment, and that scientific method, diagnosis and prescription are as necessary in the work of prevention and cure as are the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love.

CHAPTER VIII

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN

I

With the awakening of Japan and her struggle for international recognition arose the need for expanding trade and for industrial readjustment. Japan realized that in order to develop her people and country along progressive lines she must create possibilities for greater well-being. If she wished to build schools and railroads and maintain a substantial army and navy, the people must pay for them. Obviously more wealth must be created. This could not be accomplished merely by developing domestic trade; foreign commerce must be developed as well. So in order that she might keep pace with her other lines of progress Japan plunged into industrial activity and the struggle for world markets. Scores of foreign mechanical engineers and experts were employed by the Government to teach the people methods of organizing business and of exploiting their natural resources and mechanical arts. Hundreds of students were sent to Europe and America to study Occidental methods of forestry, mining, manufacturing, shipbuilding and business organization. In the course of a few years

this accumulation of knowledge was applied to the industrial readjustment of Japan.

Meanwhile the Japanese Government fostered industrial initiative and enterprise; in short, anything that would enable capital quickly to develop native industries and to force an opening into the world markets was encouraged.

The results were stupendous. The mining of coal, zinc, copper, sulphur, magnesia and other ores and metals was prosecuted vigorously. Laws governing the exploitation of these products were passed. Docks, harbors and an adequate fleet of merchant vessels were built, largely by private capital. In order to assure and encourage a marine business, merchant vessels were subsidized by the Government with the stipulation that such vessels be put in the service of the Government in case of war. Furthermore, manufactories, great and small, equipped with Western machinery, sprang up mushroom-like all over Japan, so that we have to-day a unique situation paralleled probably nowhere else in the world. Side by side with established modern machine methods combined with the soulless scramble in competitive trade, one still sees the widespread use of the hand-loom and other primitive implements for spinning, weaving, dyeing and designing. In fact, while the foreign trade of Japan is almost wholly in machine-made articles, a universal demand perseveres among all classes of the Japanese themselves for new and original patterns, weaves and color combinations

which will doubtless preserve the hand-looms and the hand-made articles for years to come.

Yet withal, in her larger industrial development, Japan has had serious handicaps, inasmuch as she has very little skilled labor, comparatively little iron and produces no wool or cotton. This implies the importation of vast quantities of machinery, pig iron and all her cotton and wool and many other raw materials; also the necessity of competing in the world markets with products made by more skilled hands and better paid labor than her own. In a word, Japan is self-supporting only in the preparation of her national liquors, in soya brewing and the manufacture of silk, matches, porcelains and a few other articles; while her factories, mining, printing and many other trades are still worked with foreign machinery.

II

The two most important minerals of Japan are coal and copper. There are large deposits of anthracite, although a brown bituminous of good quality is the predominant coal. With the acquisition of certain rights in Manchuria, Japan has added other rich deposits, so that according to her geological surveys her complete supply of coal is enormous; her annual output averaging now over twenty-one million tons.

Copper is also abundant and is now being mined

in every district in the country. The total output annually approaches forty-three million yen in value. Japan to-day ranks third among copper-producing nations.

Petroleum and sulphur are perhaps second in importance. While the present yield of petroleum is not extensive, due to inadequate capitalization and prospecting, yet the survey has revealed a narrow petroliferous strata extending throughout the country following the western coast of islands from Karafuto to Taiwan.

Sulphur would naturally be found in a volcanic country like Japan, and it has been one of her oldest exports, having been shipped to Holland and China as early as the fifteenth century.

Gold and silver are also fairly abundant. The total annual yield of gold amounts to over seven billion yen, while silver does not exceed fifty-one million, though the output of both is steadily increasing.

Zinc, and a small amount of lead and tin, are found, but for lack of suitable smelting machinery the zinc ores have been shipped to Germany for refining.

Iron is also found, but in quantities wholly insufficient to supply the pressing needs of Japan, amounting only to about three and one-half million annually. Thus far the bulk of her raw material for producing pig iron has been imported from the Taiyo mines in China. The urgent demand for

this raw material accounts partly for Japan's keen desire to acquire a foothold in China.

Thus it may readily be seen that the exploitation of the minerals and metals of Japan has kept abreast of her other industrial activities. There are now in the country about 9,500 mines and about 229,308 mine workers. While Japan has prosecuted her mining with considerable vigor, she has also made wise, legal provisions and established a system of inspection which conserves her natural resources most carefully.

Under these laws the owner of the land does not own the mineral rights. Such rights belong to the State. The right of prospecting is granted to the first applicant. A land owner in default of applying first for prospecting privileges may be supplanted on his own land by another.

The privilege of mining may not extend over less than forty-one acres and more than eight hundred and twenty acres. Prospecting rights are granted for two years from the date of registration. A mine in operation pays an annual tax of one per cent. on the value of the products, excepting gold, silver and iron ores.

When mining operations interfere with the owner's use of the surface, a certain amount of land is requisitioned for the use of the concessionaire, who in turn must lease the surface; or if the owner so desires, the concessionaire must purchase the use of the land he requires for not less than three years.

In case of disputes arising they must be submitted to the mining inspector. Should his decision be regarded as unsatisfactory, an appeal may be made by the parties concerned to the Minister of Agriculture, or in case of further disputes, to the ordinary courts of law.

Five mining inspection offices have been established which exercise control over such matters as ventilation, construction and the use of explosives. Each concessionaire must prepare and submit to the inspection office a set of rules for his workmen, stating the number of working hours, the nature of the work, the scale of compensation in case of injury, etc. This is to prevent harsh treatment of the workmen by the employers and thus to lessen the chances of disturbances.

Until 1900 a foreigner was not permitted to participate in a mining venture. Since then a foreigner enjoys equal privileges with a native if the company is formed by native Japanese. However, the mining regulations of 1905 empower the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce to grant, cancel or suspend mining or prospecting rights and also to delegate part of his authority to the mine inspection officials.

Although some of the mining in Japan is established and conducted in a first class up-to-date manner, much is still belated and inefficient, due to the use of antiquated machinery and to the lack of capital to develop the mine properties.

III

In her process of industrial expansion Japan has developed and improved many other industries besides mining. Forestry and fishing of every variety have been encouraged. At present no less than a million families are engaged in the various fishing enterprises. In 1897 the Government took over the Fishing Training School established by the Japanese Fishing Association, and since then has done much to instruct and train those engaged in this industry.

In matters of forestry and re-forestration Japan has been no less alert and progressive. The Japanese have always guarded their forests. Perhaps no other people in the world has such an innate love of trees, such a sympathetic appreciation of their beauty, and the quality of the various woods, their grain and their possible utility. Since a very early period the Japanese have been taught to safeguard their forests, and they have not been allowed to cut recklessly or without special permission. Early forest laws were passed both by the provincial governors and by the Central Government as well. Commissioners of forestry and subordinate officials were appointed who oversaw the cutting of timber and the replanting of saplings when trees were cut.

During the struggles of the Middle Ages the contending factions often resorted to fire or pillage, although the forests in which temples or shrines had been built were usually respected; consequently, tem-

ples and shrines were commonly built with a view to keeping the forests sacred and to protecting them from all forms of abuses. Doubtless this attitude of respect for the woods and trees has subtly influenced and helped to mould the Japanese character.

At present the wooded land of Japan constitutes about seventy per cent. of the entire area or 54,164,786 acres, and over half of it is owned by the State. Much of this forest is more or less inaccessible, due to the very mountainous nature of the country.

Previous to the Restoration of 1868 all effort was directed toward preserving the forests in their primitive state, but with the sudden and steadily growing demands for timber in shipbuilding, railroad supplies, telephone and telegraph poles, there resulted some reckless cutting. However, the Government proceeded promptly to correct or regulate this abuse and to study more scientific methods of conservation, replanting, and the utilization of the by-products of the forests. Trees have been planted to prevent soil denudation, sand shifting, floods, avalanches and as a means of protection against winds and tides; also as a means of feeding springs, attracting fish and to compose "scenery." Scientific methods have been adopted of utilizing by-products, such as the underbrush and grasses for fuel and fertilizers, the seeds and acorns for producing oils and waxes, the barks of various trees for tanning and dyeing, and the stones for building, landscape gardening and the manufacture of pottery.

This is typical of the thrift of the Japanese and of their progressive point of view and teachableness. When contrasted with the laxity and wastefulness of the natural resources in our own country, and with the pitiable results in wasted, denuded lands and consequent famine, floods and innumerable other evils, resulting from wastefulness and neglect in China, one feels that we have much to learn from the Japanese.

The revenue in Japan derived from the products and by-products of the forests amounted in 1910 to over ten million yen, though the expenses were heavy and left a net revenue of only seven million yen. In five years the productivity of the forests increased over sixty per cent.

The State forests are managed by the Government through the Imperial Household Department, and over the peoples' forests the Government exercises a supervision in accordance with the forest laws.

At present there are over sixty institutions in which forestry is taught. Some of these schools are devoted to the exclusive teaching of forestry, but in forty-eight the subject is taught subsidiary to other major subjects.

There is perhaps no better illustration of Japan's efficient conservation methods than in connection with her production of camphor. Since 1899 the camphor business has been a government monopoly. Japan to-day leads in the world's supply of this commodity.

Previously the refiners used only such portions of the trees as yielded the largest amount of camphor at a minimum of expense and effort. The result was over-production and such very low prices that the refiners were scarcely able to pay the tax upon it. Every effort is now made to conserve the supply, and prevent the previous waste, over-production and adulteration. At present the refiners sell their product to the Government at the price determined by the market.

It is roughly estimated that the present supply of camphor trees may last forty or fifty years, though it is hoped the supply may be made permanent by continuous planting. Already the Government has set out millions of young camphor plants.

Salt is also a government monopoly, produced mostly in Formosa and shipped in large quantities to Japan proper. It is hoped that in time salt will be produced in even greater quantities than at present.

IV

Many of the newer industries of Japan owe their inception to the Government. The idea in initiating these enterprises was to demonstrate to the people how such industries might be developed, how trade might be expedited and expanded. Between 1880-1883 most of these government enterprises were sold to private companies, although a few were

retained, such as works which supplied the military stores, steel foundries, the mint, printing offices and still others, like the tobacco, soya, salt, *sake* and camphor. In 1907 the railroads were nationalized and it is thought that in time insurance, matches and sugar may also be taken over by the Government.

It would appear from the nationalization of so many industries that the Japanese were strongly inclined to Socialism. As a matter of fact the Government is almost foolishly hostile to any and all Socialistic propaganda as such. The nationalized industries have been taken over, not with a view to serving the public with a first rate commodity, produced under ideal labor conditions and careful management, but solely with the purpose of obtaining a large revenue. The salt business alone nets the Government a profit of ten million yen annually, and the tobacco monopoly over fifty million yen.

During a period of twenty-five years the export trade of Japan has increased thirteen fold until now it approximates one billion yen. The United States is Japan's best customer, taking at least one-third of her complete output. China ranks second, and Great Britain third.

The leading exports are raw silks, cotton, yarns, matches, fancy matting, tea, camphor, marine products, coffee and coal. In the textile industries the manufacture and export of silk ranks first. In fact silk covers one-third of her whole export trade. In silk-raising Japan ranks second to China, which

leads the world. Over two and a half million families are now engaged in this occupation, many selecting it as an avocation in connection with farming or fishing. The United States takes two-thirds of Japan's whole output of raw silk.

Among the textile industries cotton ranks second in importance. The raw material has been purchased chiefly from China and India. Formerly considerable amounts were purchased from the United States, but during recent years purchases from the United States decreased steadily while those from China and India more than doubled.

Through the opening of the Panama Canal, Japan has been somewhat stimulated to increase her cotton purchases in the United States, though our cotton trade with Japan is still far less than formerly. American cotton has been largely supplanted by the cheaper and poorer grades from India and Egypt, but there is still a field for increased sales of finer cottons if the trade possibilities were properly studied and wisely handled. Since 1891 the total value of raw cotton annually imported into Japan has increased from eighty million to one hundred and sixty million yen.

At present Korea is growing a little cotton, and government experts now predict that if all the suitable waste and inferior agricultural lands in Korea were planted in cotton there would be a total of one hundred and seventy-five thousand acres with an annual yield of one hundred thousand bales.

Experts further maintain that the spinning business in Japan is now organized upon lines which clearly indicate a determination to obtain a place of predominance in this industry. The spinners and weavers are closely affiliated, and the Government has given such encouragement as will counterbalance the disadvantages which Japan may have in competing with other countries. Already the sales of British and American cotton fabrics have been largely supplanted in Manchuria and have decreased considerably in many parts of China, while the sales of Japanese goods have been steadily increasing, even during periods of financial depression. In a word, British and American manufacturers are now competing for markets against State-aided enterprises. In order to assist these vast trade and industrial activities, the Japanese Government has been forced to borrow heavily from other nations, chiefly from England, where she has procured money at a low rate of interest not exceeding five per cent. Thus we have the curious anomaly of Western nations, chiefly England, furnishing Japan with cheap money in order that she may supplant the trade of England and other nations in Oriental and even Occidental markets. Clearly Japan has not failed to learn Western methods of "big business," and it is interesting to note how she is quietly but surely beating the Westerner at his own "game."

Japanese experts themselves maintain that in time they will dominate the Oriental trade in the

coarser cotton threads, although they do not hope to compete in the finer threads. This should furnish a good suggestion for American cotton manufacturers.

V

Perhaps in no line of industrial enterprise has Japan become quite so efficient as in developing her merchant marine by purchasing and building vessels, by extending and increasing steam routes, by securing favorable trade treaties and by sending experts to foreign countries to study trade methods, industrial conditions and opportunities for wedging in Japanese goods.

In 1871 the Japanese merchant marine comprised only forty-six ships with a tonnage of 17,948. By 1914 the gross tonnage of steamers amounted to 1,538,000 and that of sailing vessels to 494,000.*

For the encouragement of shipping and shipbuilding the Government long since established a system of paying bounties and subsidies. Until 1910 a ship of from seven hundred to one thousand tons gross, manufactured of iron or steel, approved after authorized inspection, received twelve yen for every ten tons gross and a ship of one thousand tons gross and upwards received twenty yen. If the engines of the steamer as well as the vessel itself were of Japanese manufacture, five yen extra per unit of horse-power were granted. A subsidy was

*See *Japan Year Book* for 1916, page 509.

also given of twenty-five sen (twelve and one-half cents) per ton gross for every one thousand miles traveled by a ship of one thousand tons gross with a full speed of ten knots; ten per cent. extra for every five hundred tons gross; and twenty per cent. additional for every additional knot above ten knots speed.

New laws came into force covering the period 1910 to 1914 which required that subsidized vessels be home-built steel steamers of over three thousand tons gross, not more than fifteen years old and having a speed of twelve nautical miles per hour. The rate of subsidy for such vessels was fifty sen or less per ton gross for every one thousand nautical miles with an extra ten per cent. of the above sum for an additional speed of a nautical mile per hour.

For foreign built vessels under five years old put on service with the sanction of the authorities, only half the subsidy was allowed. For vessels built according to special plans approved by the Government, an extra twenty-five per cent. of the shipping subsidy was granted. The subsidy was reduced on a graduated scale for older vessels.

Since 1914 many of the subsidies have been still further reduced, as the shipping lines have become well established and prosperous. Besides bounties and subsidies other inducements have been offered to encourage shipbuilding as well as other industrial enterprises. Money was loaned to the banks so

they in turn could loan at as low as two per cent. to assist worthy enterprises.

Clearly such inducements furnished a tremendous stimulus to Japanese shipbuilding, so that to-day Japan is building large and excellent steel ships of twenty thousand tons and over. As early as 1904 there were already sixty-two ship companies, besides many individual ship owners, and the number has been steadily increasing. In 1914 there were fourteen ships built with a total tonnage of 66,329, while in 1915 orders were placed for fifty-one ships with a total tonnage of 212,100.

The two most important lines are the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and the Toyo Kisen Kaisha. The passenger service on some of the Japanese lines in details of comfort, such as cleanliness, good food and personal service, at a moderate price, are probably second to none in the world. By many who have traveled upon various boats of the best established Japanese lines, the service has been pronounced unsurpassed.

The freight service, we are told, is no less efficient and reasonable in cost, due, it appears, to the study and careful management of all details—precisely the secret of the excellence in the passenger service.

"So efficient has the Japanese shipping service become," remarked a British sea-captain, who has sailed the Eastern seas for twenty years and has

made a careful study of shipping matters, "that if the British do not soon wake up and improve their belated methods, they will no longer be able to compete with the Japanese in Eastern waters."

Besides the regular subsidized lines, there are many so-called outside lines and thousands of tramp-boats engaged in regular coasting service or in over-sea trade getting a foothold in China, India, South America, Australia and the remotest sea islands. Indeed, it is claimed that Japanese ships are found in every open port and river in China. Besides, Japan possesses an enormous mosquito fleet composed of junks and small steamers plying everywhere in Chinese waters, all of this contributing much to the common purpose of expanding Japanese trade.

The coastwise trade of Japan is forbidden to all steamers not under the national flag, though by treaty arrangement some ocean-going steamers carrying passengers are given freight-carrying privileges.

A number of schools for the training of marine officers have been established, the most useful one of which is the Tokyo Mercantile Marine College. Besides these schools, there are various marine associations for the mutual benefit and instruction of their members.

Another factor which must not be overlooked in its tremendous benefits to Japanese trade is the Panama Canal. A passage through this canal

shortens the journey between Yokohama and New York—Japan's largest tea and silk market—by twelve days. This naturally insures a great saving of freight and will faciliate a wider Japanese-American trade.

But, in spite of this great increase in trade, up to 1915 the imports have exceeded the exports. In 1913 the export trade amounted to 632,460,213 yen; the excess of imports was more than 97,000,000 yen. In 1914 the exports totaled 591,101,461 yen while the excess of imports was only 4,634,244 yen. The European war has naturally brought about considerable commercial irregularity which resulted in an excess of exports for the first time in the experience of modern Japan; these exports totaling 682,095,000 yen while the imports amounted only to 518,653,000 yen, making the export excess 163,442,000 yen, and this excess is constantly on the increase.

VI

There has been and still is much discussion and difference of opinion concerning the business customs and conditions of Japan. Be this as it may, there is no doubt that the ethics of trade in Japan during the past fifteen years has undergone a process of rehabilitation and improvement quite in keeping with her progress in trade. While the old Samurai Code was strict and exacting upon many points of

honor, at the same time it sanctioned double-dealing more or less. Indirect methods were preferable to direct methods and so persistently was this emphasized in conduct that the language developed along lines which made it nearly impossible to put a point in a direct, straightforward manner, or to make a contract which could not be evaded.

In feudal times, merchants were classed lowest in the social hierarchy. Barter for gain was despised and condemned as a low practice. Naturally, with such a stigma upon business occupations, only the lowest classes of people engaged in them. Prior to the Restoration the great masses of the Japanese people were very poor, living on a minimum scale, with wretched food, scant clothing and bad housing. With the awakening of the whole nation came a general desire for better and more food and clothing, for travel, education and diversion. Since money only can procure these advantages, a desire for money and respect for gainful occupations began to increase. But business methods were not included in the Japanese code of morality and naturally, with their pressing new desires, the people did not always resist the many temptations opening up before them.

When Japanese goods first found their way into foreign markets they were so pleasing and satisfactory that orders were promptly sent in for additional supplies. Then it was that adulteration, shortage in weights and lengths, substitution of inferior mate-

rials and defective workmanship became common, in fact, so common that the Japanese people readily gained the reputation of being knaves and tricksters.

And not only did they resort to the simpler practices of adulteration, short weights and measures, but they soon began to develop subtler practices like making inferior imitations of standard and well-established European goods. In time trade-mark piracy became a widespread practice, and China as well as Japan was flooded with the inferior pirated articles. Naturally, this despicable practice added greatly to Japanese business disrepute, and it remained uncorrected until 1909 after the combined diplomatic pressure of the great Western manufacturers was brought to bear upon the Japanese Government. Even the present law provides protection to the owner of a trade-mark only in case that mark has been registered in Japan previous to the registering of the pirated mark, and a protest must be made against such piracy within three years after the owner has registered. This, it may readily be seen, does not insure a very great degree of protection to the foreigner.

In the subtler mal-practices of business, trade-mark piracy had companion practices. A merchant would contract for shipments of foreign goods and when they arrived, if the markets were depressed or if he thought he might force down the original price by leaving the goods on the shipper's hands in Japanese ports, the purchaser would not hesitate to repudiate

his contract. By this method he could frequently repurchase the goods he had originally ordered at a much reduced figure.

This and other similar dishonorable and despicable practices became quite common during the earlier years of Japanese trade development—practices no worse and not so different from the early Yankee methods, some substantial remnants of which—not even excepting trade-mark piracy—American business still retains. But naturally such unsavory business methods brought in time all Japanese merchants and merchandise into disrepute. The honest suffered as well as the dishonest, and Japanese goods, which had so quickly become popular in the markets, suddenly began to be regarded with disfavor, and orders did not increase as they should. It was the realization of these facts which led the Japanese Government in 1884 to take action to organize and control business with a view to stimulating legitimate enterprises and putting an end to disreputable methods which unquestionably have done great damage to Japanese trade. This action resulted in the organization of trade guilds. These guilds, backed by the Government, decreed that Japanese goods should be examined before they were allowed to leave the country, and if short weight or measure, adulteration or substitution of inferior materials was discovered, drastic punishment would follow. In some cases quantities of condemned goods were burned publicly merely to show to the

world that trade dishonesty would no longer be permitted. The result of this drastic action has been that trade methods have been greatly improved and trade guilds have become a factor of tremendous importance. They had so multiplied that by 1914 there were 916 commercial guilds established with a membership of more than a million, though in all there were over six thousand guilds, including those dealing with agriculture, fishing and forestry.

In 1901 legislation was enacted which provided for the amalgamation of credit, purchasing, sales and production guilds. This was an effort on the part of the Government to control business. In various ways the government authorities keep in constant touch with the guilds; give them expert advice on occasion; and discuss with them subjects of mutual advantage. When struggling enterprises are in need of assistance, the Government makes grants of money to stimulate them, and when necessary uses its power to induce them to act in accordance with the best interests of the nation. Indeed, these guilds are nothing more nor less than powerful trusts supported by the Government. In addition to the industrial guilds there are fifty-four chambers of commerce scattered throughout the country, their purpose being to discuss and improve methods for developing trade. Bounties are also granted by the Government to assist various enterprises, and money at low interest is often loaned for the same purpose.

Obviously foreign competition with Japanese trade is not competition with individuals or corporations; it is competition of American or European or other individuals or corporations with the Japanese Government.

In a word, the Japanese Government which is so hostile to Socialism for the laboring classes has, with the possible exception of Germany, adopted more Socialistic methods than any other nation in the interest of the exploiters of capital and industry.

Some critics of Japanese methods contemplate with alarm the great advantages which such methods give to Japanese industries competing in the world markets. Others maintain that the principle of taxing the whole people to endow and subsidize capitalistic interests is unsound and pernicious and can not persist. The reply to the latter criticism by the authorities responsible for such methods—however fallacious the retort may be—is that it has worked satisfactorily and that the rapid expansion of trade has brought excellent returns to the whole people, enabling all classes to pay the taxes and to live on a much improved scale; consequently, there is no protest against it. Moreover, the authorities doubtless feel that by combining this method of the government subsidy and supervision of trade with efficient methods of production and obtaining markets, they have a certain dominant advantage which leaves them nothing to fear in competing with the present-day individualistic methods of other nations.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

I

With the sudden and rapid increase in the development of Japan's natural resources and the establishment of many new industries on a large scale, numerous changes have come about and many evils have developed in the social and economic life of the people.

When Japan began to cast about for a world-wide trade she knew she must compete with the highly specialized industrialism of the Western world, and in order to do this quickly she must necessarily adopt the methods and machinery of her competitors.

Yet she was still greatly handicapped, inasmuch as capital was scarce and could be had only at exorbitant rates and there was no labor skilled in modern methods. Therefore, her only chance of competing seemed to be by selling cheap goods made by cheap unskilled labor. As previously stated, the Government tried to aid various approved enterprises as much as possible. Some were established outright and disposed of later to private corporations; others

were subsidized or aided by loaning capital at low rates of interest. Nevertheless, in spite of the stupendous efforts made by the Government, many of these initial enterprises either proved unprofitable or failed outright.

In business management and in economy of time and energy there appeared to be great waste and inefficiency. Old established business habits and formal customs could not easily be abandoned or reconstructed. The old methods were slow, easy-going, wasteful and, in the long run, costly. And not only were the hours long and wages low, but conditions of safety and sanitation were extremely poor—so poor that the rate of accidents, sickness and death was exceedingly high, and the material and machinery of the various industries were almost invariably inferior. In brief, most of the conditions of labor were belated and unsatisfactory, and many have not yet been greatly improved.

Moreover, the Government appears to be convinced that if Japan wishes to hold and extend her markets, the workers must be paid as little as possible, hours must be long and holidays few. Naturally the Government wishes those initiating or taking over the various new enterprises to succeed, yet she has taken little thought for the welfare of the workers.

The masses of the Japanese people are very poor. Their struggle for bare existence is terrific. The peasant is forced to work very hard to cultivate his

bit of land, which is usually tied up with debt to the professional money-lenders at an exorbitant rate of interest. To live, even on a minimum scale, the peasant and all members of his household must work far into the night at subsidiary occupations, such as match-box, sandal or brush making, sericulture and hand-loom weaving. When thousands of peasant children, chiefly girls, are recruited into the factories to work from twelve to sixteen hours per day, the Government excuses itself from interfering by pointing out that the hours are no longer than those they have been accustomed to at home.

Such are the sophistries with which the authorities of Japan, just as the authorities of our own and other countries, have salved their consciences. Doubtless such sophistries will continue to prevail until workers become intelligent and enterprising enough to demand justice for themselves collectively.

II

During the past twenty years wages have more than doubled in Japan, but the increased demands of living have exceeded the advance in wages and the economic standards among the laboring classes are still so low they may scarcely be compared with those of Western countries. Skilled laborers, even now, receive only one-eighth of what laborers of the same class receive in America and one-third of what

they receive in England, and Japanese women workers receive from one-third to one-half less than men. Bricklayers are among the highest paid workers, but their average does not exceed fifty cents a day.

However, authorities appear to differ on the economic value of cheap labor. Some claim that it has been a great advantage in competing for trade, while others maintain that low economic standards invariably result in inferior amount and quality of production and that Japan is to-day suffering greatly for lack of skilled, efficient labor, as well as from lack of equipment. It is commonly conceded that it takes two or three skilled Japanese to achieve as much as one American or European.

Before 1867 no labor-saving devices had ever been employed in the mining industries. Then an Englishman, Erasmus Glover, and an American named Pumpelly first introduced the use of explosives. After the advent of the Meiji era, 1868, the Government took over for a time a number of the larger mines. Foreign mining experts were employed, modern machinery was introduced and though the output of ores, metals, coal and petroleum was greatly increased, nevertheless, according to the government reports, a number of these enterprises proved to be financial failures, while others were sold eventually to private persons in whose hands, in the course of time, most of the enterprises prospered. But because of the great cost of outfitting and of the lack of finances, the equipment is

inadequate and inferior, the mining, in consequence, is not deep and is generally considered wasteful and dangerous.

The miners live usually in large, community dwellings provided by the employers. Those with families have a separate room or two, and those without families live in large common rooms.

Generally, when the mines are remote from the larger centers, the operators furnish provisions at a low price. This, it is claimed, helps to keep the workers satisfied and prevents them from demanding increased wages on the pretext of increased cost of living. This is only one of various devices employed to keep wages low and to prevent wage-earners from any organized effort to improve their condition.

That mining is dangerous because the provisions for safety are inadequate is indicated by the number of casualties. In 1913 the total number of employees at eleven of the leading mines numbered 262,163. The total number of casualties was 35,-512, nearly fourteen per cent. of all the workers. Of this number there were 730 deaths, 889 severely wounded and 33,793 slightly wounded. Naturally, the rate would be still higher at the more poorly equipped mines.

The highest wage paid per day of from eight to eleven hours, to men workers at the metal mines, is 69 sen (34½ cents); the lowest is 42 sen (21 cents). Women mine workers generally receive less than

half as much as the men, and children less than one-third. Wages at the collieries average a little more.

Considerable emphasis is placed upon the aid given to the families of disabled and deceased workers, but upon close examination of the statistics given one finds that the sums paid are at best scandalously paltry. Five yen (two dollars and fifty cents) —sometimes a little more—is the amount usually donated toward the funeral expenses of a deceased worker, injured in the mines. The amount paid for relief to "bereaved families" in case of death varies from ten to forty yen (five to twenty dollars). Hospital expenses are generally either shared or paid in full by the operators when there are no mine hospitals.

At the better class of mines mutual aid societies have been established, in which monthly payments are made by the workers to a common relief fund. The operators contribute to these funds also, but there appears to be no uniform rule or custom regulating the operators' contributions.

At the smaller mines there seems to be provision for teaching the children of the employees, while at the larger mines the operators either provide teachers for the children of the workmen or subsidize the public schools. Since many of the children are employed at the mines, the educational results must be unsatisfactory.

It is clear that many of the old feudal customs

and feudal ethics have been carried over into mining as well as into other industrial pursuits. The oaths of chiefs and protégés swearing loyalty and obedience have been adopted by the "bosses." These oaths, we are informed, practically insure obedience to the boss whether he is right or wrong. And since the "bosses" at the various mines keep in communication with one another, their power over the workers is very great. While they may co-operate to assist a faithful workman, their power to crush and defeat one who may be considered disloyal or rebellious is almost absolute.

III

For years after the introduction of modern mining methods the workmen appeared to be tranquil and satisfied. But later their attitude seems to have become ominous. In the wake of the Chino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars the burdens of taxation upon all classes were extremely heavy and for the working classes they were almost unendurable. Every commodity was taxed, yet the Government continued its policy of making large army and navy appropriations. These burdens, coupled with the increasing opportunities of the capitalists for shameless exploitation of labor, at length drove the naturally peaceful and submissive Japanese proletariat to desperation. Little by little their desperation took form in uprisings now here,

now there, until by 1907 petty strikes and violent outbreaks of various sorts appeared to have become epidemic. In some cases there was ruthless burning and destroying of industrial plants and employers' dwellings, cutting of telephone wires, throwing of bombs, and employers were sometimes driven to flee for safety.

Since it wished to continue its policy of heavy taxation for naval and military expansion, the Government, instead of frankly facing the facts of the situation, began to cast about for some other than the real cause for the constantly increasing violence and industrial eruptions.

A flourishing Socialistic movement which had been initiated about 1901 and had acquired influence among certain classes of workmen appeared to offer the best pretext upon which the Government might focus the blame for the increasing industrial insurrections.

Originally this Socialist movement was organized by a small group of college-bred men who met to study the works of Karl Marx and other Socialistic writers. They called themselves Social Democrats and inspired such alarm in the Government that they were soon disbanded by Count Ito and his Cabinet.

In 1903 the first Socialist Congress was evoked at Osaka by members of the disbanded organization. In November a newly constituted body began publishing the *People's Journal*. Through writings and

public meetings a few Socialists tried to rouse the industrial classes to organize and to make some concerted effort to resist the terrible abuses which were being imposed on them. Unquestionably these Socialists did vehemently denounce the militaristic party and their merciless policy of taxation for military expansion, and when the strikes occurred it was found in a few cases that the strike leaders were Socialists.

Not only was the proletariat affected by these "dangerous" doctrines, but some eminent members of the aristocracy had also become converts, and in their home provinces fearlessly proclaimed their ideas. All this became most alarming to the oligarchic-militaristic Government, which from the beginning had been apprehensive of a Socialistic movement and which now resorted to measures of suppression. As the movement progressed the Government became more and more hostile and concluded that inasmuch as the Socialists were sowing seeds of discord between the workers and employers, they were an evil influence in the country and must be stamped out.*

One after another of the Socialist publications were suppressed; a law was passed which forbade the formation of a political party without the consent of the Government, and police orders were

*See *Le Japon Modern*, by Ludovic Nandeau, pages 239-244.

issued against holding Socialist meetings or conferences. In time a regular crusade was inaugurated against the whole Socialistic movement. Foreign publications like the works of Tolstoi, Zola, Macaulay, and even Goldsmith's harmless *Vicar of Wakefield,* were put under the ban. Indeed so ridiculously fanatical did this crusade become at one time that harmless books which merely included *Social* in the title were interdicted.

The climax to this tyranny was the arrest by the Government in May, 1910, of a group of twenty-six supposed conspirators, twenty-four of whom were condemned the following November and sentenced to death for *lesé majesté.* The sentences of twelve of this group were later commuted to life imprisonment, but the remaining twelve were executed.

This was apparently an effective blow to Socialism in Japan and since that time the Government has never relaxed in its fanatical vigilance to keep down all propaganda of Socialistic doctrines. We have been informed on good authority that the propaganda is being still continued in an educational way, and that ultimately it will again come to the front in a more rational and intelligent organization of the working classes.

Meanwhile the Government has expanded its monopolistic enterprises along Socialistic lines, though these chiefly benefit the State and not the working people.

As a result of the many petty strikes and uprisings, some concessions in increased wages and improved conditions for the workers were granted, but the concessions made, it was claimed, were entirely due to the "generosity of employers."

As has been stated, some laws affecting mine labor have been passed, but they mainly concern mine construction, compensation, ventilation and the regulation of hours in the mines. Five mine inspection offices have been established, with a view to having regular inspection, reducing abuses and lessening the chances for organized disturbances.

Yet the weight of governmental authority is still directed toward defending and upholding the capitalistic classes and their present methods of exploiting labor. And not until the working classes become more intelligent and more ready to break away from the old feudal ideals of loyalty and obedience to employers will there be much chance for improvement. Individual rebellion or initiative is still generally deprecated among the lower classes themselves. This alone would prevent organized effort on a large scale from succeeding rapidly.

While some concessions have been granted and some improvements made in the occupations in which male workers predominate, in the textile industries where women workers prevail little has been achieved. The textile industries, chiefly cotton and silk spinning and weaving, are perhaps to-day the most important industries in Japan.

IV

When Japan adopted the Western system of manufacturing, her dominant idea was to learn to produce cheaply and to find markets quickly; consequently, she adopted the strictly mechanical methods of production of the Western world with little concern for the social or ethical welfare of the workers. To-day factory conditions in Japan are perhaps the worst in the civilized world—the darkest blot on her map of wonderful progress and achievement. Thousands of workers—mostly women and children—are recruited from all parts of the country to feed the factories which have multiplied faster than workers could be obtained. There are now more than a million factory workers, seventy-three per cent. of whom are females—mostly girls under twenty years of age—and children.

The majority of female workers are engaged in the spinning, weaving and dyeing industries; seventy per cent. live in the factory compounds or quarters, i. e., under the direct control or supervision of the factory managers. In the larger factories one thousand to fifteen hundred are frequently housed in a single compound. A high fence usually encloses a compound of several acres which contains the factory proper, large dormitories for sleeping accommodations, sometimes a theater, hospital and store furnished with general supplies, and possibly a Buddhist-Shinto shrine or small place of worship. The

hospitals at some of the best factories are clean, tidy and well equipped, while others are unsanitary and are pest houses of contagion. Ordinarily there are no charges to the workers for hospital service.

The theaters are generally attractive and at the best factories some effort is made to keep the amusements clean and wholesome, but more often the entertainment is vulgar and indecently suggestive, at least from the Western view-point; though it is doubtful whether in the long run they are any more vulgar and demoralizing than are the London music-halls or the American vaudeville or picture shows. The purpose of these theaters is to amuse the workers of the compound so that they may be prevented from going elsewhere to seek amusements.

The dormitories are usually flimsy, cheaply built oblong buildings divided into sleeping compartments, each of which is furnished with from eight to twenty sleeping pads placed closely together. At a few of the factories there is sufficient sleeping space and equipment so that the pads may be ventilated, but at the great majority of places the pads and bedding are in constant service, the night workers taking possession of the *fouton* while they are still warm after the day-shift workers have left them. Such unsanitary conditions are dangerous and contribute much to the high rate of tuberculosis and other diseases prevalent among the workers.

In ordinary times working hours vary from eleven to fourteen per day, but they are considerably

longer during periods of commercial pressure. The following is the program for the night-shift workers at one of the best factories in Japan: At 6 P. M. the workers go on duty. There is one-fourth hour rest at 9 o'clock; one-half hour for dinner at midnight; one-fourth hour rest at 3 A. M.; off duty at 6 A. M., after which the workers have bath and breakfast. At 9 A. M. they go to bed and sleep until 3 or 4 P. M.; lunch is served from 4:30 to 5 P. M. They have one holiday every ten days, when they change over to the day-shift. On such occasions the workers are allowed to go out of the compound either accompanied by a delegated employee or sometimes in groups of three or four unattended, though they must return to the compound by 6 or 7 P. M. At some of the smaller factories the workers are less carefully supervised, but in case they stay out very late their names are publicly posted in the factory.

In many factories the conditions are, to say the least, badly behind the times. The ventilation is generally poor; the oil and lint in the atmosphere are very obnoxious. As far as we could ascertain, up to 1915 there had been no lint consumers installed in all Japan. Various methods of speeding are resorted to. At some places captains of groups are appointed to urge on the workers, the group accomplishing the most within a stipulated period receiving a banner.

At some factories rice balls and other cooked

food are passed to the workers at the machines so that they may continue working with one hand while using the other to eat. At many places there is but one rest day or holiday a month or one every fortnight. In changing from the night- to day-shifts there are frequently only the quarter- and half-hour periods of rest allowed during a continuous stretch of twenty-four hours. This in itself is nothing short of a social crime.

At some of the factories and even at the government factories women carry children upon their backs while working. The excuse offered is that women with children from distant towns often seek employment and since workers are scarce they are taken on. Naturally the children must be cared for. When small they are carried about on the mothers' backs, but as soon as they are large enough they are put at some light work. Many employers maintain that child-labor is so inefficient that it does not pay, but they give small children light work merely to placate the mothers.

V

With the rapid increase of the textile industries the demand for workers is very great and continuous. Under the present deadly system the endurance of the workers does not last long, and the industrial mill must constantly be fed with fresh human grist.

There are two methods of recruiting: through advertising, when the workers deal directly with the employers; and through recruiting agents, who are often merciless and unscrupulous fellows who go from house to house and from district to district beguiling the innocent peasants and their young girls with alluring descriptions of the pleasant, remunerative and instructive opportunities which factory life has to offer. Parents are told that their children, by not very hard work, can earn sufficient to live well and to lay by extra money either for a marriage portion or to help pay off the parents' mortgage or other debts. Often the agents exhibit samples of writing and sewing from the factory children's classes—held an hour or two daily before the twelve-hour shift begins. These samples are compared with samples of writing and sewing by children of the same age from the public schools, the factory samples being always superior. The theaters, parents are told, are places of amusement designed to keep the workers from leaving the compound. The natural conclusion drawn by the peasants is that here is an opportunity to transfer their daughters from the hard, endless toil at home to places where they will be protected, where they will receive good instruction, earn their own support and save a little money all at the same time.

The peasant is almost invariably in pinched circumstances, and is able, only by the most strenuous effort and assisted by all members of the family, to

eke out the barest subsistence in favorable seasons. In seasons of famine peasant families frequently face literal starvation. Consequently, parents lend a ready ear to the pleasing overtures of the factory recruiter and are soon persuaded to bind over the daughters—never the sons—for a period of from three to seven years' service in the factories—a period of almost absolute slavery.

When the simple-hearted peasant girls arrive at the factory, everything is different from the account given them. The working day is twelve hours, with extra hours added when business is pressing. The housing is crowded and the food is often poor. Every move of the worker, even her correspondence, is supervised, and guards are on duty to prevent running away.

Sometimes girls and children enter certain lines of industry as apprentices.* They receive their board and lodging from the managers, but no other remuneration. The apprenticeship, according to the contract, usually lasts from five to seven years. At the end of that time the worker receives from eight to fifteen dollars. Sometimes the supervision is so strict that even the mother is not allowed to visit the daughter during the apprenticeship. Such one-sided privileges naturally breed abuses.

*See an extremely able article by K. Kuwata entitled "Die gegenwärtige Lage der Arbeiter in Japan," published in the *Archiv für Socialwissenschaft und Social Politik*, Bd. xxxv, Heft 3 (1912).

Conditions in the small factories appear to be the worst, since only a few rest days are granted, such as New Year's day, the three national holidays, and a few festival days. Sunday is not observed. Some factories grant the day off when the workers are changed from the night- to the day-shift, but this merely means a free day after working all night. Payment is usually monthly, though in some provinces it is semi-annually or annually.

Many factories have saving rules whereby a certain sum is set aside each month for the worker. The manager holds the savings in trust and meanwhile has the use of this money, as the savings may not be withdrawn until the expiration of the contract. Sometimes there are conditions which enable the worker to draw out the savings before the expiration of the contract, but usually the conditions are so hard that it makes the opportunity almost impossible. In fact, the compulsory saving system is in most cases only another link in the chain which fetters the worker to the employer.

At the larger factories where the dormitory system prevails, large flimsy buildings accommodate the workers. These are often as crowded as are the slum-quarters of large cities. The housing is free but the workers pay for their food and clothing which is generally furnished at a minimum cost. The dormitories are enclosed by a high fence which includes all the factory buildings. Although only women are housed within the enclosure, the protection is

not generally effective. With the change from the day- to the night-shifts, men workers can readily come and go to and from the compound, and as the sleeping apartments in the dormitories are easily accessible—merely a matter of pushing open the sliding windows or doors which run the length of the sleeping apartments—all sorts of sex irregularities may occur. To be sure sex immorality is not so seriously condemned in Japan as with us, at least not until there are serious results. Then usually the unfortunate girl is sent away.

In the smaller country towns, factory workers are commonly housed and fed by the manager. The outer doors to their sleeping apartments are generally locked at night to prevent their getting away. Sometimes the manager rents houses to accommodate his workers, but the dwelling places are supervised by the recruiting agents, who sometimes permit immoral license with the double purpose of keeping the workers better satisfied by adding a little to their incomes and incidentally adding also to the income of the agent himself with whom the profits of immorality are shared.

Thus it can readily be seen how many shameful abuses may result through this system from which there is almost no legitimate release before the worker is reduced to utter worthlessness by disease or bad health. Thousands of such releases are granted annually, and the broken-down workers either return home to linger in misery for a time,

then die, mostly with tuberculosis, or they go over to clandestine or licensed prostitution, hoping to find life a little more endurable. Parallel with the continuous dismissal of broken-down workers is the incessant demand for fresh workers—the inevitable result of a system cruel as it is wasteful and destructive, and dangerous to the future welfare of the whole nation if it continues uncorrected.

In justice to some of the best factory employers, it must be said that a few have made real efforts to improve the condition of their workers. The working day is eleven hours; good hospitals are furnished; theaters with carefully selected amusements are provided; the holidays have been increased; the dormitories are not so crowded but that the bedding may sometimes be ventilated; the food is good though simple and furnished at a very low cost; children under twelve are not received; and the savings may be had on demand. At such well conducted factories there is no lack of workers, as is commonly the case. But the number of such places is so small that the relative results upon the great body of workers are practically negligible.

Among all the memories we retain of Japan—most of which are pleasant ones—perhaps the most vivid and depressing was one carried away after a social hour spent at one of the factories in Osaka with an expert Japanese children's entertainer in charge of the evening.

About nine o'clock, after having worked twelve

hours, from four hundred to six hundred girls, clean and fed, crowded into a room and knelt Japanese fashion, one against the other upon the matting before us. We sat upon a platform face to face with this group.

We asked no questions concerning the ages of the workers, but judged they ranged from nine to twenty years. Some were sweet-smiling little girls cuddling up closely to the motherly older ones. A few had bright, pleasant faces, but most of them appeared dull, listless and exhausted, and when the vivacious entertainer began they showed little interest or hope of being amused.

As the entertainer moved about, snapping his fingers with animation at certain climaxes, the children brightened and some laughed heartily, but many in the midst of their laughter drooped their heads and fell over upon the shoulders of those next them, limp with exhaustion. In a few minutes many were asleep, and most of those sleeping held their mouths wide open which indicated adenoids or other nasal affections.

The agony of watching this group of young girls and children struggling to keep awake and to keep their aching bodies from collapse became almost unbearable. Indeed their faces betrayed keen suffering as the program continued. Yet here was only one illustration of the condition of many thousands of young workers in Japan. Torn from their homes, many at such a tender age that it seems the

direst cruelty to deprive them of family surroundings and to herd them together indiscriminately away from all home and humanizing influences, their bodies were being so rapidly and surely destroyed that one was certain that these, like thousands of others, would shortly be numbered among the other thousands of physical wrecks which are turned out annually from these factories of human destruction again to be replaced by thousands of other fresh young girls who in turn will be destroyed by the same merciless process. All this transpires in the land of Nippon where relations between parents and children, between employer and employee, are so much lauded and declared to be so much superior to similar relations among Western peoples. On every hand in the course of our investigations we had been assured of the fine attitude of benevolence and consideration on the part of the Japanese employer and of the gratitude and appreciation on the part of the Japanese workers. Indeed, many had maintained to us that industrial relationships were so superior in Japan that there was really no need of laws to restrain employers or to protect the workers who so generally appreciated the benevolent treatment which they received.

VI

For years the old established Confucian disdain of legal education and the old benevolent paternal

ideals of feudalism furnished the backbone to the tenacious resistance to legal reform. The chief promoters of modern industrial enterprises were themselves members of the ruling class under the old feudal régime. Naturally those most opposed to industrial reforms were the industrial leaders and business men, many of whom were closely related to government officials.

As early as 1895 a Society of Social Politics was formed in Japan composed chiefly of university professors, business men and statesmen, with the purpose of bringing newly developed social and industrial abuses into the field of discussion. Nothing tangible was accomplished, however, until 1911, when Law No. 46 was finally promulgated. But this led to no direct social consequence since the law, after having been passed, was carefully shelved to await the time when the small sum of fifty thousand yen might be appropriated to provide inspection officials to see that the law was enforced.

It is extremely interesting to note the nature of much of the public discussion during the years of agitation for legislative action—it is so typical of the old Japanese view-point.

Baron Shibusawa—the leading Japanese financier, a Confucianist and one of the most public spirited and representative patriots—in a series of a "Hundred Talks," published later in two large volumes, perhaps best reflected the mental attitude common among his class.

Social and family problems, he declared, were not to be solved simply by law. The relation existing hitherto between capitalists and laborers had been a family relation. To establish this relation on the basis of rights and duties would have the effect of creating distance between classes. Let the rich fulfill their obligations to society as rich. Let the poor perform their duties as poor exerting themselves. Let the upper and lower classes mutually forbear and give way to one another. Thus social harmony and good feeling would be maintained. Industrial laws, he feared, would become the source of agitation between capitalists and laborers. He feared also that limitation as to age and hours of work would meet with opposition among laborers. They desired to work as long as possible and to cause their children to work in order to increase the family earnings. The law would thwart their purposes.

Moreover, workmen lived in unsanitary conditions in their own homes and they would prefer higher wages to sanitary improvements in factories. In a word, the bill, the object of which was to befriend the laborers, was calculated to grieve and disappoint them. Baron Shibusawa's remedy was to revert to the Confucian-feudal ideals. Let the relation between capitalist and laborer be that which existed between parent and child, between prince and retainer.

In opposing factory legislation the feudal ideals were generally advocated. During a discussion be-

fore the Society of Social Politics, Mr. G. Kolayashi, counselor of the Imperial Government Railways, offered an opinion which is still held largely in Japan. In reply to an argument that the proposed factory laws were intended to put down the strong and protect the weak, particularly women and children, he asked: "What need is there for factory laws in view of the excellent spirit among the Japanese people? In the West where this fine spirit was not known, where the strong oppressed the weak, the necessity for factory laws was recognized a hundred years ago, since it was necessary to restrain capitalists. In Japan the laboring people prefer long hours. The people are poor. Old, young, men, women and children alike have to exert themselves; competition is keen, and Japan cannot bring about the industrial conquest of other strong nations except by cheap labor and long hours."

This latter statement furnishes the key to all the opposition to industrial legislation. In more definite terms, it implies—Succeed we must, and only by long hours and cheap labor can this be accomplished. So let us not disturb the beautiful old customs by which master and servant are bound together.

Seventy years ago, it must be remembered, similar ideas and conditions dominated England, and twenty years ago they were commonly prevalent in the United States. But in Japan opposed to powerful men like Baron Shibusawa and Imperial

Counselor Kolayashi advocating the old feudal ideals, are a few strong, fearless men like Professors Toda and Kuwata, Mr. E. Komada of the House of Lords and President of Keio University, Dr. Soyeda, Member of the House of Lords, and a minority group of eminent and similarly minded men who vigorously denounced these belated ideals —the lack of public concern for the welfare of the workers and for the future social welfare of the nation, the lack of economic intelligence and the blind and cold-hearted neglect of workers by statesmen and the State.

During all this agitation the majority of the Japanese people remained indifferent to existing conditions, and in face of such powerful opposition to reform it took great courage to persist on the part of the reformers. Even men of powerful social and political influence scarcely dared speak out openly and frankly.

We knew personally of one eminent Japanese who, though he openly advocated reform, dared not state conditions as he knew them actually to be; consequently, he went to the pains of writing a series of able articles exposing the exploiting system of Japan and suggesting legislation to abolish the prevalent abuses. These articles he published in a prominent English paper under an assumed English name and afterward had them copied and circulated in Japan, with a view to quickening the pressure at home.

VII

But let us inquire into the legislation actually achieved. In 1909 legislation for the control of factories was first taken in hand. A bill was formulated, considered by a committee appointed by the Diet and finally—because of disagreement—withdrawn. In 1910 a draft of a second factory law was made, but, like the first, failed to be enacted. This bill in a slightly amended form was passed by the Diet in January, 1911. The time when the act was put into operation was left to be fixed by Imperial ordinance. Originally it was intended that the year following its passage would see it in force. In January, 1912, it was announced that this would be done in 1914. The delay was necessary to await financial adjustments and the appropriation of fifty thousand yen for supervisory officials. Early in 1915 a further postponement until April, 1916, was announced. But once more there was difficulty and disappointment. In May, 1916, it appears certain regulations did not meet with the approval of the Privy Council and the bill was to be amended and ready for final adoption in September. It was at last published in the Official Gazette as an Imperial ordinance so it is not likely to meet with further changes or delay.

The original proposals of this act have been changed until it is claimed that the bill is merely a shadow of its original form. Perhaps the worst

feature is the exemption of all the State factories from this law. There is also a special provision allowing an extension of working hours in factories engaged in raw silk and silk textiles. Special privileges for some industries have of course aroused prompt inquiries from the textile industries. Why should not such privileges be extended to them also?

Children under ten years are excluded from factory work. The original law fixed the age at twelve, and even the ten-year-old provision may be cancelled by special permission from the authorities.

Children from ten to twelve may be employed only on certain light work and not over six hours per day, and provisions must be made so they may complete the six years' primary course. Obviously, after children have worked six hours they are in no condition to take up their studies.

Even in the original law of 1911, as has been stated, there were many loopholes for evasion. For example, one provision required that children under twelve years of age should not be employed in the factories. At the same time another provision declared that children under fifteen were not to be employed longer than twelve hours per day. Another provision decreed that twelve hours should be the maximum day—except at times of special business pressure. The regulations of 1916 provide for the gradual reduction of hours for young persons and women, commencing at fourteen hours per day, then to thirteen and finally to twelve, the process of reduction covering a period of fifteen years.

When it is taken into account that only two holidays a month are granted and that the intervening periods of rest during working hours are usually not over thirty minutes, it still leaves conditions deplorable. In fact, the new law is almost a farce, since it promises so little relief to the workers.

But while the enactment and eventual application of this law as it now stands can have no momentous social results, the fact that the Government itself has been moved to pass legislation indicates that a few enlightened, public-spirited men have succeeded in the face of powerful and persistent opposition in rousing and crystallizing enough influential opinion to bring about some action in the right direction. This in itself is a real triumph and should give courage to the agitators to continue the struggle.

Meanwhile general education in Japan is becoming more and more popular, and public opinion is certain to become stronger and less tolerant of the present ghastly exploitation of human life. It is to be hoped also that in time the glorification of submission and obedience in women will become less potent, and that women themselves may be roused to a sense of the injustices forced upon them and will cease to be so docile and submissive to employers, who for mere pecuniary gain in a few years destroy them physically and relegate them to the great masses of social wastage with no hope, no prospect, and no outlook but misery and death before them.

CHAPTER X

POVERTY AND SOCIAL EVILS

I

By some modern writers it is claimed that while there are many poor in Japan, there is little actual poverty or pauperism. Under the old feudal system this was unquestionably true. In old Japan there were few vast fortunes. Comparatively speaking, the whole people were poor. But under the modern industrial system, greater accumulations of wealth are possible and the old story is repeating itself—the rich are becoming richer and the poor poorer.

The burdensome taxes resulting from two wars have been the strongest factor tending to force multitudes of the poorer classes into the outer poverty lines. Wages have generally risen, but living commodities have gradually been so heavily taxed as to result in the poor having far less than formerly; while for many thousands the struggle for the barest and often most wretched existence is a truly desperate one.

Every large city of Japan may now boast of its slum quarters in which conditions of wretchedness are nowhere surpassed. Tokyo has its Shitaya

quarter where multitudes are herded together in the lowest degree of human degradation. In streets like the Shin Ami Cho there are about three hundred and fifty tiny two- and three-mat houses (six and nine feet square) occupied by people too poor to possess the rags which cover them at night. For one-half sen, or a fourth of a cent per night, they rent sleeping space and are often crowded in upon the floor of these tiny compartments with a whole family or with other unfortunates like themselves. For half a sen they rent the miserable coverings made of dirty rags or pieces of clothing, and sometimes in the severest weather a whole family must cuddle together under the one covering. In Shitaya there are several larger houses for the sleeping accommodation of detached people, where sleeping space with rag coverings are rented at from one to two sen per night. At these places men, women and children are huddled together as closely as possible upon the floor in filthy rags infected with vermin.

While housing conditions in Shitaya and in corresponding quarters of other cities are detestable, the feeding of these multitudes is still more revolting. One may literally say they are fed upon garbage.* Fish heads and entrails, partly decomposed fruits, rice and other cooked and uncooked vegetables, compose their diet. There are established restaurants in some of the poorest quarters of the larger cities

Cf. Henry Dumolard, *Le Japon politique, economic et social,* chapter viii.

where a meal of garbage collected from the hotels, restaurants, tea houses or hospitals, is served for from two to five sen (one to two and one-half cents), at a handsome profit. It is said that men have made and are making small fortunes in such collections and dispositions of garbage. One would suppose that in the midst of such dire poverty there could be no opportunities for great gain. But in Japan, as in most countries, the usurer, the speculator, the landlord, commonly reap their richest harvests in the exploitation of the poor.

One item of stupendous exploitation is in the renting of the wretched shacks called two-mat houses. The cost of building one of these is about 20 yen ($10.00). They rent commonly for 4 sen per night (4½ with mats). During the year the rent would amount to 1,460 sen or 14.6 yen—about 70 per cent. on the capital invested. Sometimes this amount is almost doubled by renting mere sleeping space. In such cases, even with taxes and the paltry repairs deducted, the net profits may amount to one hundred per cent. annually. Equally large profits, it is said, are reaped from the sale and rental of filthy, ragged clothing and bedding; also in the pawning business where often even the family's supply of food is put in pawn for the day. It is not an uncommon custom, we were informed, for a family to pool their paltry gains at the end of the day in order to purchase enough rice, sweet potatoes, or what not, to last during the next day. After

eating from this supply at night and again in the morning the remainder is then put in pawn in order to get a few sen for materials to start some petty business in the morning, like purchasing straw to make sandals or bamboo for baskets. If the day's earnings permit, the food is redeemed at night, leaving a good profit with the pawnee.

The *Japan Mail* of August 29, 1915, contained an editorial on the relief work in the slums of Tokyo which claimed there were then in that city about 205,800 persons who were forced to receive relief from the Imperial Charity Fund and Association and similar organizations.

Many imagine that only tramps, vagabonds, peddlers, cripples and beggars inhabit these slum quarters, but investigators have found that rickshaw men, artizans of various sorts, petty merchants, men who go about repairing household utensils, rag and paper collectors, sweepers, in fact all sorts of people who have fallen into poverty inhabit these quarters.

Naturally sex promiscuity, infanticide and disease of all sorts are very common in such districts. Indeed, they are pest-breeding centers and most city governments do little or nothing to improve or ameliorate conditions. Thousands of these people, it is claimed, are too poor even to pay the residence tax which does not generally amount to more than ten or twenty cents a year. Cities in turn give as little public service as possible. The lighting is extremely scant and the sanitary service shameful.

In the city of Kobe, for instance, we visited a section in Fukiai which contained 1,944 one-room, two-mat (six by six feet square) houses. There were eleven blocks which housed 7,510 persons. Most of the alleys on which the houses are built were mere passageways with an open trench extending down one side through which flowed a sluggish little stream of water. Some of the inhabitants were washing food, others were washing pieces of clothing in the water. At the upper end, in a corner of three of the crowded alleys entirely exposed to the public gaze was an open vat with a mere iron rail about it, which served as a community toilet. The human excrement in the vat was overflowing and running down into the water trench in which people, only a short distance away, were washing food and clothing. Although these vats are emptied every day or two by peasants who purchase the contents for fertilizing purposes, yet the accommodations in these congested quarters are inadequate and indecent, to say nothing of the grave dangers to the public health.

"Does not the city ever clean up these pest places?" we inquired of our guide who was showing us about through the city streets. "Yes, usually before festival days," was the rejoinder. We were further informed that several well-intentioned Japanese in Kobe who were desirous for better conditions for the very poor people had repeatedly appealed to the authorities for improved lighting and

sanitation for these quarters, but no action had resulted.

Japanese always remind one that even in the most wretched quarters facilities for bathing are always free. Bathing originally was included in the religious rites of the Japanese as of other Oriental peoples, and it has become one of the normal functions of life, almost as important as eating. In the better quarters of large cities, diseased persons may not enter the public bath, but in the very congested slum districts, where diseases of all sorts prevail, the public bath, which is a vat of very hot water into which many individuals enter one after another, after a preliminary soaping, must be a medium for transmitting disease and contagion. Moreover, the clothing of the people in the slums do not have the appearance of receiving the same religious attentions as do their bodies.

II

The abject poverty of Japan is by no means confined to the congested districts of the larger cities. As has been stated in a previous chapter, the cultivated land is much overcrowded, and the peasant on his small holdings is commonly unable to eke out an existence for himself and his family except by engaging in some subsidiary occupation at which each member of the family may turn a hand during every spare moment of the day. But even in pros-

perous times the peasant usually has no margin for economies which might tide him over periodical calamities like floods, famines and earthquakes. When such adversities do come, invariably there are thousands of peasant families who face literal starvation and without charitable aid could not survive.

Floods and famines, however, do not appear to be the worst inflictions constantly menacing the peasants. Numerous uncontrolled and merciless money-lenders are the leeches who constantly sap the life and hope of the poor farmers as well as of many other classes high and low, including tradespeople and petty officials.

The vast majority of petty land holdings are heavily mortgaged and at such extortionate rates of interest as would crush the prosperous, to say nothing of the poor. These rates vary from twenty to fifty per cent. compounded monthly. In some cases they mount even to one hundred and two hundred per cent. Such shameful usury coupled with the other heavy taxes imposed by the Government upon every commodity, every necessity—and some are taxed several times in different ways—have undoubtedly combined to create these vast hordes of destitute poor who number not thousands but millions.

In 1914 the Government made the startling announcement that during the previous winter nine million people in the northern districts of the Empire, including the Hokkaido, were in pressing need

of assistance. From an article on "Relief Work" by the Rev. J. P. Neone, one learns that the suffering among these people in the rural districts at such periods is most acute. "Thousands possess no bedding, except a few old rags, no fuel, and no food."

In the face of such distress, it is not so astonishing that parents are induced to bind over their daughters—often little girls—into slavery of the most shameful kind. At such periods of acute desolation the recruiting agents for the factories and for the Yoshiwara (prostitute quarters) are always on hand, going from door to door, telling the poor ignorant people how daughters may save their families from starvation and may lay by extra money for themselves by doing service in these places for a period of years after which they may return to their homes. When facing such hopeless distress on the one hand and such rosy redeeming prospects on the other, parents readily bind over their daughters for a period of from three to seven years either to the great factories or to the prostitute quarters, little dreaming what martyrdom their children must usually undergo.

The methods of recruiting for the factories have already been discussed. Those for the Yoshiwara are similar, excepting that the contracts call for a lump sum to be paid the parents in advance.

This leads to a discussion of the question of licensed prostitution in its various phases—an institution established and controlled by the State.

III

The Yoshiwara is an ancient institution of Japan, but the present system of State-licensed prostitution was established in 1872 on the advice of a British army surgeon then in the employ of the Japanese Government with a view to lessening the abuses and horribly degrading conditions of social vice controlled by private individuals and political scoundrels.

The Western world looks aghast upon a State that permits parents practically to sell their daughters into lives of shame and slavery and itself shares richly in the profits. Ghastly as the practice is and loudly as it should be denounced, yet the self-righteous, superior attitude which most Occidental writers assume in the discussion of this institution as it is established in Japan is almost ludicrous, since it must be acknowledged that the social evils as existing in Western lands, and particularly in our own large cities, are far more degrading for both sexes and far more merciless and immoral in their effect upon the young women victims concerned than is the case in Japan.

An example of smug superiority typical of so many Occidental writers, particularly British, is found in Lawton's *Empires of the Far East.** He says: "It is not realized that in the midst of a coun-

*Volume I, page 724.

try which, perhaps, more than any other part of the world, has been endowed with the glorious beauties of nature, thousands of women, and even little girls are enslaved in a condition of moral degradation that has no parallel in lands where the teachings of Christianity are accepted."

This sort of comment indicates either supreme ignorance of the conditions of prostitution as they exist in Western countries or an intolerable pharisaical twist of mind. The statement would doubtless be more literally true of conditions in Western lands if it read: "Permitted by the National Government, and local governments sharing often in the shameful profits of their exploitations, thousands of women and little girls are allowed to be enslaved in a condition of moral degradation that has no parallel *except* in lands where the teachings of Christianity are accepted."*

It must also be remembered that sex morality has not been rated the highest morality for Japanese women as it has been for Western women. Self-sacrifice for a high purpose was formerly rated of greater importance socially. Consequently, Japanese social ethics decreed that a woman might defile her body but not her soul to save her family

*For data concerning vice conditions in Western countries, see *The Social Evil in Chicago* by the Vice Commission; Kneeland's *Commercialized Prostitution in New York;* Flexner's *Prostitution in Europe;* and Sanger's *History of Prostitution.*

from death, starvation, extreme suffering, or her husband from disgrace. Until recent years, since the teachings of Christianity have somewhat influenced the thought concerning social standards, daughters were respected, even lauded, for such sacrifices, just as the sons were lauded for laying down their lives for their retainers, and now for the Mikado or their country. Prof. Rein, writing as early as 1884, says: "In the opinion of all those who are actually acquainted with the facts relating to this subject, the fallen woman in Japan is never found to occupy so low a position as in our own great towns. On the contrary, the inmates of the Yoshiwara are not despised but pitied by the better classes of society; and indeed it is known that they are pursuing their degraded avocation from no fault of their own, but at the will of their parents or nearest relatives, who have for the most part sold them in their early years to the proprietors of houses of public resort, where they are trained in various branches, but more particularly in the arts of Aspasia, until the time arrives when they are fit to turn them to account as slaves of their masters."*

The practice of parents selling daughters purely for gain has not been uncommon.† "In plain language," says Lawton, "some parents are not slow to bring all the pressure of that family system of authority which has been so inconsiderately extolled, to

*Rein, *Japan,* page 432.

†Lawton, *Empires of the Far East,* volume I, page 728.

bear upon their daughters in order to induce them to quit a life of virtue for a bondage of vice from which they themselves may receive the ill-gotten proceeds. . . . Moreover, it is notorious; and in addition there are thousands of instances where, if the relatives are not actually parties to the evil contract, they are, at least, constant receivers of the resultant earnings."

IV

As has been stated, the Yoshiwara, or segregated quarter of prostitution, is an old institution in Japan. It was regulated by legislation as early as 1617, with a view to lessening and controlling, more or less, the various evils associated with vice, such as kidnapping children for evil purposes and preventing prolonged and costly debauches; also with a view to facilitating the hunting down of criminals who so often take refuge in vice quarters.

A custom which indicated that prostitution is not frowned upon seriously by the public is the frequent practice of locating the segregated quarters close to the temples. In fact, there are many places where the temples are on one side of a street and the houses of pleasure on the opposite side. Often the main road leading to the temples passes through the licensed quarters. "On the great temple festivals," Rein informs us, "they [the inmates of the Yoshiwara] have to march in the procession in their best

attire and to serve the dishes at the feast given by some high official." Indeed, it has always been the custom on festival days for the people, even the better classes, to go with their families, including the children, to the Yoshiwara to watch the gay, brilliant spectacles given by the inmates.

In Japan as elsewhere there are grades and classes of public women. The geisha are the public singers or entertainers. Commonly they are recruited as children, or they are adopted as orphans or kidnapped with a view to preparing them for public life. When quite young they are trained in dancing, singing, posing, story-telling, playing the samisen, in pretty manners; in short, in all the arts and wiles of conduct which will eventually make them attractive to men. Rarely are they given any moral training beyond being docile and obedient. Naturally, they are ill-fitted to resist the temptations by which they are constantly beset later as public entertainers. Very commonly they are first corrupted by their so-called foster fathers, who afterward hire them out as mistresses to natives or foreigners for a short period of time, or as concubines. When the masters wish to change, the girls return to their foster parents and are hired out as entertainers, or as the trade may indicate.

But some of the geisha appear to manage their own lives fairly well, and with more independence than any other classes of women in Japan. Some have married, and are to-day living legitimate con-

ventional lives in high places. Up to a very recent period the geisha were omnipresent at all public and even private functions of importance from the Court down. At mixed social gatherings it has been an imperative custom for wives to exchange formal courtesies and then to retire to one side and remain silent and demure while the geisha performed, after which the husbands amused themselves with the geisha while the wives looked on. But it must always be remembered that loose, familiar conduct is never seen in public in Japan. Good form is almost invariably observed. Of late years there has begun to be considerable reaction against this old-established custom. A movement against the omnipresence of the geisha, conducted by Madam Yajima and her W. C. T. U. following, has made such an impression that even during the recent coronation festivals the geisha were largely eliminated from the Court functions.

The common joro (prostitutes), and even the higher classes of courtesans, led a very different life from that of the geisha. They are recruited when young by agents—men or women, who follow recruiting as a business—and are also given some training with a view to preparing them for later duty. In short, practices corresponding to those of the white slave trade of which we have so recently become aware have long been common in Japan as elsewhere. "It is a positive fact," says De Becker in *The Nightless City,* "that some evil-

minded persons make it a regular profession to take in the daughters of the poor people under the pretext of adopting them as their own children, but when the girls grow up they are sent out to service as concubines or as prostitutes, and in this manner the persons who have adopted them reap a golden harvest."

In considering the problem of prostitution in Japan, it must be borne in mind that almost no young women engage in this profession of their own free will. Generally they are bound over by a firm and fast contract made by parents or guardians after the girl has first formally appealed in writing to the Government for permission to engage in the practice.

It is true that in order to safeguard* the applicant as much as the system will permit, she must appear in person at the police station, where she is closely questioned and warned against taking such a fatal step. She is then required to file a document, usually through one having power of attorney, giving full details of her necessity for becoming a prostitute. She is also questioned concerning her birth, parents or relatives, the place where she intends to practise, the name she will adopt, her proposed term of service, her present means of livelihood; in brief, regarding everything pertaining to her life. This application must be accompanied by the documents

*De Becker, *Nightless City*, pages 333-334.

of consent signed and sealed by the proper parties, i. e., her family. "Strictly speaking," Lawton informs us,* "the law places itself on the right side. Theoretically, the girls are free to choose their own way in life. In reality, they are bound hand and foot, just as much as though they wore chains and manacles." In a word, the Japanese girl may in no wise follow her own will.

After official permission to practise prostitution has been granted the applicant must undergo a medical examination before the contract with the brothel keeper is made. The contract is then executed, signed, sealed and witnessed. Usually a sum of money is paid in advance to the parents or guardian, for which the girl gives service until the debt is cleared. During her period of service the girl receives food, clothing, medical attention—all of which comes out of her portion of her earnings. Unfailingly she is encouraged to be extravagant in the brothel, and the charges made for all she receives are so exorbitant that often instead of liquidating her debt at an early period, as she hopes always to do in the beginning, fresh charges are added constantly to her account, and her debt increases.

Perhaps the worst feature of the contract is the practice of having a guarantor who may be held legally responsible for the loans by the brothel keeper, in case the girl by some chance does not

*Lawton, volume I, page 727.

redeem the debt. This accounts for girls bearing up under the most shameful abuses when they might sometimes escape or would gladly destroy themselves. Yet the terrific family pressure does not always inhibit them. Sometimes they do escape and not infrequently they commit suicide. A well-established rule at all brothels forbids guests from entering with any sort of a weapon, the double purpose being to prevent brawling and as a precaution against suicide. Nevertheless it is stated by good authorities, such as Colonel Yamamura, head of the Salvation Army, and others, that an average of from two to three double suicides a month occur in Tokyo alone, to say nothing of the single suicides of the girls. The double suicides are cases where young men and young girls become attached to each other, both parties knowing they can never be legitimately united.

The Government requires frequent and regular inspection of all prostitutes. Hospitals are maintained in connection with the segregated prostitute quarters. But medical inspection in Japan, like similar inspection elsewhere, is more or less farcical, and experts maintain that an average of fifteen out of every twenty prostitutes are diseased. In connection with commercialized vice there are many rules and regulations intended to safeguard the public, to prevent the exploiting of all parties concerned, to guard the health of the patrons and to keep all conduct as proper and orderly as possible, accord-

ing to the accepted standards. But it is known that police officials, inspectors, doctors and nurses are all underpaid, and that in order to live they must add to their legitimate incomes. This fact, in a nutshell, accounts for the general corruption of the whole system, so that notwithstanding the numerous rules and regulations against fees and other forms of exploitation, there is no small amount of "salving," "squeeze" and tea-money all along the line.

Before entering a brothel each patron must be registered and pay a fee of twenty sen. The registration includes the name, profession, status and recorded place of living, details of dress and personal appearance of the guest. This record is kept carefully and may be used at any time for police or secret service purposes, as well as to keep an account of the business returns, in which the Government shares. While the Government reaps a harvest in vice traffic through various forms of assessment, it has nevertheless made great effort to make this evil as safe, orderly and free from associated crimes and grave debaucheries as possible. To be sure, there are infamous practices connected with the business, such as exposing the young girls in cages to public gaze in the streets, although this is no longer done at the best houses, where photographs are on exhibition at the entrance; and the keeper bawls out in extravagant terms the charms and virtues of his inmates. But some unspeakable abuses common in Western nations have been largely eliminated in Japan. The

various uses of drugs, excessive drinking, brawling and bullying of women are not tolerated, and the treatment of the inmates of brothels is often more humane than in Western lands, where physical ruin and early death are the general rule. In Japan, on the other hand, women of the same class are often redeemed and marry after a time and become respectable wives and mothers.

It is said that there are about nine different classes of Japanese prostitutes, graded according to looks, talent, popularity, and the streets or houses in which they are practising.

V

As to the extent of prostitution in Japan, statements and statistics are so much at variance that even an approximate estimate can scarcely be made. Lawton* concludes from statistics made in 1898 that there were 40,208 courtesans, 24,261 singing girls, 546 segregated quarters and 10,172 establishments.

A French writer, M. G. Weulersse,† published an

*Lawton, *The Empires of the Far East,* volume I, page 727.

†Weulersse, *Japan d'ajourd'hui,* page 286. Compare the above figures with those concerning Great Britain estimated a few years latter by W. W. Sanger, in *History of Prostitution,* page 359. See also Flexner, *Prostitution in Europe* (1914), especially pages 24 ff. By comparing these authorities it will readily be seen that conditions in Western Europe and America are in some respects worse than in Japan.

investigation of social problems in Japan in 1910. He estimated the number of registered prostitutes at fifty thousand; the non-registered (those doing service as maids in tea-houses, etc.) at eighty thousand, and the geisha at thirty thousand.

This would seem to indicate considerable moral laxity in Japan, resulting in widespread disease. According to conservative authorities like Colonel Yamamura, venereal disease is very common in spite of frequent inspection and the hospital service. But when the figures concerning Japanese prostitution are compared with the figures in America and European countries,* one finds every associated evil existing in greater profusion and variety in these Occidental countries than in Japan. True, Western Governments do not share in the exploitation of this vice, though they unquestionably do not prevent local city officials from levying assessments in the way of "police protection" and "privileges," nor do they prevent the liquor interests from sharing and co-operating largely in the traffic. Furthermore, the precautions against the spreading of disease are more or less desultory and neglectful; in brief, abuses of every form are unquestionably worse in Western countries.

The most shameful feature in the Japanese system, as has been indicated, is that of parents prac-

*See *The Social Evil in Chicago,* by the Vice Commission; Kneeland, *Commercialized Prostitution in New York City;* Flexner, *Prostitution in Europe.*

tically selling their own daughters into such bondage and entering into contracts with the Government for such a privilege, both parties sharing in the profits of this infamous exploitation. And it must be acknowledged that a people who tolerate such conditions, with so little public protest against them and with so little social stigma upon the families who engage in such practices, may not lay claim to being highly civilized, even though they have acquired beautiful manners, artistic standards of conduct, and make lofty claims of social and family superiority.

Clearly the Japanese would do well to provide a liberal education for women which would make for broader social as well as domestic development and would give women a chance for some expression concerning the disposition of their own abilities, their own services, and particularly their own bodies.

CHAPTER XI

CHARITIES, BENEVOLENCES AND MUTUAL AID

I

From time immemorial the Japanese people have been compelled to accustom and adjust themselves to frequent and stupendous disasters like floods, famines, earthquakes, various pestilential epidemics, as well as ruinous internal wars; and because of these numerous far-reaching disasters the people and rulers early learned to devise ways and means of collective co-operation in protecting themselves against such calamities.

From the earliest period, when the Emperors were considered divine, they were expected to cure cattle and human diseases, to check epidemics and to exterminate harmful birds, beasts and insects through "charms" which their supernatural power enabled them to exercise against such evils. In a similar manner we find the early pagans, and later the Christians, were expected to perform miracles and cast out devils. The early Japanese rulers were also expected to give aid to the sick, the aged and beggars. Consequently, Japanese mythological history abounds in traditions of miracles and relief-works performed by the divine Emperors.

After Buddhism was introduced (572-621), the attitude of the people underwent some change, and Buddha began to share in the divine powers formerly attributed solely to the Emperors. The Buddhist priests did much also in teaching and aiding the people, in promoting public welfare and community enterprises, in preventing disasters or preparing against them. Side by side they built temples and relief-hospitals, as they would be called nowadays.

Early Buddhistic and Confucian teaching strongly emphasized the importance of practising benevolences and of cultivating benevolent conduct, and history relates that as early as the seventh and eighth centuries there were great public benefactors and princes who built public baths and asylums for the sick and poor. Buddhist priests themselves often directed and even personally aided in the various public welfare enterprises like building the public granaries and roads, mending bridges and reclaiming waste lands.

There is a story commonly told of a priest named Shaku-Kuya who, about 938, changed his name and went on a pilgrimage throughout the empire, everywhere devoting himself to good works of public welfare, such as mending roads, building bridges, digging wells, improving temples and burying corpses exposed along the waysides. Meanwhile he preached Buddhism in the streets of the various villages. Later he was given the title "Great Priest." History records that during an epidemic which

caused many people to die at Kyoto and in the surrounding country this "Great Priest" carved an image of Buddha ten feet high with eleven faces. When the image was completed the epidemic ceased. Thus we learn that many of the early devout followers of Buddha were quite as able to perform miracles as were the early devout followers of Christ.

As was customary in most countries, the various early Emperors and princes of Japan often initiated public works like the building of castles, roadways and canals, primarily to give employment and to teach habits of diligence and thrift to destitute tramps and beggars. As many as one hundred thousand out-of-work coolies, it is claimed, were employed at a time upon such enterprises, which not infrequently caused criticism for such lavish extravagance.

One of the earliest, commonest and most needed institutions for relief was the establishment of the *Giso,** the public charity granary, where rice was received as taxes and stored as a community provision against famine. The practice of building *Gisos* was commenced as early as 702, in imitation of similar institutions already established in China.

Originally rice was collected from all classes, including the very poor, to fill these granaries, but later it was decreed that the rice should be collected

*See *History of Relief Works in Japan* and *Our Relief Works and Charitable Enterprises*, published by Bureau for Local Affairs, Home Department.

from the middle and upper classes. In course of time many interesting methods of giving aid to needy members of a province or community were introduced. In some localities the poor paid taxes except in times of famine, when they were partially or wholly exempted from taxation. Pensions to orphans and to the aged were sometimes granted in the form of certain annual allowances of rice. A custom became prevalent for rich or prosperous persons to donate a tract of land to the community for relief purposes. Such customs still obtain in Japan, though relief works have been extended to educational and various other public welfare enterprises.

After the decline of the influence of the Fujiwara family, who more or less dominated the Court from 670-1050, the Central Government deteriorated, and there followed a series of internal rebellions and struggles among the nobles. In consequence of these almost incessant civil wars, society became greatly demoralized; various industries were paralyzed, and for want of employment vagrants and beggars were so common and suffered such extreme want and distress that it was not uncommon for men, women and children to die along the wayside from starvation, exposure or lack of medical care. During this period community relief work was largely neglected or abandoned and all benevolences were in the hands of the Buddhist priests.

In time, however, the various nobles, in imitation of the royal families, began to hold themselves

responsible for the welfare of the people of their respective provinces. Some of the feudal lords lived most frugally, sometimes even meanly, in order to provide ample granaries against floods and famines. In fact there was a classic motto commonly known which implied that a province which had not three years' provisions in store against public disasters was not qualified to be independent.

Along with the *Giso* there was often established a public loan fund, made up of rice, wheat, money and even medicines and clothing. All members of the community contributed to the fund. When necessary, members of the community might borrow from the fund in ordinary times, but must return the materials borrowed with interest at the expiration of a stipulated period. In times of great and general distress the city officials doled out the paddy of the *Giso* to the very needy.

Sometimes, during these intermittent periods of public distress, grave social errors were committed in the name of charity by well-intentioned rulers. Perhaps all debts were cancelled, or the property of the well-to-do was confiscated to help the poor, or sometimes mortgaged lands were declared disencumbered and reverted to their original owners. Such practices naturally must have been demoralizing to the people, and, as one author maintains, "diffused incurable evils throughout the country." The common people, hitherto moderately industrious, degenerated "into a mob of idlers and sturdy beggars."

On the other hand, many of the benevolent enterprises of the early nobles were most commendable and are worthy of imitation to-day. One initiated in 1666 by Maeda-Tsunanori, Lord of Kaga Province, was particularly noteworthy. He ordered the officials of various provinces to take a census of the beggars, after which, contrary to the advice of his councilors, who considered the project too daring and impracticable, he undertook the care and housing of two thousand homeless wanderers. He built houses for their accommodation near his castle and doled out rice from his store-house to feed them. He built a hospital for the sick and workshops wherein the well might learn useful trades. An effort was made to discover the special aptitudes of every individual and to train each one along some useful line in accordance with his taste. Useful articles were made in the shops for which there was a public demand, and the proceeds from the sales of these articles went to support the institution. When the inmates had learned a useful trade they were sent out provided with clothing, rice and money. Sometimes they married and borrowed from the loan fund in order to purchase tools and materials for colonizing.

Within a short time this institution became self-supporting, and the money which Maeda had used for developing the enterprise was paid back. A secondary noteworthy feature was the manner in which the beggars who entered the institution were han-

dled. It is recorded that they were no longer treated as beggars, but with "rare delicacy" they were taught self-reliance and self-respect. Instead of calling their dwellings "beggar shelters," they were called "honorable lodgings where belated travelers through life might purchase rest and refreshment before starting on their journeys again."

II

Systematized neighborhood aid was also an early institution in Japan. The province or clan was sometimes grouped in families of five for mutual help. If one became ill or in need, he must first appeal to this group before applying to the communal or provincial authorities for assistance.

Most interesting of all were the various early enterprises developed for mutual and community benefits. Burial societies were frequently organized in the various communities with a view to aiding the sick or of performing a free burial service in case of death. These guides often extended the scope of their benevolences to aiding the worthy poor or to helping them pay off their debts by loaning them rice at half-rate interest. Gradually more and more guilds were formed for public relief works, such as building much-needed bridges, rebuilding villages which had been destroyed or damaged by fires, floods or earthquakes. Sometimes waste lands were reclaimed and put under cultivation, the proceeds be-

ing devoted to public welfare enterprises. It appears that in early Japan there were many such enterprises, some of which are still extant. Of late years public funds from such sources have been diverted to educational purposes.

In Sagana there is a small mountain village made up of perhaps two hundred families. Since the middle of the Tokugawa régime (1600-1868) there has been a rush society in this village for the purpose of thatching the roofs. The village is divided into five sections, one group taking on the thatching of all the roofs each year. A day is appointed for the task when the farmers are not busy, and at the appointed time all the families in the section assemble. Each family contributes two loads of rushes and one *sho* of rice. Usually forty or fifty people set to work and in a day the whole village is thatched.

Collective community tree planting has also been an old-established custom in Japan, and in recent years has been more generally practised than formerly. During and after the Russo-Japanese War whole villages commemorated certain great victories by planting barren hillsides. One village—Iwane, in Shuga—planted four million trees in thirteen days. Thousands of acres, it is said, have been planted in this way. In many cases the income accruing from these public forests is devoted to the support of the families of men who died in the war. Sometimes the income is turned over to the Red Cross Fund.

In many of the smaller villages assiduity organizations have been formed for the purpose of encouraging both landlords and tenants in agricultural enterprises and also in initiating various auxiliary industries to help the communities. If public work needs to be done, the members of these organizations volunteer their services. Other organizations have competitive contests in such work as rope-twisting, sheave-binding and mulberry-planting.

The chief auxiliary industry of Japan is sericulture. The district of Hagri contains about six thousand three hundred houses, of which five thousand are engaged in raising the silk-worm, the annual income from which totals five hundred thousand yen. This district now has about twenty-two small training schools, in which the people are instructed in methods of feeding and handling the silk-worm so as to obtain the best results. In this way silk-raising as an avocation has spread so rapidly that now there are districts in which there is scarcely a house which has not a room devoted to raising the silk-worm.

Obviously, the nature of the early charities and benevolences of Japan leaned usually in the direction of mutual aid among the smaller social groups, but general calamities like floods, earthquakes and famines now and then pressed the people to band themselves together on a larger scale. Many of these early organizations for mutual benefits still survive, although their activities have generally been modified to meet modern demands and conditions.

III

The new era of industrial Japan has developed new exigencies, and the spirit of mutual aid has fallen somewhat into decay. Largely through the instigation or on the initiation of the foreign missionaries, Western methods of giving charity and social aid have been adopted, so that to-day Japan abounds in organizations such as the Y. M. C. A., the Y. W. C. A., the W. C. T. U., the Salvation Army, the Young Men's Buddhist Associations patterned after the Y. M. C. A., charity hospitals, open air schools, day nurseries for children of the poor, free employment bureaus, orphanages, asylums for defectives, hospitals for lepers and tuberculars, homes for the aged, for ex-convicts, for invalided soldiers, for tramps and vagrants, and schools for delinquent children. In fact, there is almost no modern European or American "uplift" enterprise which has not been attempted in Japan, and in tracing them back to their origins almost invariably one finds they have been initiated or suggested by the missionary.

The results of these endeavors at reform and benevolence, generally combined with religious propaganda, either Christian or Buddhist, are now scattered more or less throughout the whole empire. The latest accessible reports* inform us that there are now 414 charitable and benevolent enterprises

*The *Japan Year Book* for 1916, page 225.

costing about one and a half million yen annually and giving aid and protection to over fifteen thousand persons. But even with all this effort there is great need for more to be done. For instance, there are at present about twenty-four thousand lepers in Japan, and hospital accommodations for only five per cent. of the number afflicted. Besides these general public benevolences, there are patriotic philanthropies of which the Red Cross work is the most important. The statistics of this organization in 1914 showed that it possessed two hospital ships, fifteen hospitals, 142 medical corps, 205 doctors and pharmacists and 5,387 nurses. The total membership of the society numbered 1,694,796, their annual expenditure was 2,820,997,863 yen, and the sum total of their property amounted to 29,308,-707,647 yen. In 1914 the society decided to devote ten per cent. of their annual receipts for six years to efforts at prevention of tuberculosis. When the great war broke out in 1914 this society dispatched three relief corps to Europe.

There is also an auxiliary organization to the Red Cross of volunteer nurses having a membership of nearly fourteen thousand. In ordinary times the members prepare bandages and attend monthly lectures on rescue work. It is interesting to note that there is a branch of this society in nearly every prefecture.

The largest and most important women's organization in Japan is the Women's Patriotic Society

which has a membership of nearly nine hundred thousand. This organization owes its inception to Madam Okumura, who, after having witnessed the frightful conditions during the Boxer uprising in China in 1900, was inspired to do something to organize the women of her country for relief work in time of war. This organization disburses annual relief amounting to one hundred and fifty thousand yen to invalid soldiers and their families and keeps a workhouse for the disabled ones. It also concerns itself with the schooling of soldiers' orphans. At present they are schooling 639 boys. Patriotic lectures and celebrations are given by this organization with a view to stimulating patriotism. In this respect this work is considered by many Japanese rather futile, since lack of patriotism is no fault of the Japanese, high or low, rich or poor. On the contrary, they seem overcharged with nationalism of a somewhat belated order, ambitious for mere national glory. To such a point, in fact, does this spirit prevail that many would sacrifice the best social interests of the community, state or nation, to further such ends.

Aside from the private charities in Japan, there are two other important sources of relief and benevolences. The Court has always been most generous, and during recent years has liberally supported almost every important relief work of the country, whether under Christian, Buddhist or State management. Porter informs us that "the splendid mu-

nificence of the Royal Family of Japan has been a shining example to philanthropists throughout the Empire. There is scarcely a charitable undertaking, Christian or Buddhist, which can not claim the recognition or support of the Emperor or Empress, or of the Princes or Princesses of the Blood Royal, and Imperial benevolence mitigates the effect of every calamity that overtakes the country. The scale upon which the Emperor's gifts are conceived is lavish enough to be remarkable even in a land where the liberality of the monarch is traditional."*

A second source of relief, aside from private and Court donations, is the State. In view of the frequent natural calamities, causing widespread distress, the State has almost been forced to enact legislation so that prompt relief may be given when needed. The relief regulations of 1880 provide that each administration prefecture shall create a permanent reserve fund with a minimum of five hundred thousand yen. The State shall undertake to hand over every year for ten years an amount to be fixed in proportion to that set apart by the prefecture toward the fund. Now, in case of great calamities like floods, earthquakes, extensive fires, plagues from vermin or kindred pests, the Central Government promptly dispatches warships or soldiers with clothing, provisions, fuel and medical aid, and gives or loans the survivors resources such as

*Porter, *Japan, The New World Power*, page 597.

timber from the State forests and tools for rebuilding. The State also donates funds for disbursements in the support of foundlings, orphans, infants, decrepit persons and invalids with no relatives to care for them.

IV

One of the most exemplary efforts along the line of public welfare conducted and supported by the State is that of prison management and reform. The accepted attitude toward prisoners on the part of the Government is that of amelioration and correction rather than punishment and revenge. Since 1870 prisoners have been regarded by the State as possible good citizens who may be reclaimed from bad habits and bad surroundings. Moreover, the keeping and management of prisoners have not been in the hands of desultory appointees or politicians. Men who go into prison management, whether in high or low positions, are required to take a special course of training to fit them specifically for such work.

A school for such training was established in Tokyo in 1900. The course of study covers penal and civil codes, penology, procedure, criminology, prison sanitation, hygiene and drill. Under-officials must first serve probationary terms, assisting in the prisons, after which they must pass examinations before being appointed to positions.

The results of expert prison management in Ja-

pan are most favorable, and Western nations might do well to re-learn from the Japanese much that the Japanese learned originally from us and other Western nations. Perhaps in this line of modern prison reform work, better than in any other, is typified the customary habit of this intelligent people of learning all they can from Western nations and returning home to adapt—with improvements—what they have learned, to their own conditions.

One finds the prisons in Japan plain, but clean and sanitary, the living simple but wholesome, the discipline humane and kindly, never arbitrary or dictatorial. The prisons are usually more like dormitories with doors and windows open, letting in the fresh air, while the men are scattered about the various prison workshops cheerful and smiling. Apparently there exists no lack of careful discipline, but there is no bullying or undue rigor, such as is common in our own prisons.

An exemplary system of rewards and punishments for good and bad conduct, with commutation of time for a good record, has been instituted. The granting of medals is part of the reward system. The possession of a medal brings special privileges, such as* an increased rate of earnings, more interviews with friends and relatives, or favors in connection with baths, which are highly valued.

*See Porter, *Japan, The New World Power,* chapter xxv; *Japan Year Book,* 1916; and *Our Relief Works and Charitable Enterprises,* by the Home Department.

The expense of maintaining a prisoner averages a little more than one hundred yen per year, one-fourth of which is defrayed by the proceeds of prison labor. Prisoners who work of their own accord receive wages according to the time at work and the labor achieved. If they have families dependent upon them, a certain amount is deducted from the earnings for the dependent relatives; if not, all their earnings are handed to them when they are liberated.

Courses of primary and higher education are offered to those desiring them, and books for reading are furnished to those who do not wish to participate in the study classes. Courses in industrial training are also offered, chiefly with a view to preparing the untrained men for some useful occupation.

Much has been accomplished in the way of aiding dismissed prisoners. A number of homes have been established for liberated prisoners where men may come and go with considerable freedom before and after employment is found for them. But at present only one per cent. is cared for in this way. An organization for the protection of discharged prisoners has also proved effective. These organizations, of which there are now fifty-five in all, have self-governing* bodies to extend protection to pris-

*See *Our Relief Works and Charitable Enterprises,* Home Department.

oners whenever they are discharged. It is claimed that seventy per cent. of all prisoners discharged in Japan are restored to good citizenship, thirty per cent. having proved incorrigible.

Besides these larger State, Court and public charities and benevolences, there are many unrecorded private efforts at giving assistance, principally along educational lines. There are a great many people, some with large incomes and others with very limited incomes, who are constantly aiding one or several young men—and sometimes young women—to procure an education.

Another long-established method of aiding families, caring for orphans or of assisting the sons of a poorer friend is through adoption. "It is strange but true," says Chamberlain,* "that you may go often into a Japanese family and find half a dozen persons calling each other parent and child, brother and sister, uncle and nephew, and yet being really either no blood relation at all, or else relations in quite different degrees from those conventionally assumed. . . . Adoption is resorted to, not only to prevent the extinction of families and the consequent neglect of the spirits of the departed, but also in order to regulate the size of families. Thus a man with too many children hands over one or more of them to some friend who has none. To adopt a person is also the simplest way to leave him money."

*Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*, pages 17-18.

Formerly most orphans were taken care of through this custom of adoption.

Aside from the various charitable and benevolent activities already discussed, there has been some effort at constructive social welfare, but such work has been very limited and has been initiated chiefly by evangelical missionaries who are not especially trained along the various lines attempted. Most of the missionaries now in Japan are engaged in educational work, and by many of the missionaries themselves it is generally hoped that in the future trained social welfare workers will be sent instead of the ordinary missionary educators.

CHAPTER XII

THE GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTION

I

THE Government of Japan may perhaps best be described as a military-bureaucratic-clan aristocracy or oligarchy,* veiled by representative forms. Its policy in matters fundamental is essentially dictated and controlled by relatively few clans, families and individuals, consisting of members of the Imperial Family and Household, representatives of the great Satsuma and Choshu clans, leaders of the official and military classes and certain leading business men.

The basic fact in the long course of Japan's political history is the psychological unity and racial homogeneity of her people. "For more than five and twenty centuries, ever since the embryo of their national life began to develop under the leadership of the first Emperor, Jimmu,† the Japanese have

*According to the Aristotelian terminology the term "aristocracy" would perhaps be the more accurate. For it must be admitted that the rulers of modern Japan have, in the main, ruled in the national interest. But theirs is a government *for* rather than *by* or *of* the people.

†Of course no modern scientific historians other than Japanese accept this fabulous date of a mythical Emperor. All history prior to 645 A. D. is purely conjectural.

always lived under one and the same government, and have scrupulously maintained their ethnic unity. Throughout the country they have a common language, a common custom and tradition, and a common mode of life; and they as a people have, in spite of wide individual variation, a certain consistency and individuality in feeling and thought which are expressed in any phase of the national life."*

The fundamental principle of Japanese statecraft is the Divine Right of the Emperor and of the Imperial Dynasty.

"The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.†

"The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.

"The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and he exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution."

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*Uyehara, *The Political Development of Japan*, page 5. Into the much controverted question of the racial origin of the Japanese people, we have not found it necessary to venture. We agree with Uyehara when he says: "It matters not one iota, so far as the development of the Japanese nation is concerned, whether we claim that the parent stock of the Japanese came from Turkestan or Tibet, from the coast of India or from the Malay peninsula, or whether we proclaim the island of Kiushiu as the source of the Japanese race."

†"The Sacred Throne was established at the time when the Heavens and the Earth became separated (*Kojiki*). The Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred. . . . He must be reverenced and is inviolable."—Ito, *Commentaries*, page 7.

It must, however, be admitted that the absolutism of the Mikado has never degenerated into tyranny or despotism. He has ever been regarded as the patriarch or ancestral representative of his people rather than as their actual ruler. Indeed, he has usually been more or less of a figure-head who lived in harem-like seclusion and ruled by proxy or rather was himself one of the most obedient and restricted of the ruled. In this respect he might well be compared with an English sovereign who likewise "can do no wrong." But there is this important difference—the King of England has never been actually worshipped by his nominal subjects.

Since the Restoration of 1868 the Mikado has partly emerged from his former seclusion and has taken a more active part in public affairs. The late Emperor Mutsuhito exercised, in fact, a powerful influence, though opinions still differ as to the nature and extent of his influence. At any rate, it is generally agreed that his power was wisely exercised. The present Emperor Yoshihito is a still more doubtful factor in the Government. By some he is credited with liberal and democratic tendencies, by others with militaristic and reactionary leanings. It is certain that he has been carefully trained in mind and body, that he concerns himself with the general activities and welfare of the people, and seems destined to play an important rôle in the epoch-making history of Japan during the coming generation.

II

The Restoration of the power of the Mikado in 1868, the most important event in the modern history of Japan, was effected by a formidable coalition of feudal lords, under the leadership of the Choshu and Satsuma clans.*

The way had been prepared by a sort of literary, religious and intellectual renaissance in the latter half of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, more particularly by a study of history. Thus, those of the Samurai who were learned became convinced that the Shoguns (generals), who had ruled Japan through the military class since the close of the twelfth century, had usurped their power and that the Mikado was the true or legitimate ruler.

When Commodore Perry clamored for admittance at one of the gates of Japan in 1853, the power of the Tokugawa Shogunate† had already begun

*A clan is a sort of territorial clique of feudal lords and their retainers or personal followers (formerly Samurai). The ties of friendship and brotherhood engendered by the feudal system with its mutual obligations of patronage and service have survived the abolition of feudalism in 1871. But "clan government does not refer so much to the continuance of the feudal spirit as to the monopolizing of power by the representatives of a few of the clans to the exclusion of the others."—McClaren, page 61.

†This dynasty of Shoguns was founded by the great general and statesman Iyeyasu in 1603. He inaugurated a reign of peace which lasted for about 250 years and gave

to wane. Perry's opportune arrival merely set in motion forces which hastened and eventually precipitated the downfall of this dynasty. The various elements opposed to the Shogunate and hostile to the "hairy red-bearded barbarians" united in a crusade in favor of the so-called restoration of Imperial rule—a unification and centralization of power otherwise necessitated by the critical state of affairs both externally and internally.

The work of the Restoration was completed by the total abolition of feudalism in 1871 after all but seventeen out of the two hundred and seventy-six daimiates had voluntarily surrendered their fiefs. This was soon followed on the part of the Samurai by the surrender of their privileges and emoluments. In this movement the most powerful and influential retainers of the Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen clans played the most important rôles, and these four clans naturally reaped most of the political rewards of their action. In fact, "the disappearance of feudalism (i. e., of the daimiates) actually served to

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orders for the expulsion of the Jesuit missionaries. Owing to fear of aggression, his immediate successors forbade Japanese from leaving the country and closed the doors of Japan to all foreigners (with the exception of the Chinese and a Dutch settlement near Nagasaki)—a policy of exclusion which was maintained for over two centuries, or until 1854. Iyeyasu and his successors also succeeded in fastening upon the Japanese an elaborate code of regulations and ceremonial observances, and a rigid system of class distinctions, the effects of which have never been wholly eradicated.

strengthen rather than weaken the so-called clan-power which upheld the new imperialism in Japan."*

III

The actual powers vested in the Emperor by the Constitution are very extensive. Not only is the Mikado the supreme commander of the army and navy, but he also "determines the organization and peace standing of the army and navy"; he has the right to "declare war, make peace and conclude treaties"; he may "proclaim the law of siege" and "confer titles of nobility, rank, orders and other marks of honor." "The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration and the salaries of all civil and military offices, and appoints and dismisses the same"; that is, he has complete control over administration.

"The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet."† He gives sanc-

*Putnam Weale, *The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia,* page 346.

†"Thus," observes Count Ito *vide Commentaries,* 2nd ed., page 10), "the Emperor is not only the centre of the executive, but is also the source and fountain-head of the legislative power. . . . The legislative power is ultimately under the control of the Emperor, while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent. Thus between the Emperor and the Diet, a distinction is to be strictly maintained as to their relative positions."

It may be observed how closely Count Ito follows his Prussian model in this and other respects. Indeed, the

tion to laws and orders them to be promulgated and executed;* "he convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives."

In case the Imperial Diet is not in session and there exists an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or avert public calamities, the Emperor may issue Imperial ordinances which take the place of law. Such ordinances are, however, to be laid before the Diet at its next session and declared invalid for the future if not approved. But it would seem possible for the Emperor and his ministers to govern *constitutionally* in absolute fashion for indefinite periods by continuous prorogations and dissolutions of Parliament. Count Ito himself recognizes this danger. He says: "Should the Government make use of this power as a pretext for avoiding the public deliberations of the Diet or for destroying any existing law, the provisions of the Constitution would become dead letters."†

Even while the Diet is sitting the Emperor may

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analogy between German and Japanese social and political institutions becomes more and more striking the more closely they are studied and compared.

*It would seem that not only may the sanction be withheld, but that, as in the case of the Factory Law (see *infra*, pages 173-175), the promulgation of a law may be delayed indefinitely. "Sanction completes the process of legislation, while promulgation produces binding force upon the subjects."—Ito, *Commentaries*, page 11.

†*Commentaries*, page 16.

issue ordinances "necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws." According to Count Ito, administrative ordinances are here meant, but he makes it clear that while there must be no conflict with existing law, he does not approve of the "erroneous opinion" laid down even in the "Prussian Constitution," that the executive power of the sovereign should be "confined to the execution of the provisions of law." It seems to him that "ordinances are not only means for executing the law, but may, in order to meet requirements of given circumstances, be used to give manifestation to some original idea." In other words, the Japanese bureaucracy appears in some degree to enjoy a separate and original law-making power of its own. Here the analogy is with Russia of a former day rather than with Prussia.

These enormous Imperial powers are, of course, exercised mainly through ministers and a Privy Council. "The respective ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. All Laws, Imperial Ordinances and Imperial Rescripts, of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of State, require the countersignature of a Minister of State."* It will thus be seen that

*Constitution of Japan, article 55.

the Ministers are responsible to the Emperor instead of to Parliament, and that, according to the letter of the Constitution, the responsibility is an individual matter rather than a joint or collective one.

Nevertheless, these Ministers, with a Minister President at their head, form a Cabinet which initiates and executes general governmental policies. True it is that this body has no such joint responsibility as the British Cabinet, but Ministers do not act independently of their colleagues. For the policy of his department, each Minister must secure the approval of the Cabinet, or at least of the Minister President, though he is responsible only for the action of his own department, whereas the Minister President is responsible for the Cabinet as a whole as well as the action of each department.*

IV

We now approach the mysterious keystone in the arch of the Japanese Constitution—the hidden power which surrounds divinity itself. Who appoints the Ministers and what are the influences which really determine the public actions of his sacred Majesty?

The only reference to the subject in the Consti-

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*Uyehara, *The Political Development of Japan,* pages 137-138. This system was expressly designed to prevent the evils of party government. *Vide* Ito, *Commentaries,* 2nd ed., page 140.

tution is to a Privy Council which shall "deliberate upon important matters of State, when it has been consulted by the Emperor." Its functions are purely advisory, and it is only consulted upon important measures and policies. It consists of thirty-nine members, ten of whom are Cabinet Ministers. Its decisions, if accepted by the Emperor, are binding upon the Cabinet and the nation. Whether the Privy Council controls the Cabinet or is controlled by it would seem to depend upon which of the two is the stronger body at the time.

Ito tells us that the Emperor established the Privy Council so that he could obtain from it thorough and impartial information. "Ministers of State have to be acute of mind, quick and active in the dispatch of internal and external affairs. But the task of planning far-sighted schemes of statecraft, and of effectuating new enactments, after a careful deliberation and calm reflection, ... must be entrusted to a special institution made up of men of wide experience and of profound erudition." They must be "impartial, with no leanings to this or that party," and able to "solve all difficult problems."*

Uyehara says that "Each Departmental Minister is appointed nominally by the Emperor, usually on the advice of the Minister President; and the Minister President, as a rule, on the advice of the out-

**Commentaries,* 2nd ed., pages 108, 109.

going Premier, and seldom of the Privy Council. The sovereign may choose any one as a minister of State, but he has never done so."* These statements may be accurate as far as they go, but they hardly express the essential truth of the matter. Not merely the appointment and dismissal of the Ministry, but the real control of the Government of the country may be said to rest largely in the hands of groups or coteries of class leaders who owe allegiance to the *Genro* or Elder Statesmen.

The *Genro* or Elder Statesmen have been well described as "those statesmen still alive who, beginning to play small parts at the time of the Restoration, when they were young men, automatically succeeded their elders as years went by and those older men had died; then took their places as responsible ministers during the first great reconstruction period, which may be said to have ended in 1900; and finally vacated such substantive appointments in favor of younger men in order that they might surround the Throne as the chief members and real controllers of the Emperor's Privy Council, thereby securing continuity of policy and the preservation of the old clan-rule under the modern and sanctified forms of the West, which had finally been adopted so as to allow Japan to enter the family of nations."†

It has been claimed that the *Genro* has suffered

*Uyehara, *op. cit.*, page 139.

†Putnam Weale's *Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia*, page 369.

political death or eclipse since the demise of the late Emperor Mutsuhito; but recent events seem to demonstrate that this view is a mistaken one, though it may be admitted that their power has somewhat declined since 1900. During the winter and spring of 1914, while the authors of this book were in Japan, they had an opportunity of observing at close range the mode of procedure followed during a Ministerial crisis.

Upon the resignation of the Yamamoto Ministry, on March 24, 1914, a conference of the capacitated surviving Elder Statesmen was promptly called together. These were Prince Yamagata, Field Marshal Oyama and Marquis Matsukata. Marquis Inouye was at first too ill to attend, but joined the conclave later to urge the appointment of Count Okuma. This council first appealed to Prince Tokugawa and then to Viscount Kiyouri, who tried to form a bureaucratic Ministry of non-party members—an effort greeted with general ridicule and contempt on the part of the vernacular press. The *Genro* then turned to Count Okuma, the "grand old man" of Japan, who succeeded in forming a Ministry.

Count Okuma is not an Elder Statesman, as is often misstated. If he lives and is successful, he may possibly be admitted into this sacred and secret Inner Circle. There has been a vacancy since the death of the late Marquis Inouye. During the Cabinet crisis of December, 1912, the Elder Statesmen held no less than ten conferences, though Prince

Katsura does not seem to have found it necessary to consult them in January, 1906, when he recommended Marquis Saionji as his successor. When Saionji resigned in 1908, he in turn recommended Katsura as his successor. In 1911 Saionji again displaced Katsura on the latter's recommendation. In 1912 Katsura once more succeeded Saionji on the recommendation of the Elder Statesmen. In 1913 the *Genro* recommended Admiral Yamamoto.

In the main we feel bound to agree with the *Jiji Shimpo,* the *Times* of Japan, when it says: "In this country the work of Cabinet-making at present rests in the hands of the Elder Statesmen,"* if by Cabinet-making is meant the selection of the Premier or Minister President.

V

The Japanese Imperial Diet "takes part in legislation, but has no share in the sovereign power; it has power to deliberate upon laws, but none to determine them."†

The Diet consists of two Houses—a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. Both Houses have equal and practically co-ordinate powers, though the House of Peers, even if theoretically "more strongly constituted and more advantageously

*Quoted from *Japan Mail* (weekly ed.) for August 7, 1915.
†Ito, *Commentaries,* page 68.

placed," is nevertheless "much weaker" than the House of Representatives.*

Count Ito enumerates the following rights or powers of the Diet: (1) the right to receive petitions; (2) to address the Emperor and make representations to him; (3) to put questions to the Government and demand explanations; and (4) the right to control the management of the finances. Of these the more important and effective are the rights of interpellation and of address and representations to the Emperor. The right to receive petitions is negligible and that of financial control is exceedingly limited. It amounts to a certain degree of supervision rather than control.†

With respect to legislation it may be said that each House has a nominal or ineffective initiative, but the real initiative rests in the hands of the Government. "The Ministers of State and the Delegates of the Government may at any time take seats and speak in either House." The deliberations of both Houses are public, but the Government may at its discretion insist that they be secret. The Constitution requires that the Imperial Diet be convoked every year and a session shall last three months,

*This is the view of Uyehara, *op. cit.*, pages 166 and 208 ff.

†On the financial power of the Diet, see especially articles 62-72 of the Constitution and Ito's *Commentaries.* See also Uyehara, *The Political Development of Japan,* pages 141-146, and Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East,* pages 135, 136. On the rights of interpellation and address to the Crown, see Uyehara, pages 151-159.

except in "case of necessity, when the duration of a session may be prolonged by Imperial Order." In addition an extraordinary session may be convoked in case of "urgent necessity." In case of dissolution of the House of Representatives and a new election, "the new House shall be convoked within five months from the day of dissolution." The House of Peers stands prorogued during this period.

VI

The House of Peers is composed of the members of the Imperial Family, the orders of nobility, and of those persons who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor. It consists of several hundred hereditary and representative Peers and of one hundred and twenty-four Imperial nominees (including forty Peers and forty-five representatives of the highest taxpayers). The latter are elected for seven years, one from each prefecture by the fifteen male inhabitants thereof who pay the highest taxes. They are mostly rich merchants and wealthy land owners. The Imperial nominees are mostly government officials specially chosen by the Emperor for life on the recommendation of Cabinet Ministers. They are of course strongly bureaucratic in their sympathies.

Of the remaining members, the hereditary and representative Peers, there are 12 Princes of the Blood, 14 Princes, 34 Marquises, 17 Counts, 70 Viscounts and 63 Barons. Peers who are Princes or

Marquises sit by right of birth when they reach the age of twenty-five. Counts, Viscounts and Barons elect representatives from their respective orders. It may be said that the Japanese House of Peers is not a plutocratic body. Neither is it a stronghold of the landed interests as is the British House of Lords. It is essentially bureaucratic and represents the interests of the clans and of the civil and military classes.

This body, according to Ito,* is intended to "represent the higher grades of society." He hopes it may serve to "preserve an equilibrium between political powers, to restrain the undue influence of political parties, to check the evil tendencies of irresponsible discussions, to secure the stability of the Constitution, to be an instrument for maintaining harmony between the governing and the governed, and to permanently sustain the prosperity of the country and the happiness of the people."

On the whole it may be said to have fulfilled at least some of these expectations. It even turned against Count Ito himself in 1901 and mutilated his budget when this great statesman attempted to govern by means of a political party. Recruited largely from nobles and office-holders, it is bureaucratic and conservative. Like the Cabinet and the Privy Council, it is a stronghold of officialdom and an instrument in the hand of the Japanese oligarchy.

**Vide Commentaries,* pages 72, 73.

The House of Representatives is composed of members elected by the people. According to Ito, the members are "not to regard themselves as the delegates only of the people of their respective districts, commissioned to attend merely to matters entrusted to them by their constituents," but rather as "representatives of the people of the whole country."

VII

Since the revised election law of 1900 every male Japanese subject not less than twenty-five years of age who pays a direct tax of not less than ten yen (five dollars)* can vote for members of the House of Representatives. Election is by secret unsigned ballot, with a general election at least once in four years. Under the new law the system of large electoral districts was substituted for that of small ones and an independent electoral district was created for municipalities with a population of over thirty thousand. "Thus Japan has forty-seven rural electoral districts which coincide with the prefectural administrative districts (*fu* or *ken*) to each of which are allotted from four to twelve seats, according to their population; and sixty-one urban electoral districts, to each of which are allotted from one to two seats, except the districts of Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto, which have eleven, six and three

*Instead of fifteen yen, as formerly.

seats respectively."* The law of 1900 increased the number of representatives from three hundred to three hundred eighty-one and the number of possible voters from five hundred thousand to one million seven hundred thousand, that is, about one thirty-third of the population now enjoy voting privileges instead of one eighty-seventh, as was formerly the case. This to us astonishing result of a five dollar instead of a seven dollar and a half tax franchise is, of course, due to the dire poverty of the Japanese masses. In spite of the rather heavy land taxes, only a small minority of the farmers of Japan can qualify as voters. Yet the agrarian interests are well represented in the House of Representatives.

Still more surprising than the relatively small number of electors is the indifference to the franchise both of the voting and the non-voting population. Not only are the great majority of the voters either indifferent or purchaseable, but there appears to be no general demand for a wider suffrage. This was the case even during the agitation which resulted in the law of 1900.† An extension of the

*Uyehara, *op. cit.*, pages 178, 179.

†Thus the *Japan Mail* (weekly ed.), March 25, 1911, complains that the passage of a bill in favor of universal suffrage by the House of Representatives should have attracted so little attention from Japanese journalists. Judging from the summary of the debate given by the *Mail* in this issue, this is not surprising. It would not have been creditable to an American high school.

suffrage is demanded by certain politicians, but they do not seem to be backed by a strong popular agitation. None of the political parties at present advocate universal manhood suffrage.

During our sojourn in Japan there was some discussion of reducing the tax paying qualification from ten to five or seven yen and there was some sentiment in favor of granting the franchise to all graduates of middle schools, thus increasing the number of franchise holders by about a quarter of a million. But there was no suggestion of an educational qualification based upon literacy or elementary schooling.

The following utterance by Mr. Ozaki, one of the most radical and progressive of Japanese politicians, may serve as a commentary upon the backwardness of political conditions in this politically belated country:

"It is the aim of the Government to extend political rights of the people as much as possible, and we will give them the right to participate in the Government to the extent that they sincerely want it. It will do more harm than good to give a great boon to people who do not realize its value. Let the franchise be given to those who seek it. We will not hesitate to grant even universal suffrage if the Japanese people want it sincerely. The cause of much corruption which prevails in Japan today can in the last analysis be attributed to the fact that the right of voting is possessed by many who do not know how to use it or who do not realize its

value. So in my opinion the Government would do well to take such measures as may develop the intelligence of the people so that the boon of suffrage may prove a blessing, not a curse, to the State."

It may be added that Mr. Ozaki personally favored what he called an educational franchise: the grant of suffrage to all graduates of the middle schools in addition to the present property qualification. He considered even the literate masses too ignorant and indifferent to exercise the right of voting. Yet his political enemies call him a demagogue.

The truth is that the much-vaunted educational system of Japan has failed to implant political ideas and aspirations, and that the masses are too heavily burdened with taxation to think of much else than the struggle for a bare subsistence.

CHAPTER XIII

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICS

I

Political parties in Japan have naturally aimed at participation in political power and privileges. Their earliest efforts were directed toward securing the grant of a constitution. In 1880 and 1882, under the rival leadership of Itagaki and Okuma, respectively, the Liberal (*Jiju-to*) and Progressive (*Kaishin-to*) Parties were organized. Both parties had substantially the same purpose—the abolition of clan despotism and the introduction of representative government; but, owing to temperamental differences of their leaders, they were unable to co-operate toward this common end. In 1885 the present Cabinet system was adopted with Count Ito as first Premier or Minister President. In 1889 the new Imperial Constitution was promulgated. This was followed by the first general election and meeting of the first Diet in 1890.

A history of Japanese political parties since 1890 would be a tedious and unprofitable narrative of rapid changes, of kaleidoscopic formations and dissolutions. During the first few years the so-called People's Party, really a coalition of existing par-

ties or groups, constituted a majority in the Diet, which proved very hard to control. In 1892 that system of governmental interference and corruption in elections, which in Japan has proved so fatal to the development of representative and parliamentary institutions, was introduced. Nevertheless, the People's Party was again successful, and in 1893 its opposition to the budget was finally overcome by an Imperial rescript. However, the conflict was soon renewed in consequence of one of those public scandals in which the recent history of Japan has been so prolific. This scandal arose from apparently well-grounded suspicions of improper relations between the President of the House of Representatives and members of the stock exchange. The Minister of Agriculture and Commerce and his Vice-Minister were also involved in this disgraceful affair, but the Privy Council, when consulted by the Emperor regarding the matter, expressed the opinion that while there "seemed to be some ground for suspicion as to the irregularities of certain officials in the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, . . . it was not desirable for Ministers who held office by virtue of the confidence of the Sovereign to be removed for so trifling a matter."*

In 1894 the People's Party won another victory at the polls and continued an opposition which soon

*Uyehara, *op. cit.*, page 226.

resulted in another dissolution of the Diet. This opposition was suspended during the Chinó-Japanese War, but was renewed after that conflict.

Count Ito now modified his policy of "ministerial independence," and formed an open alliance with the *Jiju-to* or Liberal Party, giving its leader, Count Itagaki, a place in the Cabinet in 1896. In like manner Count Matsugata, when he succeeded Ito the same year, formed a temporary coalition with Count Okuma, leader of the Progressives, who was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs—an arrangement which lasted until November, 1897, when Okuma resigned and thus dissolved the partnership.

After several more dissolutions and ineffectual attempts to form alliances in spite of the opposition of all parties, "a meeting of the Elder Statesmen (Ito, Yamagata, Saigo, Oyama, Kuroda and Inouye) was held to discuss what step the Government should take with regard to political parties. It was reported that the discussion which took place was extremely heated. Ito, strongly convinced by recent developments, contended that the Government ought to establish a definite connection with the dominant political party or else to organize a party itself which would adhere to the principles of clan government and so enable the Ministry properly to conduct the business of the State; on the other hand, Yamagata argued that to make the Government dependent upon any political party was a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, and there-

fore the Government must be kept above and independent of all political parties."*

Acting upon the advice of Count Ito, the Emperor, on June 27, 1898, entrusted the formation of a Cabinet to Counts Okuma and Itagaki, the leaders of the newly organized Constitutional Party, really a combination of the former Progressive and Liberal Parties. It now seemed as if the struggle for parliamentary and real representative government had been won and that clan oligarchy or despotism was at an end.† But alas! for the best laid schemes, the quasi-party government proved short-lived. In spite of an overwhelming victory at the sixth general election, internal strife and rivalry over the division of the spoils of office resulted in the downfall of the Ministry the same year after a period of four months. The Ministry collapsed even before the meeting of the new Diet.

The immediate cause of the Ministry's downfall was afforded by the resignation of Mr. Osaki, Minister of Education. In the course of a lecture this radical politician had merely *supposed* the *dream* of a republican system of government for Japan. This statement made in mere form of hypothesis

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*Uyehara, *op. cit.*, pages 235-236.

†It should, however, be noted that this was not a party Cabinet in the English sense. True, with the exception of the Ministers of War and the Navy, all the members were party men or politicians; but, with one exception, none of them had seats in the Diet.

was denounced as impolitic and blasphemous and forced his resignation. The quarrel over the appointment of his successor resulted in the break-up of the Ministry.

After this demonstration of the incapacity of party leaders and politicians to hold together, the clan statesmen naturally returned to power. "This experience taught both the Elder Statesmen and the party leaders that the only course, both for the clan statesmen and the political parties, was to join hands in the management of national affairs."*

A second Yamagata Ministry, consisting of Satsuma and Choshu clan statesmen, was formed which was able to govern for several years by forming a corrupt alliance with the *Kensei-to,* or so-called Liberal Party. We are told that the Ministry sought to maintain favor with the *Kensei-to* by "selling public forests and lands, as well as by a special grant of funds, both of which demoralized the political parties."† They were not admitted to a share in the spoils of office which were closed to them by civil service regulations.

In the meantime Count Ito, having become convinced of the practical necessity of political parties, had organized in 1900 a new political party of so-called Liberals called the *Rikken Seiyu-kai* to which most of the members of the dissolved *Kensei-to* flocked. In October, 1900, there was created the

*Okuma's *Fifty Years of New Japan*, volume I, page 177.
†*Ibid.*, page 178.

fourth Ito Ministry, consisting mainly of members of the new party. Thus was formed the second quasi-party government in Japan.

Contrary to his expectations, Ito encountered serious opposition in the House of Peers—an opposition which, coupled with dissension in his own Cabinet, finally resulted in his resignation at the end of six months.

II

The Elder Statesmen then took counsel and decided to give the young men a chance, themselves retiring from active political life. In June, 1901, the Emperor sent for Viscount Katsura, who formed a ministry of non-party men, mostly followers of Marquis Yamagata.

By various means of corruption, compliance and conciliation, because of the incapacity of Ito as a political leader, and finally, on account of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the first Katsura Ministry held together until the close of the conflict when it was driven from power in consequence of the unpopularity of the Treaty of Portsmouth. It may also be said that the political parties had wearied of fighting for political principles and were more amenable than formerly to corrupt influences or inducements offered by the Government.

Early in 1906 Marquis Saionji, who had succeeded Ito as leader of the *Seiyu-kai,* was appointed Premier on Katsura's recommendation. His Min-

istry of non-party members was supported by the *Seiyu-kai* and enjoyed the favor of the Elder Statesmen, even if he was not directly appointed by them. In accordance with what seems to have been a secret understanding, Katsura succeeded Saionji upon the latter's resignation in 1908 and likewise enjoyed the support of the *Seiyu-kai* or majority party in the House of Representatives. In 1911, after numerous conferences of the Elder Statesmen,* Saionji again succeeded Katsura and in December, 1912, Katsura succeeded Saionji the second time.

The Third Katsura Ministry was extremely short-lived. In consequence of riots, public meetings and mob demonstrations it was soon driven from power. "I am the last of the clan statesmen," Katsura is reported to have said. In this he was mistaken, for in February, 1915, he was succeeded by Admiral Yamamoto, who made a deal with the *Seiyu-kai* by sharing with this party the spoils of office. The real hub on which the politics of Japan appears to have revolved was the struggle between the Choshu representatives of the army and the Satsuma men of the navy. Katsura had been a general and was believed to have favored the army. Yamamoto represented the Satsuma clique of the navy.

During the administration of Admiral Yama-

*In this instance, at least, Katsura was not recommended by Saionji. He was bitterly opposed by the *Seiyu-kai*, and hence set about the formation of a new party in which he was not very successful.

moto a state of affairs in the navy was revealed which it is hoped represents the lowest water mark in the history of Japanese political corruption. The naval scandals, in which were legally implicated five high naval officers (including rear admirals), one of Japan's leading business firms, the Mitsui Yussan Kaisha, and a number of leading business men, form one of the most disgraceful chapters in the nation's history. The worst of these charges concerned Vice-Admiral Matsumoto, who was convicted of having accepted enormous bribes from the Mitsui firm as part commission on a warship ordered from Vickers in England in 1910. The various sums paid to Matsumoto, as proved in court, amounted to more than two hundred thousand dollars. It was generally believed in Japan that this money was divided among various members of the naval clique. Certainly the Japanese Government was in no haste to prosecute. Admiral Matsumoto was not arrested until after the fall of the Yamamoto Ministry.

Like the unpopular third Katsura Ministry of the year before, the Yamamoto Cabinet, in consequence of a series of riots and mob demonstrations, was driven from power in March. Under the circumstances, the *Genro* were compelled to bow to the storm and yield to the force of public opinion. They finally turned to the aged Count Okuma, now nearly seventy-eight years of age, the life-long champion of

party government and free institutions, who had thus characterized his predecessor:

"I cannot but admire the thickness of skin upon Gombei's (Prince Yamamoto's) face. He has been called thief, liar, and yet persists in disgracing and polluting the honorable post [of the Premiership]. If the present Premier at all knows what shame is, he should have bidden farewell to his public career and hidden his face in abashed contrition.

"To disregard the popular indignation is a terrible thing. Should it be resisted too much, it would end in revolution, if the history of the world's greatest revolution tells us anything. Can Japan alone be an exception to the rule?"

As far back as 1898 Count Okuma had formed a coalition Cabinet including himself and Itagaki as leaders of the progressive and liberal factions, but that attempt to establish party government failed and he had never enjoyed another opportunity to participate directly in governmental affairs. In the meantime he had resigned his position as leader of the Progressive Party, but as "Sage of Waseda University," which he had founded in earlier years, he continued to play an important rôle as critic of Japanese politics. He had always remained true to his earlier convictions as advocate of parliamentary and representative government, and had even sacrificed place and power in defense of these principles.

Owing to the state of parties in Japan, Okuma was unable to realize his ideal of a two party system on the English pattern, but was compelled to form a sort of coalition Ministry which included Baron Kato, head of the *Doshi-kai* or Bureaucratic Party, and Mr. Ozaki, leader of the *Chusei-kai* or Parliamentary Club of Radical Opportunists. He was unfortunately unable to induce his own friend and successor as chief of the *Kokumin-to* or Progressive-Rationalists, Mr. Imukai, to join the Cabinet, though the latter appears to have given assurances of benevolent neutrality.

Hampered and opposed by the *Seiyu-kai* party, which commanded a majority in the House of Representatives and was also strongly intrenched in the politics of local government, Okuma finally dissolved the Diet and appealed to the country in the early part of 1915-6.

III

At this time there were active in Japanese politics the following parties or factions:

1. The *Seiyu-kai,* Liberals or Constitutionalists (literally "Association of Political Friends"). This party was created by the late Prince Ito in 1900 and is, historically speaking, the successor of an older Liberal Party. Prince Ito, a disbeliever in parliamentary government, had apparently become convinced of the evil necessity of party support, either

for the maintenance of his own power or for that of "constitutional" government. But the members of the party disappointed his expectations and he soon retired from its leadership. He was succeeded by Marquis Saionji, but at present the real leader is Mr. Hara, late Minister of the Interior. For nearly a decade the *Seiyu-kai* had enjoyed an absolute majority in the House of Representatives, but its political future was seriously compromised by its alliance with Count Yamamoto and its preference of the spoils of office to political principle.

2. The *Rikken Doshi-kai,* the Constitutional Unionists or Bureaucratic Party (literally "Society of Men of Similar Ideas"), which was founded by the late Prince Katsura in 1913 as a means of securing power after the downfall of his third Ministry. Its leader is Baron Kato, the late Minister of Foreign Affairs. Though of bureaucratic origin, it obtained an accession of liberal or democratic elements and became the main support of Count Okuma and his liberal program.

3. The *Kokumin-to* or Nationalist Party, which was organized in 1910 by members of the Progressive Party created by Count Okuma in 1882. It became divided in 1913 between those who proposed to effect a coalition with Prince Katsura and those who stood out for its traditional anti-bureaucratic principles. In consequence of this division, about half of its members deserted and joined the *Doshi-kai* or Prince Katsura's new party. The feelings

engendered by this split probably account for the refusal of its leader, Mr. Inukai, to accept a portfolio in Count Okuma's Ministry.

4. The *Chusei-kai* or *Seiyu* Club, which is a small parliamentary organization formed by Mr. Ozaki early in 1913, when the *Seiyu-kai* made an alliance with Count Yamamoto. Its leader was the Minister of Justice and its members were supporters of Count Okuma.

There were also a number of "Okuma supporters" and "Independents."

IV

During the election of 1915 Count Okuma and at least some of his supporters seem to have made a sincere effort to prevent and discourage corruption, but apparently with indifferent success. In some localities the voters were directly bribed, in others the candidates followed the old custom of contributing to a fund for village or local improvement. Early in the campaign many "bubble candidates" had presented themselves. After securing a certain number of promises to vote, these very practical politicians were then ready to withdraw from the field and transfer their promised votes for a consideration. In many constituencies in Japan there are professional canvassers who form cliques under local bosses. Candidates often find it necessary to bid against each other for the support of these

cliques and bosses who are said to apply the "squeeze" to the utmost. The "canning" or "bottling" of votes and the "netting" process were also practised. The former consists in persuading the doubtful voter to take a trip or to go to some resort on election day; the latter, in inducing him to spend the night before the election at some hotel near the polling places, his expenses being paid after six months (to evade the election laws) by the candidate.* The sums spent for election are said to range from one thousand dollars to twenty-five thousand dollars, the average cost being somewhere between three thousand dollars and thirty-five hundred dollars—a very large sum in Japan.† There are no laws governing election expenses, though bribery and other corrupt practices are penalized.

There were, however, some evidences of improvement; there was no rioting or bloodshed; public meetings were more frequent than formerly; and members of the Cabinet took the stump for the first time. Baron Kato is said to have made the first speech ever made by a Foreign Minister to a political gathering, and Count Okuma made a regular political tour. For this he was severely criticized by the ultra-conservatives who claim that this practice is undignified. There seems also to have been considerable distribution of printed matter. But

*These details were gathered from conversations and from the newspapers.

†From the *Japan Year Book* for 1914, page 650.

the main reliance in a present-day Japanese political campaign is house to house canvassing, as the Japanese are still in that rudimentary stage of political education where personal influence and solicitation count for more than discussion.

A new feature of the campaign was the beginning of the participation of Japanese women in the work of canvassing and soliciting votes. A number of the candidates were actively supported by their wives, and in one case by the mother and daughters as well. There was, however, much disapproval of this novel practice.

The result of the election of 1915 was a "landslide" in favor of the Okuma Government. The *Seiyu-kai* Party, evidently discredited by its support of the Yamamoto Cabinet, had dwindled from 205 to 107 members in the House of Representatives, and the number of *Doshi-kai* members and Okuma supporters had increased very considerably. The *Kokumin-to* faction or so-called Progressives and Ozaki's body of supporters known as the *Chusei-kai* remained about stationary. In the new House of Representatives Okuma commanded a support of about 210 members, consisting of 145 members of the *Doshi-kai* (Bureaucratic Party founded by Katsura), 35 *Chusei-kai* or Ozaki followers, and 30 Okuma supporters. The opposition consisted of 107 members of the *Seiyu-kai* and 27 of the *Kokumin-to* party (led by Iunkai). Besides these factions, there were 37 members classed as Independ-

ents, though most of them seemed favorable to Okuma, whose majority may thus be said to have been about 100.

In spite or perhaps because of this overwhelming majority of supporters, Okuma's political path was far from smooth. Apart from his conduct of foreign affairs, he was severely criticized by some of his former supporters for neglecting to establish a régime of party government, and for failing to sever the ties which seemed to bind even his Government to the Elder Statesmen. He yielded, so it is claimed, to the very influences which he so severely criticized when he was in opposition.

Count Okuma's severest ordeal, so far as home politics is concerned, was the discovery that his Home Minister, Viscount Oura, had been employing a favorite means of corruption—direct bribery—to secure votes in Parliament in favor of the two division army bill. Acting upon the theory of nominal or technical responsibility, the Premier tendered his resignation which was rejected by the Mikado after repeated conferences on the part of the Elder Statesmen. In view of the serious situation both at home and abroad, Okuma finally decided to remain in power with a reconstructed Cabinet.

The reconstructed Okuma Cabinet remained in power until October, 1916, when it was succeeded by a new bureaucratic government headed by Count Terauchi, a representative of the military-clan oligarchy ruled by Prince Yamagata. Okuma had

recommended as his successor Baron Kato, his Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the *Doshi-kai* Party. But the Elder Statesmen proved as powerful as ever in this crisis, and dictated the selection of Count Terauchi. The *Doshi-kai* was dissolved and a new party formed known as the *Kensei-kai,* in support of the Government.

It seems certain that the "grand old man of Japan" failed in his great and life-long purpose of introducing parliamentary government into the Orient. He has himself admitted his failure, and even while still Premier sought refuge from public criticism by invoking the name of the Emperor—a practice which he had formerly condemned. For he is reported to have said: "The present Cabinet is the choice of the Emperor and any person among his subjects venturing to criticize his ministry is active against the will of the Emperor."*

This experiment in party government was made under very unfavorable auspices, but it seems most unlikely that any real progress in this direction will ever be made so long as the power of the clan oligarchy as represented by the Elder Statesmen, the Privy Council and the House of Peers survives.

V

There can be no question that political corruption exists to a frightful degree in Japan. As

*Cited from Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East,* page 186.

early as 1906 Count Okuma said at a meeting of Progressives: "Unfortunately a great abuse of the electoral system had arisen in Japan. Men of moderate means could not bear the expense of elections, and even men of good means were crippled by it. The origin of this abuse was to be sought in official interference. This had been frequent, and now it had taken the form of secret purchase of votes."*

Count Okuma supposed that the abolition of the system of large constituencies and the adoption of unsigned ballots would correct these evils, but he would probably now admit that this was an illusion. One commentator remarks that such a statement as that made by Count Okuma regarding the secret purchase of votes, "which in any other country where representative institutions obtain would have raised a storm of protest or denial," is in Japan "taken as a matter of course, a thing generally recognized and not causing any surprise or shame."

Speaking of the House of Representatives, Mr. Ozaki (late Minister of Justice) once said:

"It is an Assembly of the lowest types of men. Thus in attending the House, sober thinkers feel as if they were being conducted to a hell or assembly of devils. It is absolutely a mistake to imagine that one feels at home in the Japanese Parliament. Neither happiness nor any taste exists in the House. I console myself with the feeling that my duty in

*For this and numerous similar citations, see Lawton, *The Empires of the East,* volume I, pages 543 ff.

the House is to lead, instruct, and train other members. In meeting, therefore, the rough and uneducated members, I cannot keep from entertaining feelings of compassion. If one attends the House with the idea of learning anything there he would be greatly mistaken. Instead of improving himself, he would be made ill by coming in contact with conditions of corruption and degradation, and with the power of the Prince of Darkness."*

The writer can himself bear witness to the unruly and undignified character of the proceedings of the body. Most of its work is, however, done in committees. The House of Peers is of course more dignified.

"Political parties in Japan consist of factions or groups interested in the fortunes of some leader or clique. They are controlled by autocratic or oligarchic methods, and their members are not greatly concerned with principles or policies. Their platforms or manifestoes are a tissue of vague platitudes and declarations to which no possible exception can be made. They all denounce favoritism, bureaucratic and clan influences and declare in favor of constitutionalism, progress, and such reforms as reduction of taxation, curtailment of expenditure, and the like. The conclusion is irresistible—a conclusion supported by enlightened public opinion—that Japanese political parties lack stability and principle, and that they are for the most part mere

*Lawton, page 553. See Putnam Weale's *Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia,* pages 382-85, for a much fuller report of Mr. Ozaki's indictment.

associations for personal or political spoils and aggrandizement.

"Parties thus led and constituted are easily dissolved and are at the mercy of the governing powers and of corrupt influences. They are incapable of constructive legislation or even of enlightened opposition. They render constitutional government a mockery and the representative system an illusion, and must be cajoled, bribed and flattered by those in authority. This state of political parties affords striking evidence of the belated conditions of political life in Japan."*

The remedy would seem to lie in the directing of political education, a freer and more general discussion of political issues, a gradual widening of the suffrage and the substitution of true democratic representation and parliamentary government for the present system of government by a bureaucratic-military-clan oligarchy.

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*Cited from the writer's report to the Kahn Foundation, published in *Kahn Foundation Reports*, volume III, number 2.

CHAPTER XIV

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN—KOREA

I

THE Japanese nation is essentially militaristic* in character, aims and policy. It is true that during the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate, extending roughly from 1600 to 1867, there was an era of comparative peace, but it was a peace during which minute and drastic regulations were maintained by the two-sworded Samurai† and by an army of police, spies and informers. This period of relative quiet had been preceded by centuries of civil strife when warlike qualities were cultivated to a high

*By militaristic is here primarily meant an ambitious state of mind or mental bias which aims at the achievement of political purposes by the use of force when diplomatic methods fail. With the Japanese, as with the Germans, war is an instrument of policy—a justifiable method of attaining positive ends such as commercial greatness, national prestige and territorial increase. If to this psychological quality and militaristic teaching and training there is added the existence of a powerful military caste or clique, the possession of great military power, and a Hegelian philosophy of the State, the analogy with Prussia becomes very striking.

†The two-sworded Samurai freely exercised their right of cutting down any commoner who failed in the observance of the proper courtesies.

degree. This experience made the Japanese a nation of hero-worshippers and taught them the value of the martial virtues. Under the discipline of the Tokugawa Shogunate they finally acquired those habits of obedience and a sense of deference to superiors which have made them ideal soldiers and deferential subjects.

It is also true that at only one period in their history* (in 1592-98) did they attempt a foreign conquest—that of Korea by Hideyoshi. But this was probably because until then the times had not been propitious, inasmuch as the work of national consolidation and unification had not been completed.

The work of unification was accomplished by the Restoration, and the process of expansion soon began. No sooner had military service been introduced in 1872 than an expedition was sent to Formosa to secure redress from China for the murder of certain shipwrecked inhabitants of the Loochoo Islands whom Japan claimed as her subjects. This controversy nearly caused a war between Japan and China, but was settled by a treaty (in 1874) which secured the tacit relinquishment by China of the Loochoo Islands, ending in their incorporation with Japan in 1879. In 1875 Japan obtained from Russia the Southern Kurile Islands in exchange for the southern half of Saghalin, since (in 1905) ceded

*The chronicled expedition of the Empress Jingu to Korea in the second century, A. D., is probably fabulous.

back to Japan. The Bonin Islands were added to the Japanese domain in 1876.

At about this time modern Japan began to show that special interest in Korea which soon became a cardinal feature of Japanese policy. A Japanese gunboat having been fired on by a Korean fort in January, 1876, an expedition was sent which, in imitation of Commodore Perry's action, secured three open ports and a treaty of peace and amity with the "Hermit Kingdom." It was the acknowledgment of the independence of Korea that contributed to the outbreak of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 against the Japanese Government, for the military faction in Japan urged war with Korea at that time.

Now began the struggle for influence and reforms in Korea. It is the old story of peaceful penetration backed by diplomacy and force. The Koreans were a weak and ignorant, if not a degenerate people, and their government was to the last degree contemptible. There were two factions at the Korean Court—the pro-Japanese Progressives who favored reform and the Conservatives or Exclusionists who opposed it. In 1882 the Conservative Regent instigated an attack on the Japanese legation which resulted in the intervention of both Japan and China and in the stationing of Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea. In December, 1884, as the result of another insurrection fomented by the pro-Japanese faction, these troops came into

collision, and China and Japan suddenly found themselves on the verge of war. The Japanese legation was again attacked and was burned, and the Japanese people again demanded war with both Korea and China. But war was averted at the eleventh hour by the Convention of Tientsin negotiated by Count Ito and Li-Hung Chang in 1885. Each state agreed to withdraw its forces and in the future not to dispatch troops to Korea without previous notice to the other in writing.

The decade between 1885 and 1894 was marked by much strife, bloodshed and intrigue among the factions in Korea and between these factions and the Chinese, Japanese and Russians living there. Of the Japanese residing in Korea at this time, Professor Longford says:* "The Japanese who came to these ports were the reverse of a credit to their country; unscrupulous adventurers, bullies, and the scum of all the ruffiandom of Japan predominated among them, and their conduct and demeanor toward the gentle, submissive, and ignorant natives, who were unresisting victims to their cupidity and cruelty, were a poor recommendation of the new civilization of which they boasted. On the other hand, Chinese traders—law observing, peaceable, and scrupulously honest in all their transactions—were living witnesses of the morality engendered by a faithful observance of the old."

**The Story of Korea,* page 328. Cf. the quotation on pages 337-38.

II

In consequence of a third insurrection, in 1895, Japanese and Chinese troops* found themselves face to face in Korea. Japan, incensed by the murder of her protégé Kim-ok-Kim at Shanghai, was determined to solve the Korean question by the introduction of certain reforms, as well as by the suppression of the rebellion. China, on the other hand, opposed these reforms and reasserted her ancient claims of suzerainty.

It can not be denied that in so acting China gave Japan a good pretext† for a war, which resulted in the speedy and complete triumph of Japan. But neither can it be doubted that the doughty islanders had prepared for and were eagerly awaiting such an opportunity.

Among the results of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95 were the recognition by China of the independence of Korea; an indemnity of two hundred million taels; the cession to Japan of the island of Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liao-tung

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*China had sent three thousand troops to Korea, and Japan had sent eight thousand whom she refused to withdraw after the suppression of the insurrection.

†In his Introduction to the *Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi* (page 44), Mr. Pooley remarks that "the manner in which Japan fomented trouble in Korea and fixed a quarrel on China was ugly," but he thinks that "at the worst she was forestalling a similar course of action by China." For evidence of this, see the *Secret Memoirs,* appendix A.

Peninsula, including Port Arthur, the key to Peking. But Japan was deprived of the valuable cession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by the intervention of Russia, Germany and France, who advised her that its possession "would not only constitute a constant menace to the capital of China, but would also render the independence of Korea illusory, and thus jeopardize the permanent peace of the Far East."

The forced retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula brought to Japan an acute realization that only a powerful armament would enable her to guard her new position in the Orient. Even her own independence seemed at stake. In the words of Asakawa: "If she would not retire within herself, and finally cease to exist, she must compete with the greatest nations, not only in the arts of peace, but also in those of war. Moreover, a far vaster conflict than she had ever known in her history, excepting the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, was seen to be awaiting her."*

"What Japan has now to do," wrote Count Hayashi,† "is to keep perfectly quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen against her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national power, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient. When that day arrives she will be able to

*_The Russo-Japanese Conflict_, pages 79, 80.

†_Secret Memoirs_, page 113.

follow her own course, not only able to put meddling Powers in their places, but even, as necessity arises, meddling with the affairs of other Powers. Then truly she will be able to reap advantages for herself."

III

Russia now took the place of China as rival intriguer in Korea. With their wonted lack of skill in dealing with other Orientals, the Japanese were guilty of an act which was a gigantic blunder as well as a detestable crime of the first magnitude. "Impolitic attempts at hasty and radical reform in Korea were resisted by the Court party, headed by the Queen and the Min family to which she belonged. Early in October, 1895, the Queen planned a *coup d'état* with a view to disbanding the soldiers who had been trained by Japanese officers, and of replacing the pro-Japanese partisans of reform in the Korean Cabinet by her friends. The result was a counterplot to seize the King and Queen with the aim of obtaining complete control of the Korean Government in the interest of the pro-Japanese or Reform Party. In carrying out this plot, in which the Japanese Minister seems to have been an accomplice, the Queen was murdered by Japanese and Korean ruffians."*

*Hershey, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, pages 43-44.

This disgusting crime committed by the Japanese was soon followed by another equally revolting on the part of the Russians, by means of which Russia for a time obtained the control of the Korean Government. A number of Russian marines entered Seoul in February, 1896. The King fled in disguise to the Russian legation where he remained until February, 1897. As a result of a royal edict which declared the Cabinet Ministers guilty of treason, the Prime Minister and two other ministers were murdered, while several others fled to Japan.

In spite of all that diplomacy could do in the way of protocols, there followed a period of seven years' rivalry and struggle for concessions and other advantages between Japan and Russia which culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

It is not necessary to discuss here the causes of this war.* Suffice it to say that Japan had fully foreseen the struggle and prepared for it ever since the lease of Port Arthur by Russia in 1898, if indeed, not since the compulsory retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula in 1895. From this time on Japanese budgets show a great and steady increase in army and naval expenditures. In 1900 Japan had increased her military prestige and gained valuable experience by her participation in the expedition for the relief of the legations at Peking dur-

*For the causes of this war, see Asakawa's *Russo-Japanese Conflict* and Hershey's *International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War,* chapter I.

ing the Boxer uprising of 1900. In January, 1902, she had contracted a defensive alliance with England which committed both countries to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Far East, the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and the open door or policy of equal commercial opportunity in these countries.*

IV

Soon after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan signed a protocol with the Emperor of Korea in which the "independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire" were definitely guaranteed, though the Emperor of Korea agreed to

*The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 only provided for mutual aid in case a fourth Power joined in hostilities. If either ally should become involved in war with a third Power, the other was to remain neutral. This restricted and purely defensive alliance of 1902 was replaced by a stronger defensive alliance in 1905 which stipulated for mutual assistance in defense of territorial rights or special interests in case of an "unprovoked attack or aggressive action by any other Power or Powers." The special interests mentioned are those in China, Eastern Asia and India. "The independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China" is declared to be one of the main objects of the treaty. Great Britain also recognized Japan's paramount and exclusive rights in Korea. A third alliance on the same lines was concluded in 1911. The main change was made to prevent the possibility of England's being called upon to assist Japan against the United States. For the texts of these treaties, see *The Japan Year Book* for 1915, pages 369-372.

adopt the advice of the Japanese Government in regard to improvements.

Nevertheless, in November, 1905, a few months after the cessation of the war, the Emperor of Korea was practically compelled* to sign a convention which placed the "control and direction of the external affairs of Korea" in the hands of the Japanese Government. Korea was thus definitely transformed into a Japanese protectorate and formally deprived of her external independence.

The consent of the Emperor of Korea and his Cabinet to the convention of 1905 could scarcely be described as "voluntary." It appears to have been secured as the result of what might perhaps be described as official pressure, with little or no chance of escape.

In July, 1907, in consequence of the unfortunate sending of a Korean delegation to the Second Hague Conference, the weak and intriguing Emperor of Korea was induced by his own Cabinet to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince. At this time "Marquis Ito handed to the Korean Government a document conveying Japan's proposals as

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*It is a controverted question whether force was actually used or whether the consent of the Korean Emperor and his Cabinet was "voluntary." The former view is maintained by such anti-Japanese writers as Hurlbert, Lawton, and Millard. For a convincing refutation of the misrepresentations of Hurlbert and others, see Ladd, *In Korea with Marquis Ito*, chapter 11.

the basis of a new Japanese Korean agreement."* According to the terms of this convention, practically all the powers of the state were placed under the direction of the Resident-General, and Korea was thus virtually reduced to a position of dependency in internal as well as external affairs, though not formally annexed until August, 1910.†

In spite of a diplomatic record of broken promises and many acts of oppression and injustice, it is our opinion that Japan should not be judged too harshly for her treatment of Korea. To be sure, this record may serve to make one wary of the methods of Japanese diplomacy, but it should not blind us to the defects of the Korean Government. Never perhaps has there existed a weaker government, one

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*Ladd, *op. cit.*, page 432. "Wrested from them an agreement" is the phrase used by a Japanese writer.—Kawakami, *American-Japanese Relations*, page 154.

†The vital purpose of annexation, as officially explained, was "chiefly to secure stability of peace and tranquillity for the Peninsula." Insurgents and bandits, particularly numerous in 1907-8, continued to operate in certain districts. A series of political murders and attempts at assassination by Koreans, culminating in the murder of their best friend, Count Ito, in 1909, probably hastened the Act of Annexation; though it would seem that this step had already been decided upon prior to the commission of this dastardly crime, for Ito had already been succeeded by Viscount Terauchi as Minister-Resident at Seoul. For the Proclamation of Annexation and various other official documents bearing on this subject, see *Annual Report* on Reforms and Progress, in Chosen for 1910-11. See also Lawton, *Empires of the Far East*, volume II, pages 1087-1097.

more corrupt and more incapable of governing than that of Korea, at least during the nineteenth century. No government has better deserved its fate. Besides, it must not be overlooked that Korea, so indispensable as a *point d'appui* for Japan, had for years been menaced by another Power. Under the circumstances the "Land of the Morning Calm" was doomed to become either Russian or Japanese.

V

However critical we may be of the methods by which it was accomplished, the annexation of Korea seems to have been justified by its results. As remarked by Count Terauchi, subsequent Premier of Japan and Late Governor-General of Chosen, in the Report issued in January, 1914, "it is no easy task to uplift a decayed people." Yet the task has been essayed and most remarkable results have been attained, at least from a material standpoint.

It is no adverse criticism upon the policy and methods of Japanese administration in Korea to say that, aside from the maintenance of law and order, its main efforts have been directed toward the improvement of material conditions. Any one passing from Japan to Korea or China will at once be struck by the denudation of the forests in the latter countries. One of the greatest needs of Korea, as of China, is reforestration. The Japanese authorities adopted energetic measures to re-

store the forests and thereby diminish erosion, floods and droughts. Hundreds of nurseries were established, in which seedlings of pines, acacia, chestnut, poplar and other trees were raised to be distributed free. In 1911, April 3rd was set apart as "Arbor Day" and on the first holiday of this sort four and a half million young trees were planted by officials and private persons throughout the country. In 1912 over ten million young trees were set out, and in 1913 over twelve million more.

Much has also been done to encourage agriculture and improve agricultural methods. Several model farms and a number of agricultural schools have been established; seeds, seedlings and plants have been distributed to the farmers; technical experts have been engaged to teach them proper methods of irrigation, stock-breeding and the care of fruit trees. Special efforts have been made to improve sericulture and to increase both the quality and quantity of rice and cotton grown. Since about eighty per cent. of the population of Chosen are engaged in agriculture, the Government-General can not be accused of dereliction in regard to what may be denominated the great national industry of Korea.

Aside from agriculture and stock-raising, Korea must be said, industrially speaking, to be still in its infancy. Chosen is rich in mineral resources, particularly in gold, iron, graphite and copper, but they are mainly undeveloped and little has thus far been done to develop them.

The foreign trade of Korea has about doubled since annexation, that is, it increased from 52,890,000 odd yen in 1909 to 102,450,000 yen in 1913. However, owing to the purchase of railway and other material, the amount of imports was more than double that of exports. It is worth noting that the Korean trade with the United States has also increased in about the same proportion.

"The technical industry of Chosen," says a Japanese official report, "was in a highly developed condition when the country was under the sway of the Koryo dynasty, but as a result of long years of maladministration it gradually declined and in recent years weaving, ceramics, manufacture of paper, metal work and a few other arts were the only branches of technical industry still remaining. These branches of industry were pursued on a very small scale, the workmanship was inferior and their production small in amount. As it was, most of the commodities of daily use had to be imported from abroad. So, with the purpose of reviving the technical industry of old Korea, the former Korean Government, under the direction of the Residency-General, established, in 1907, a Technical Industrial Training Institute in Seoul, where weaving, dyeing, ceramics, metal and wood work and applied chemistry were taught to Korean students. After annexation, in 1912, when the Government-General established a Central Chemical Laboratory, the institute above mentioned was affiliated with it. At the laboratory, testing is carried on in the brewing of Japanese *sake* and wine, and analytical examination of minerals and other articles is made. Neces-

sary arrangements are in the course of being provided for also carrying out examinations concerning weaving, dyeing, ceramics and applied chemistry. In the provinces many institutions were established at the expense of local revenue and with the proceeds of the Imperial Donation Fund for training Koreans in various branches of technical industry and subsidies have been and are given to the work undertaken by public spirited men for giving technical education to Koreans, as well as to various promising technical undertakings. As the result of all these measures taken, weaving, filature, ceramics and certain other branches of technical industry have shown some remarkable progress and in recent days some Japanese have launched out in the business of leather-tanning, weaving of matting, manufacture of paper, porcelain and so forth. It may be noted that prior to annexation, factories with capital exceeding 30,000 yen under the management of Japanese or Koreans numbered 56 and their aggregate capital amounted to 8,100,000 yen. In 1912, the figures rose to 102 factories and to a capital of 11,600,000 yen respectively."*

The Government-General has also been very active in the work of building and improving the railways and highways, the improvement of harbors, the encouragement of coastwise navigation, the establishment of postal and telegraph facilities, postal savings banks, parcels post, and similar enterprises.

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*From *Japanese Official Report,* 1913, as above, pages 31, 32.

VI

Though Japan has naturally been most solicitous for the material progress of her Korean subjects, she has by no means neglected their physical, moral and intellectual welfare. Charity hospitals have been established in all the provincial capitals with a Government-General Hospital at Seoul. Much attention has been given to the combating of epidemics and to improved methods of sanitation. In 1911 the provincial governors were instructed to "endeavor to induce Korean laborers to save part of their wages by depositing it in the postal savings bank or in other safe investments." It is recognized that "it will be an extremely difficult task to turn a people long accustomed to habits of idleness into a hard-working and thrifty people," but the task is evidently not regarded as hopeless. While the laborers are to be protected against "any measures savoring of oppression," they are not to be allowed to "become arrogant" nor to "ask for excessive wages."* Thus does a paternal government deal with those over whom it has assumed charge.

In respect to Korean education, Japan has pursued a very shrewd and cautious policy. In former days educational facilities were very meager and practically confined to the Chinese classics. After the opening of Korea, mission schools were established in many places and obtained considerable

*Appendices to *Japanese Official Report, 1913,* pages 38, 39.

vogue. After the Chino-Japanese War, the Korean Government instituted a few schools in Seoul; but, owing to lack of funds, these were unsuccessful. During 1906-10 the Residency-General established a number of common schools and effected some reforms and readjustments of the educational system of the country.

It was not, however, until November, 1911, that a new system was adopted which had as its "chief aim the education of Koreans on the basis of the Imperial Rescript on Education. . . . The greatest stress in the new educational system was laid on common and industrial education and it was arranged that higher education should gradually be given, while great care was taken at the same time that the new system should agree with the need of the times and popular conditions. Above all, the adjustment and expansion of common education was most strenuously attended to, and the establishment of new common schools year after year was vigorously pursued with very satisfactory results. Thus, whereas in the year annexation was carried, there existed 100 common schools with 15,000 children attending them, there now exist 366 schools attended by about 50,000 children and there is no prefecture or district which does not possess at least one common school. As regards private schools and *Sohtang* (village schools), great attention is paid regarding their supervision and guidance. The teaching of the national language (Jap-

anese) is specially encouraged in all schools, no matter whether public or private, and in the teaching of other subjects Japanese is required to be used as much as possible. This is done with the desire that Korean children may acquire one of the most essential qualifications as subjects of the Empire."*

It will thus be seen that primary education in Korea is not compulsory. The provision for such education is very inadequate; for, while it may be assumed that the number of common schools and school children will increase rapidly from year to year, it is evident that 366 schools, even if attended by fifty thousand children out of a population of nearly fifteen million, is a mere beginning.

To be sure, there are about one thousand three hundred private schools of which over five hundred with forty thousand pupils are connected with foreign missions† but many of these are unsatisfactory in various ways and out of harmony with the spirit of the times as well as with the non-sectarian policy of the Government. With some notable exceptions, the Christian missionaries in Korea, though more successful in their propaganda,‡ are much inferior in training and endowment to their co-workers in

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*Within the past few years religious instruction or ceremonies have been wholly interdicted even in private mission schools.

†The Protestant missions of Korea boast of over 370,000 converts and probationers. There are over 80,000 Roman Catholic adherents.

‡*Japanese Official Report, 1913,* pages 52-53.

Japan. Many of them are still opposed to the new order of things and, it is to be feared, are a hindrance rather than a help to progress.

The provisions for secondary education are still more inadequate. In addition to a higher agricultural school, a government medical institute, and a higher technical school at Seoul, there are two higher common schools for Korean youths, at Seoul and Pyongyang respectively, and a girls' higher common school at Seoul. There is also a special school for the study of law and economics.

Korea is thus left almost wholly without facilities for higher education. It would seem as if such neglect were intentional, for a leading Japanese official in Korea assured us that the Japanese do not intend to establish a government university in Korea. While they very greatly admire and have to a considerable extent imitated our work in the Philippines, they do not intend to copy our educational methods. To one of the ablest officials in the Japanese service it seemed very amusing that we read the Declaration of Independence to the Filipinos upon the Fourth of July and teach them to celebrate the day.

Nor do they intend to repeat the great blunder of the British in India which, from the Japanese point of view, consists in encouraging a mere academic education for the upper Hindu class of educated proletariats, thus breeding agitators and leaders of unrest and discontent.

Korean youths desiring secondary education are practically forced to go to Japan.* The Japanese Government is evidently determined that Chosen shall be educated in Japanese fashion. It appears to be the present educational policy to discourage the theoretical or literary education of Koreans and to encourage almost exclusively industrial education along practical lines. Says Count Terauchi on this subject:

"It goes without saying that the education of Koreans should be undertaken with the idea of fostering in them the ability and character essential to subjects of the Empire. At the same time in order to remedy the chronic evil inherent in Koreans of being addicted to empty talking and idleness, it is necessary to inspire in them the love of active and painstaking work. For this reason Koreans must be guided in the habit of industry and in the appreciation of the pleasure of work. Accordingly I, the Governor-General, sought by all means to make the avoidance of empty theories and the respect of practical knowledge the guiding spirit of the education of Koreans and seized every opportunity to explain in detail this principle to all those interested in educational work for Koreans. I concluded that the spread of industrial education was of urgent necessity and encouraged the establishment of elementary industrial schools as affiliated institutions of public common schools. It is satisfactory to note that such schools, which numbered only 4 at the time of

*In 1913 there were 55 Korean youths studying in Japan at the government expense. They are placed under the special supervision of a government official in Tokyo.

annexation, now number 60. Besides these, 14 agricultural schools and 2 commercial schools were established in different provincial centres, in addition to the Agricultural and Dendrological School at Suwon and the Technical Training Station at Seoul. It is hoped that all these schools are sufficient to enable Korean young men to obtain practical knowledge and ability in various branches of industry."*

Among specific Japanese reforms in Korea, those connected with the administration of justice and of prisons should be particularly emphasized. In old Korea all sorts of judicial abuses flourished. There was no separation of the judiciary from the ordinary executive; bribery was the rule and torture was a usual means of securing evidence; severe floggings, frequently resulting in crippling for life, were a common mode of punishment; and the unspeakable dungeons called prisons in which criminals and political offenders were frequently forced to drag out a miserable existence, without hope of trial or release, were too unsavory even to describe.

The first code for the constitution of proper law courts was promulgated in 1895, but it remained a dead letter, and it was not until 1906-07 that Japan was able to establish a modern system for the administration of justice. Torture was abolished, though flogging for minor offenses is still practised. The country now has a regular system of courts—the so-called "three trial system," consisting of local

*_Report_, page 54.

and district courts, three courts of appeal, and a court of cassation or supreme court at Seoul. The law has been largely codified, modern prisons have been built, and modern methods of treating convicts and prisoners have been introduced. In spite of certain abuses still prevalent which were exposed by the notorious Conspiracy Case scandal of 1912,* the reforming zeal of the Japanese in Korea deserves the highest credit. Judicial reforms were accomplished under great difficulties and in spite of the greatest obstacles, due to the ignorance, prejudice and inborn conservatism of the Koreans.

It is also gratifying to be able to state that, owing to the better administration and to an apparent im-

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*The main facts in this notorious case which naturally aroused much interest in missionary circles were as follows: In June, 1912, there were placed on trial in Seoul 123 Koreans, mainly Christians, on a charge of conspiracy against the life of the Governor-General Count Terauchi. Nearly all of the accused denied the truth of their own confessions made to the police or at the preliminary hearing, these confessions having, as they claimed, been extracted from them by torture and other forms of violence—a point never cleared up. Nevertheless, on the basis of these alleged confessions and in the absence of other evidence, 105 of the accused were convicted and sentenced by the court of first instance to penal servitude for life. As a result of appeal to a higher court the number of convictions were reduced to six and the term of imprisonment to six years—a decision later upheld by the supreme court. It is pleasing to note that the six persons finally convicted and imprisoned, apparently on the basis of their original undenied confessions, were pardoned by Count Okuma in 1915. The whole incident appears to have been a case of hysteria in high as well as in low places.

provement in the character of the Japanese immigrants themselves, many of the abuses formerly complained of have disappeared, and the treatment of the Koreans seems to be more just and considerate than was the case during the years immediately preceding and following the Russo-Japanese War.

If the Government of Chosen must be pronounced a great success from the point of view of reform activities and material development, this can hardly be said for Korea as an outlet for Japan's surplus population. To be sure, since 1909 there has been an annual exodus of Japanese from Japan to Korea of from twenty to thirty thousand until there were in 1914 a total of 82,578 Japanese families, numbering 290,455 persons, in the country. But the number of annual Japanese emigrants to Korea seems to have decreased since 1912 and, though greater than in the case of Manchuria, is hardly sufficient materially to relieve the congested state of the population in some parts of the home country or to provide a sufficient outlet for Japan's huge annual surplus population of from six to seven hundred thousand.*

*The statistics cited above are drawn from the *Japan Year Book* for 1915, page 708. According to the table there given, the annual emigration of Japanese to Korea has apparently decreased since 1911 and 1912, though in this as in so many other cases Japanese statistics are so fearfully and wonderfully made that it is difficult, if not impossible, to deduce conclusions therefrom.

CHAPTER XV

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN—MANCHURIA

I

JAPAN'S interest in Manchuria appears to date from 1896 when Russia, which had placed China under a debt of fear and gratitude by her successful intervention against Japan at the close of the Chino-Japanese War, obtained, among other favors, the right to run the Siberian Railway through this vast and fertile region. But this interest probably did not become acute until March, 1898, when Russia demanded and obtained from China a twenty-five year lease of Port Arthur and adjacent ports of the Liao-tung Peninsula, together with a concession for a railway through Southern Manchuria between Port Arthur and Dalny and a point on the trans-Siberian railroad in Northern Manchuria.

We are without means of knowing what impression was made in Japan by Russia's occupation of Manchuria amid frightful scenes of slaughter during the Boxer uprising in 1900. But we do know that Japan joined with Great Britain and the United States in their resistance to and repeated protests against Russian pressure upon China during

the years immediately preceding the Russo-Japanese War; and that, probably because of the implied menace to Korea and China, she regarded the "unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia" as "prejudicial" to her "security and interests."*

At the end of 1898 the breaking up of the Celestial Empire seemed imminent. Germany had obtained a foothold in Shantung, Russia was about to occupy Manchuria, France and Great Britain had taken ports and secured spheres of influence, "Japan had earmarked Fukien Province," and Italy was striving, though in vain, to secure a share of the spoils. Of all the really great Powers, the United States alone stood aloof from this carnival of plunder.†

It was soon after this juncture, which coincided with the close of the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, that Secretary of State Hay appeared in the arena of Asiatic politics as China's champion, and issued his famous circular note of September 6, 1899, to the Powers. This Hay Note was intended to "maintain an open market for all the world's commerce and to remove dangerous sources of international irritation." Our representatives abroad were instructed to obtain from each of the Powers claiming "spheres

*Hershey, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War,* page 52. See also, *Ibid,* chapter xii.

†See especially Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East, passim.*

of influence" in China formal assurances to the following effect:

(1) "That it would not interfere with any treaty-port or with the vested interest of any nation within a so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory which such nation might have in China; (2) that it would maintain the Chinese treaty itself (except in 'free ports') under Chinese management, i. e., guarantee equality of treatment for all nations under the most favored nation clause; and (3) that there should be equality of treatment for all nations in respect to harbor dues and railroad charges."*

In course of time favorable replies were received from all the six Powers addressed (though the reply of Russia was somewhat equivocal), and Mr. Hay felt able to announce that the consent of each of the Powers concerned had been obtained and would be considered "final and definite."

On July 3, 1900, during the crisis resulting from the Boxer uprising, Mr. Hay addressed to the leading Powers a second circular note in which he declared it to be the policy of the United States to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace in China, *preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and inter-*

*Cited from *House Document,* Foreign Relations (1899), 56th Congress, first session, pages 131 ff.; Hershey, *op. cit.,* page 330.

*national law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."** This note also seemed to meet with a cordial reception from the Powers.

The main principles of the Hay note have been reiterated again and again in many treaties and public documents, especially by Japan. More particularly did Great Britain, Japan and the United States co-operate in the attempt to maintain these principles in the face of Russian aggression in Manchuria during the years preceding the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, and they were incorporated in the Anglo-Japanese alliances of 1902, 1908 and 1911.

II

At the close of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan acquired from Russia, with the consent of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lien (Dalny) and adjacent territory, together with a large section of the South Manchurian Railway. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905, the contracting parties agreed:

"(1) To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula, ... and

"(2) To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of

*Hershey, *op. cit.*, page 332.

Manchuria now in occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned."*

In this same article Russia also declared that she did not have in Manchuria "any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity."

Japan and Russia also reciprocally engaged "not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria." Russia agreed to "transfer and assign" to Japan "without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government" the South Manchurian Railway between Chang-chun and Port Arthur—a distance of some 436 miles—and all of its branches, "together with all rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway."

Both countries engaged "to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commer-

*In a supplementary article, it was agreed that the simultaneous withdrawal of their military forces should begin immediately after the treaty of peace came into operation, and that the process of withdrawal should be completed within eighteen months after this date. Both countries reserved the right to maintain railway guards—not to exceed fifteen per kilometer—to protect their respective railway lines.

cial and industrial purposes and in no wise for strategic purposes."*

Equally important to a proper understanding of Japanese aims in Manchuria are the Chino-Japanese Treaty and the Secret Protocols,† signed at Peking on December 22, 1905. In the published treaty China consented to the various transfers and assignments of territory and railways contained in the Treaty of Portsmouth, agreed to the opening to international trade and residence of sixteen additional cities and towns in Manchuria, and conceded to Japan for fifteen years certain rights over the Antung-Mukden Railway, a military road constructed by Japan during the Russo-Japanese War.

The most important of the Secret Protocols concluded between China and Japan was subsequently used as a justification for Japan's refusal to permit China, England and the United States to engage in railway enterprises in Southern Manchuria. It was thus summarized by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in a note to Washington:

"The Chinese Government engage, for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line in

*But it was "understood that this restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula."

†For the texts of these treaties, see Millard, *America and the Far Eastern Question,* Appendices, pages 541-52.

the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above-mentioned railway."

Complaints from foreign merchants of trade discriminations and violations of the open door principle by Japan began to arrive at Washington and other foreign offices soon after the close of the Russo-Japanese War. There can be no question of certain evasions and violations of this principle during the period of military occupation—a period which appears to have been unduly prolonged, that is, until the spring of 1907. During this period the transport of Japanese goods shipped by Japanese merchants was permitted free of charge, whereas all sorts of obstacles were placed in the way of foreign goods entering the country, and no foreigner could travel in Manchuria without a passport granted by the military authorities. The Japanese thus secured many initial advantages which enabled them to defy later competition.

There appears to have been unnecessary delay in the establishment of customs at Dalny and Antung —an omission which enabled Japanese merchants to accumulate stocks of goods and thus still further prolong the period of immunity from foreign competition. It is even charged that preferential treatment was accorded at Dalny to Japanese shipping and that smuggling was practised as late as 1908. Certainly the trade of the Chinese city Niu-chwang has greatly suffered while that of Dalny has flour-

ished exceedingly. It is not denied that, as in the case of Korea, Manchuria was at first a happy hunting ground for Japanese adventurers who practised such dishonest methods as the counterfeiting of foreign labels and imitation of trade marks. They refused to pay *likin* and other local dues and thus enjoyed advantages not only over foreign merchants but also over the Chinese themselves who were obliged to pay these taxes. Japanese immigrants were apparently permitted to reside in places not open to foreign trade. A candid and scrupulous Japanese publicist like Asakawa* admits that such acts were both unwise and illegal.

It has also been charged that Japan for a time discriminated in favor of her own merchants by means of a system of rebates or by other means unhappily familiar to Americans, but these charges can not be said to be absolutely proven.

Though Japan can not be acquitted of a certain amount of unfairness and underhand dealing in her application of so-called business methods in Southern Manchuria, she owes her present commercial supremacy in this region mainly to other causes. These may perhaps be summed up as favorable geographical position, an abundant supply of cheap labor, subsidized steamship lines, railway facilities, government initiative and support of Japanese enterprises and the fact that she is Manchuria's best customer. Japan is in fact the chief consumer of

*In *Yale Review* for 1908, pages 278-79.

the soya bean—the main article of export from this region. Under these circumstances it is scarcely a matter of surprise that American as well as other foreign trade in this region has almost disappeared.

The "evacuation" of Manchuria having been completed in accordance with the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, Russia and Japan were able, on July 30, 1907, to come to an agreement in which each engaged to "respect the actual territorial integrity of the other, and all the rights accruing to one and the other Party from treaties, conventions and contracts in force between them and China." They also declared that they "recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire, and engage to sustain and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach." On November 30, 1908, Japan gave similar assurances regarding China to the United States.*

III

But the most important questions which have arisen in relation to the Japanese exploitation of Manchuria have been those connected with railway projects and administration.

On the strength of the provision in the agree-

*See the Root-Takahira Exchange of Notes in Millard, *Our Eastern Question,* pages 574-75.

ment between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank in 1896, Russia had acquired extensive tracts of land along her railway lines and had exercised over them a complete administration. When the South Manchurian Railway south of Chung-chun was taken over by Japan, the latter zealously followed Russia's example in acquiring railway land, notably at Mukden and Chung-chun, and in extending her administration. This was a source of considerable friction with China.

It seems to have been a wise policy on the part of Japan to co-operate as far as possible with China and Russia in the construction and operation of railways in Manchuria. To this end the South Manchuria Railway Company was organized in 1906, and the lines in possession of Japan were greatly improved until they now constitute one of the first railway systems of the world. The complete co-operation of Russia was finally secured in 1910. For a time the policy of China appears to have been unwisely obstructive; though it must be said that for this policy of China, the arbitrary and inconsiderate conduct of the Japanese was partly to blame.

One of the great controversies of this period centered about the proposed construction of the Hsinmintun-Fakumen extension of the North China Railway by British capital—a scheme which Japan vetoed on the ground that it would constitute a violation of the Secret Protocol, previously men-

tioned, forbidding the building of parallel lines. Though Japan appears to have been technically right in this matter, it would seem that from an economic as well as political point of view, her policy was unwise and short-sighted.

Another project was soon developed (in 1908) which contemplated the construction by American, British and Chinese interests of a very extensive Mongolian-Manchurian railway from Chin-chou to Aigun on the Amur through Tsitsihai, west of Harbin on the Chinese Eastern Railway. This plan had the diplomatic support of the United States but was absolutely vetoed by Russia on the ground that it constituted a menace to Russian political, strategic and economic interests. Japan did not openly reject the proposal, but made her acceptance conditional upon such terms as made the scheme impossible of execution. Clearly the sovereignty of China in Manchuria did not extend to the building of railways.

While the negotiations for the construction of the Chin-chou-Aigun Railway were in progress, Mr. Knox, then Secretary of State, made a proposal to the Powers interested which must be pronounced Utopian and, under the circumstances, extremely unwise. His scheme contemplated nothing less than the so-called neutralization or, more properly speaking, internationalization of all the railways existing or to be built in the whole of Manchuria. According to this plan, the Powers interested, including

Russia and Japan, were to loan to China sufficient funds to enable her to purchase the interests of Japan and Russia and to construct more Manchurian railways. The ownership of all these lines was to be vested in the Chinese Government, but for the time being, at least, they were to be administered by a sort of international commission. In this way China was to enjoy political rights in Manchuria, and the principle of the open door and equal commercial opportunity was to be preserved for all nations.

The neutralization or internationalization scheme of Mr. Knox might, if capable of execution, have afforded an ideal solution of the Manchurian question, but it was open to too many practical objections to make it worthy of serious consideration. It greatly embarrassed our natural ally, Great Britain, which felt obliged to approve of it *in principle,* but deemed it "wise to postpone consideration of the scheme." It offended Russia and appears to have grievously wounded Japan.* By both these nations it was politely but firmly rejected.

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*Says the *Japan Mail* (weekly) for January 22, 1910: "Since the celebrated interference of the three Powers in the case of the Liao-tung Peninsula, no diplomatic incident seems to have stirred Japan so deeply as has this Washington proposal." Count Okuma is quoted as saying that the Knox proposal astonished him because of its lack of common sense. Count Hayashi characterized it as unjust. The Japanese press seems to have been unanimous in its opposition to the scheme. Much of the comment was very bitter.

"The Knox Fiasco,"* as it came to be called, was unquestionably one of the main causes for the Russo-Japanese Convention signed on July 4, 1910. This Convention declared:

"Having in view the actual situation in Manchuria where the interests of the two Powers meet," and "with the object of facilitating communications and developing the commerce of nations," Russia and Japan mutually engage to "lend to each other their friendly co-operation with a view to the amelioration of their respective railway lines in Manchuria and the improvement of the connecting service of the said railways, and to abstain from all competition prejudicial to the realization of this object. Both countries also agreed to "maintain and respect the *status quo* in Manchuria resulting from the treaties, conventions, and other arrangements concluded up to this day between either of these two Powers and China."†

With the conclusion of this convention, which does not even render lip service to the principle of the open door, the fate of Manchuria appears to have been sealed. At least as far as this region is concerned, both Russia and Japan had reverted to

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*For the main documents bearing on the Knox Proposals, see Millard, *Our Eastern Question,* chapter I, and appendix A.

†Article III provides that in case of menace to this *status quo,* both Powers shall communicate with each other with a view to an understanding. For the text of the treaty, see *Japan Year Book* for 1915, page 574.

the old "sphere of influence" or "special interests" diplomacy based upon the idea of particular concessions and monopolistic privileges. Russia had probably at no time entertained any other purpose, but Japan had professed, possibly with some degree of sincerity, that she was fighting for the open door and the integrity of the Chinese Empire in Manchuria, though she claimed special interests in Korea. Whether she had ever deluded herself may be an open question, but there can be no question as to the disillusionment of England and the United States. The country which had loudly complained of German policy in Shantung and Russian policy in Manchuria now justified her own conduct by the very precedents which she had formerly condemned.

The more recent aggressions of Japan in Manchuria as well as in other parts of China will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XVI

JAPANESE AIMS AND POLICY IN CHINA

I

For several years after the negotiations in 1909 of a new treaty with China which settled a number of outstanding disputes, the relations between the two countries seem to have become somewhat more satisfactory than had hitherto been the case. Thousands of Chinese students had already flocked to Tokyo to enjoy the advantages of a cheap and quick education. Though speedily disillusioned with Japan, many of them imbibed radical and revolutionary ideas which bore fruit a few years later in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. However, the old feeling of distrust and dislike of Japan's aims and methods was soon again aroused in China, and relations* grew steadily worse, especially after 1912-13.

*Count Hayashi (*Secret Memoirs*, chapters ix-x) held the problem of Sino-Japanese relations to be insoluble. He says (page 257): "Even though various treaties have gained us special privileges in China, the Chinese will eventually try to limit the sphere of influence as much as possible, whilst we, on our part, must try to reserve as much room for our expansion in that country as possible. Consequently, . . .

There seems to be no evidence that Japan instigated or promoted the Chinese revolutionists in 1911, though it is undoubtedly true that the nation as a whole, perhaps not altogether on unselfish grounds, strongly sympathized with them.

Though debtor nations and with little or no capital for foreign investment, both Japan and Russia in 1912 asked to be admitted to the Four Power Loan Syndicate. This Syndicate was composed of English, French, German and American bankers who had the diplomatic backing of their respective Governments for loans to China, then in need of large sums of money for political, commercial and industrial purposes, more particularly for the building of railways and the crushing of a prospective rebellion.

The admission of Japan and Russia to the Loan

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it is impossible to avoid ill-feeling and a conflict of interests." He repudiates the idea that it is possible "to get everything for ourselves and at the same time to gain the confidence of the Chinese by making them appreciate our great services in having driven away the Russians. . . . That we drove the Russians out of Manchuria was because we wanted to protect our own interests. Our action was necessary for our preservation. We were not requested by China to drive Russia out." Again, he says (on page 259): "It is, therefore, for our own preservation that we are holding Manchuria. We have not acted in the least from humanitarian considerations. Even the Chinese understand these things." Even to the friends of Japan, the argument that the Chinese show ingratitude by not acceding promptly to all her demands, seems selfish as well as childish.

Syndicate gave it more of a political character,* and this ultimately (in March, 1913) led to the withdrawal of the United States from the new Six-Power Group on the ground that the administrative independence of China was threatened by the conditions imposed upon China by the Reorganization Loan Agreement.†

Other evidences of Japan's aggressive aims or forward policy in China at this time are not lacking. Japan assumed an attitude unfriendly to the Government of her old enemy Yuan-Shih Kai and there seems to be good evidence that Japanese officers participated in the rebellion of 1913. Among the diplomatic incidents of this period, the "Nanking Incident" and the "Changli Affair" are the most notable. They reveal a clear intent on the part of the Japanese Government to make the most of its opportunities, and they did much to increase that powerful anti-Japanese feeling which exists among the Chinese and their sympathizers.

Upon the capture of Nanking by General Chang Hsun on September 1, 1913, his troops plundered the city, killing some of the citizens. Among those killed were two Japanese. It was also claimed that the flag of the Japanese consulate had been insulted.

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*This was at once apparent when Japan and Russia demanded that they be consulted concerning expenditures for undertakings in Manchuria and Mongolia.

†For the text of this Agreement, see Millard, *Our Eastern Question*, appendix B, pages 406 ff.

For these acts, extremely reprehensible but common in Chinese warfare, Japan demanded and ultimately obtained, among other things, the payment of a large indemnity, an apology and the punishment of the culprits, including the removal of General Chang Hsun. These demands would not perhaps have been excessive had it been clearly shown that the Japanese were killed because of their nationality and that General Chang was in any way personally responsible for these crimes. But this was by no means the case. In making his apology, General Chang cleverly outwitted his accusers in characteristic Chinese fashion. After his visit at the Japanese consulate, he proceeded to call upon the other foreign consuls at Nanking as well. In this way he "saved face" in the eyes of his troops and compatriots.

The Changli Affair occurred on September 20, 1913, when a conflict between Chinese and Japanese railway guards resulted in the killing of three Chinese soldiers and the wounding of two others. According to the Chinese version, the conflict originated in the refusal of a Japanese sentinel to pay for some apples which he had filched from a Chinese peddler. The Japanese claimed that they were attacked by the Chinese who attempted to force a way through their ranks. It was now the turn of the Chinese Government to demand compensation, certain assurances, apology and punishment. But after prolonged negotiations, Japan would concede noth-

ing beyond an indemnity. As between China and Japan, it would seem that much depends upon whose ox is gored.

During the years 1912-14 Chinese aversion for Japan was still further intensified by Japan's refusal to consent to a proposed revision of the Chinese tariff on the terms agreed upon by several of the other Powers. Though Japan was doubtless acting within her treaty rights, her opposition to tariff revision is said to have excited intense excitement in China.

II

It would thus seem that the relations between the two countries were already strained to a considerable degree when the Great European War broke out in August, 1914. Within a few days after England had entered the war, Baron Kato, Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared: "We shall do our duty."* At a meeting of the Elder Statesmen there was said to be a complete accord between Prince Yamagata and Count Okuma.

On August 15th, Japan delivered the following ultimatum to Germany which contains an ironical reminder of Germany's friendly *advice* to Japan in 1895 to re-cede to China the Liao-tung Peninsula:

**Japan Mail* (weekly) for August 8, 1914. The files of the *Japan Weekly Mail* constitute our main authority for much of what follows.

"We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbances of the peace in the Far East, and to safeguard the general interests as contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain.*

"In order to secure a firm and lasting peace in Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Gov-

*It is difficult to see how "the territorial rights or special interests" of either England or Japan in the Far East, mentioned in the preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1911, were seriously menaced by Germany up to this time. To be sure, Tsing-tau might for a short time have served the small German squadron then in Eastern waters as a naval base of some importance, but it could have accomplished little in the face of the presence of the Allied fleets. Yet if Japan was not clearly bound to go to the aid of her ally England, it was doubtless within her *right* to do so. Whether Japan took the initiative in this matter or merely responded to the request of her ally will be for future historians to determine. According to a report which appears to be based upon a statement by Count Okuma in the *Japan Mail* (weekly) for August 15, 1914, the British Government merely requested the aid of the Japanese navy in policing the waters in the Far East. To attain this end, the Japanese Government deemed it necessary to destroy the German base of operations at Tsing-tau. Baron Kato stated in the Japanese Diet that Great Britain asked for assistance early in August and that there had been a full and frank exchange of views between the two Governments. Some efforts were made in diplomatic and official circles at Peking to secure a neutralization of leased territory during the Great War. Ideally speaking, this might have been a wise solution of the problem, but the pernicious and diabolical activities of Germans everywhere during this war have shown that Germany could not have been trusted to observe a real neutrality in Shantung.

ernment sincerely believes it to be its duty to give the *advice* to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

"First—To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

"Second—To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochou, *with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.*

"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer from the Imperial German Government signifying its unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as she may deem necessary to meet the situation."

Germany having failed to reply to this ultimatum, the Emperor of Japan, albeit with "profound regret" and "in spite of an ardent devotion to the cause of peace," declared war against Germany.

Meanwhile, Count Okuma and Baron Kato were prolific in assurances to the outside world that Japan was inspired by none other than the most pacific and altruistic motives. On August 20th Baron Kato gave the following explanation of Japan's action in a communication to our State Department at Washington:

"The history of the seizure of the place [Kiao-chou] by Germany and her conduct preceding and including her intervention in conjunction with Russia and France, after the Chino-Japanese War, show that it is absolutely necessary to eliminate such possession completely if Japan is to restore immediately complete peace in the Far East in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. If Japan is to look far enough into the future and adopt measures to insure an abiding peace in Eastern Asia, she must realize that a strong military base in the hands of a hostile military power right in the heart of the country cannot in itself fail to be a menacing factor."

And on August 24th, Count Okuma cabled to the New York *Independent* a "Message to the American People" which contains this assurance:

"As Premier of Japan, I have stated and now again state to the people of America and the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess.

*"My Government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always keeps her promises."**

*The italics are ours. In view of subsequent happenings, these utterances on the part of one of Japan's great statesmen reflect very seriously upon the honor of Nippon. For sincere lovers of the Japanese like the authors of this volume it becomes a very painful duty to have to record their impression that the Japanese Government must experience a considerable

On August 25th the following remarkable semi-official statement regarding Japan's policy in China was given out by the Kokwai Tsuchin-sha,* a Japanese news agency with close official connections with the Foreign Office, and cabled to all parts of Europe and America:

"On the highest authority Reuter's correspondent is able to state that it is the settled policy of Japan, approved by the Emperor, the Genro, the Privy Council, the Cabinet, and the leading business men, that Japan under all future conditions will act strictly in accord with the terms of the alliance with England and the treaties and agreements with America and her pledge to China. She will restore Kiao-chou and will preserve the territorial integrity of China. The ultimatum will be adhered to, whether Tsing-tau is taken by force or otherwise."

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change of heart and method before implicit confidence can be placed in its pledges and assurances. It is greatly to be deplored that in the field of diplomacy Japan has preferred to imitate Russia and Germany rather than the countries of Western Europe and America.

*This agency is also closely affiliated with the British Reuter's and the American Associated Press. The writers recall vividly the dislike and criticism aroused in a certain foreign circle in Tokyo several years ago when it was rumored that the Japanese Government had effected an arrangement which gave it virtual control of the powerful Reuter's agency; for it thus acquired a practical censorship of foreign dispatches. Similar arrangements appear to have been made with the Associated Press. Thus do Governments like those of Japan and Germany control one of the main sources of knowledge regarding their aims and actions.

This official and semi-official press campaign had its effect in foreign lands, and their newspapers resounded with praise of Japanese altruism, magnanimity and pacific and humanitarian motives. But how soon came the disillusionment!* Within a few months suggestions began to appear in the Japanese press to the effect that in the ultimatum to Germany, Japan had only indicated her intention to restore Kiao-chou to China in case of a peaceful transfer to Japan, but that its restoration as prize of war had not been contemplated. In December, 1914, Baron Kato, in reply to an interpellation, declared in the Diet that Japan had made "no promise whatever with regard to the ultimate disposition of what she had acquired in Shantung. The purpose of the ultimatum to Germany was to take Kiao-chou from Germany and so to restore peace in the Orient. Restitution after a campaign was not thought of and was not referred to in the ultimatum."† And in her ultimatum to China on May 7, 1915, the Japanese Government declared: "The Imperial Japanese Government, in taking Kiao-chou, made immense sacrifices in blood and money. Therefore after tak-

*This disillusionment was shared by the authors of this volume. Really, it is more than doubtful whether even from the standpoint of mere expediency, statesmen are wise in resorting to these methods of deceiving their public. The reaction is so great as to provoke perhaps excessive distrust.

†Then why the assurances by Count Okuma and the semi-official statement referred to above *after* the declaration of war against Germany?

ing the place, there is not the least obligation . . . to return the place to China."*

In their conduct of operations against Tsing-tau, Japan, on the plea of military necessity, committed a violation of Chinese neutrality and international law for which, from a purely military point of view, there was even less justification than for Germany's outrageous violation of Belgian neutrality. Troops were landed at the port of Lungkow on the northern coast of Shantung† and marched overland to Weihsien on the railway about one hundred miles west of Tsing-tau and well outside the war zone which had been marked out by the Chinese Government. Disregarding Chinese protests, Japan, in fact, soon took possession of the entire line of the Shantung Railway and the German coal mines in Shantung. She even stationed troops at Tsinanfu, 260 miles west of Kiao-chou. Indeed, long before the final taking of Tsing-tau, on November 7, 1914, it had become clear to all concerned that, temporarily at least, Japan

*Cited from Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics,* etc., page 290. Hornbeck adds: "Since then the Japanese Government has agreed to restore Kiao-chou to China—under specified conditions—after the end of the European War; but in the interval everything possible is being done not only to eliminate all signs of German possession and influence from Shantung, but further, to replace them with Japanese institutions and enterprises."

†On the other hand, the small British expeditionary force which assisted at the capture of Tsing-tau landed at Laoshou within the leased territory, thus carefully avoiding the violation of Chinese neutrality.

regarded herself as more than the heir of Germany in the Shantung Province.

III

But the worst part of the story of Japan's aggressive conduct toward China remains to be told.

After the entry of Japan into the war, when it had become evident that Chinese neutrality was imperiled, the Chinese Government, seeking to restrict the sphere of Japanese military operations, had delimited a war zone to which, however, Japan had paid not the least attention. After the reduction of Kiao-chou the Chinese Government, arguing that there was no further reason for maintaining the war zone, notified Japan of its intention to abolish the zone. The action resulted in a great outburst of indignation in the Japanese press which affected to regard this revelation of the Chinese attitude as an "insult." There arose in Japan a strong popular demand for satisfaction and the enforcement of Japan's "rights" in China.

On January 18, 1915, Japan made her infamous demands on China, in twenty-one articles. From a purely selfish but probably short-sighted point of view the time was most opportune. As an editorial in the *Japan Weekly Mail* expresses it:

"If it is Japan's settled policy to dominate and control China and to achieve the hegemony of Eastern Asia, this appears to be an ideal opportunity.

The hands of Europe are tied. The hands of the United States are folded in peace. China herself is impotent. Europe has set Japan a bad example. . . . These are days of world adjustment. . . . What is Japan that she should rise superior to the common level and show a self-restraint, an unselfish regard for the rights of other nations and peoples, when the whole civilized world is in a debâcle of conflicting national ambitions and selfishness?"

The twenty-one articles of the demands as originally presented by Japan were divided into five groups.

Group I related to the province of Shantung and required: the assent of China to all matters which might be agreed upon between Japan and Germany with regard to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions possessed by Germany; an engagement by China not to alienate or lease any part of Shantung or any territory or island along its coast to a third Power; the granting to Japan of the right to build an additional railway in the province, and the opening of certain important cities and towns as treaty-ports.

Group II, relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, provided: for the extension of the terms of the leases of Port Arthur and Dalny, and of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden railways to a period of ninety-nine years; the acquisition by the Japanese of the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacturing or for farming, as also

the rights of residence, trade, manufacturing and travel; the grant to Japanese subjects of the right of opening all mines, such mines to be jointly decided upon by the two Governments, the assumption on the part of China of an obligation to obtain the consent of Japan before granting railway concessions or loans to subjects of third Powers, as also before employing political, financial, or military advisers or instructors; and the transfer to Japan of the management and control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway.

Group III related to Japan's interest in the important Hanyang iron and steel works* (the Krupps of China) acquired near Hankow during the Chinese revolution. Article 1 provided that China and Japan "mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives, the Hanychping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations;" and that, "without the previous consent of Japan, China" shall not dispose of the rights and property of this Company. Article 2 contained this vague but far-reaching stipulation: "The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanychping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the Company, to be worked by any person outside of the said Company;" and that "if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly

*This company also owns valuable coal and iron mines in Central China.

or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of said Company shall first be obtained."

In Group IV China "engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbor, bay, or island along the [entire] coast of China."

The articles in Group V are so important and pregnant with future possibilities that they deserve quotation in full:

"Article 1. The Chinese Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

"Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

"Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle, cases which have caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of the important places in China shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese, or that the Chinese police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese police service.

"Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war, say fifty per cent. or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government, or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

"Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the

right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchwang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchou, and another between Nanchang and Choo-chou.

"Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbor works, including dockyards, in the province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

"Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right to propagate religious doctrines in China."

In presenting the above demands, Japan clearly showed her hand and revealed a purpose not merely of excluding so far as possible other Powers from leases and concessions in China but of monopolizing such privileges for herself. More than this, Group V showed that Japan was aiming at the political control of China, whether for its own sake or in order, more likely, to be able the better to exploit her commercial and industrial resources. The granting of these demands would, in effect, have transformed China into a protectorate or vassal state of Japan.

If the substance of the demands was extremely menacing, the manner of presenting and urging them was positively insulting. Instead of communicating them to the China Foreign Office, the Japanese Minister presented them personally to Yuan-Shih Kai, the President of the Chinese Republic. The greatest secrecy was enjoined as a means of preventing "complications," and the

"friendly advice" was accompanied by an intimation that "if China failed to meet Japan's advice in a satisfactory manner, and caused delay in adjusting the questions, it might not be possible for Japan to continue to restrain the activities of Chinese revolutionists then sojourning in Japan."*

When the news relating to these secret demands finally leaked out, they were at first persistently denied by the Japanese Government and its officials. When the British Minister at Peking made direct inquiries, the Japanese Minister, after evasions, "admitted that a memorandum had been presented to China; but asserted that only eleven points were raised, and that these did not infringe upon China's political autonomy, or the rights of other foreign nations."†

In the eleven proposals which Japan published to the world as those containing the whole or the gist of her demands, the articles of Group V were omitted, together with many other important mat-

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*Millard, *Our Eastern Question,* page 131. The case is thus stated by Professor Jenks in the *World's Work* for January, 1917: "She (Japan) presented a list of twenty-one demands in manner insulting to the Chinese Government. She demanded secrecy, threatening the Chinese President and ignoring China's foreign office; she violated the secrecy. The secret out, she issued, deliberately, false statements to the Treaty Powers, the United States included. She doctored the news and prevaricated to officials and the press." He adds: "These statements are fully proved by official documents. There is no denying the facts."

†Millard, *op. cit.,* page 144.

ters, such as the restrictions upon the rights of China to grant railway concessions or loans to third Powers and the far-reaching second article of the third group relating to the Hanychping Company.

Japan at first tried to persuade China to accede to the twenty-one demands *en bloc* without debate. When this failed, a series of twenty-four conferences were held between February 2 and April 17, 1915, of which, in accordance with the wishes of Japan, no official minutes were kept. In March the Japanese began to dispatch large bodies of troops to Manchuria and Shantung, alleging the need of relieving the garrisons there, whose term of service had not, however, expired. The Japanese Minister stated at one of the conferences that these troops would not be withdrawn until negotiations had been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Before the completion of the negotiations some sixty thousand Japanese troops had been sent to Manuchuria and Shantung and to points on the Yangtse River.

These negotiations were carried on during an election in Japan and it is possible that some of the demands were inspired by the needs of the political campaign.* But it is more likely that the influences resulting from a vigorous publicity campaign and British and American representations were more powerful in inducing the Japanese Govern-

*This appears to have been admitted with reference to the demand in favor of Japanese Buddhistic propaganda in China.

ment to modify its demands than the fact that the election in Japan resulted in a landslide in favor of the Okuma Government.

On April 26th the Japanese Minister offered at a suitable opportunity to restore Kiao-chou to China and presented a revised edition of twenty-four demands which were declared to be final. In this revision a few of the items contained in Group V were retained, in spite of the fact that the demands of this group had been declared to be merely "wishes." In their reply of May 1st the Chinese agreed to nearly everything asked for in the revision, but rejected several of the demands relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia and the one which required the concession to Japan of the right to construct railway lines in South China. "The Chinese also asked again that Japan agree to the retrocession of Shantung and provide indemnification for the losses caused to Chinese subjects by the military campaign in that province; and that Japan recognize the right of China to participate in the negotiations which would take place between Japan and Germany with regard to Shantung."*

Thereupon Japan withdrew her conditional offer for the restoration of Shantung and on the 7th of May presented a forty-eight hour ultimatum which declared that "the Chinese Government not only did not give a careful consideration to the revised proposals, but even with regard to the offer of the

*Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, page 324.

Japanese Government to restore Kiao-chou to the Chinese Government, the latter did not manifest the least appreciation of Japan's good will and difficulties."*

On the morning of May 9th the Chinese Government agreed to the terms laid down in the ultimatum and the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1915 was over. So far as we know† only the United States protested against the agreement thus wrung from China by the threat of war. On May 16th the following identical notes were delivered to the Chinese and Japanese Governments:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place or which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic [or the Government of Japan] that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or

*All obligation to restore Kiao-chou is denied in the ultimatum. Five articles of Group V were reserved for future consideration. Japan also declared in an explanatory note that "if the Chinese Government accepts all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum, the offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiao-chou . . . will still hold good."

†It is extremely likely that Great Britain also brought pressure to bear upon Japan at this time, for her interests, especially in the Yangtse Valley, were very seriously threatened. But documentary evidence is lacking to support this contention.

which may be entered into between the Government of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy, commonly known as the open door policy."

IV

The terms thus imposed upon China were embodied in a series of treaties, agreements, exchanges of notes and declarations which were signed on May 25th. They do not include the most dangerous demands of group V (which were reserved for further discussion), nor do they embody the vague and far-reaching stipulation referred to above respecting the interests of the Hanychping Company in the Yangtse Valley. But by an exchange of notes it was agreed that this Company should not be converted into a state enterprise and that there should be co-operation between the Company and Japanese capitalists.

Most of the demands relating to Shantung and Southern Manchuria were incorporated into separate treaties, though China undertook herself to build the proposed railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to Weihsien with Japanese capital, and it is provided that Japanese subjects in Southern Manchuria (to whom the right of free residence and travel is granted) shall "submit to the police laws and ordinances and taxation of China."

An exchange of notes granted an extension of the leases of Port Arthur and Dalny and of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railways to the years 1997, 2002 and 2007 respectively. A number of treaty-ports in Shantung and Mongolia were to be opened, and a number of mines were to be selected by Japanese subjects in South Manchuria.

"China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required, China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first. . . . . If foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first."

The Chinese Government also declared that it had given no permission to foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province (opposite Formosa), dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other military establishments;" and that it entertained "no intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the above mentioned establishments."*

With respect to the leased Territory of Kiaochou Bay, the Japanese Government declared a willingness to restore it to China on the following conditions:

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*This declaration wrested from China was particularly directed against Americans who were interested in a project for the construction of a Chinese naval base at Fukien.

"1. The whole of Kiao-chou Bay to be opened as a Commercial Port.

"2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.

"3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may be established.

"4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration."

The terms thus finally wrung from China were much more moderate than were the original demands and were regarded as a failure in Japan, but they nevertheless mark a very considerable advance in the process of obtaining political and economic control over China. They have undoubtedly served to fasten the grip of Japan on Southern Manchuria and Shantung, and they constitute an encroachment in Eastern Mongolia, Fukien and the Yangtse Valley, where British interests were supposed to dominate. They greatly strengthen the hands of Japan in dealing with the Chinese Government and may, in fact, be said to menace Peking itself. Kiao-chou may, indeed, be "restored," but it will be under such conditions as to leave Japan virtually predominant in Shantung.

There naturally followed a strong reaction against Japan in China which for several months found ex-

pression in a boycott of Japanese goods. It is premature to attempt to follow Japanese intrigues in connection with the attempt of Yuan-Shih-Kai to change the form of government in China from a republic back to a monarchy and the resulting revolutionary movement in Yunnan. In October, 1916, we heard of new Japanese demands upon China for further privileges of Japanese subjects in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia,* but the succession of Count Terauchi to the Premiership of Japan at about this time appears to have inaugurated a change in methods,† if not of policy, toward

*These demands are thus summarized in *The Outlook* for Oct. 4, 1916:

"1. A reduction of the Chinese forces stationed in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

"2. More Japanese police officers to be employed by Chinese authorities in Southern Manchuria.

"3. Japanese officers to be attached to Chinese forces stationed in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

"4. Japanese officials to be employed at military schools.

"5. The Chinese Governor of Mukden to make apologies to the Japanese Governor at Darien and the Japanese Consul at Mukden for the attack by Chinese soldiers on Japanese soldiers."

According to the *Japan Mail* (weekly) for Jan. 27, 1917, all these demands were subsequently either dropped by the Japanese Government or reserved for future settlement, excepting those for apology, punishment and compensation, which were conceded by China. This would seem to indicate that the policy of the Terauchi Government toward China has become more conciliatory than that of previous Cabinets.

†Criticism in Japan was directed not so much against the policy of Count Okuma and Baron Kato as against their

China. Though a representative of the military clique, Terauchi seems to have adopted a more moderate tone, and appears disposed to try a more friendly and conciliatory policy. As stated by the editor of *Japan and the Japanese,** there is need of "harmonious co-operation" between these members of one family who are too prone to quarrel. According to this writer, the hopes of Japan have been sadly disappointed because of China's "revengeful spirit" and her traditional and "egotistic" policy of checking her neighbor's progress on the continent of Asia.

The most significant event in the foreign politics of the Far East, prior to the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, was the growing *rapprochement* between Russia and Japan which resulted in the signing of a sort of defensive treaty of alliance in July, 1916.†

The published portion of this agreement binds each party to refrain from any political arrangement or combination against the other, and in case the territorial rights or special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties are menaced,

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methods. By some these methods were held to be too drastic; by others insufficiently so.

*In the *Japanese Magazine* for May, 1916. Another writer in this magazine (see July, 1916) accuses the United States of "taking advantage of China's weakness in a crisis" by offering her loans.

†Cf. pages 348-349.

Japan and Russia will act in concert for the protection of these rights and interests.

V

Japanese statesmen and publicists have attempted to justify their treatment of China by speaking of a "Monroe Doctrine for Asia" or of an "Asia for the Asiatics" movement. Count Okuma and other Japanese idealists have repeatedly spoken of the mission of Japan to serve as an intermediary between the East and the West, or as a harmonizer of Eastern and Western civilizations. It would thus seem that Japan aspires to a sort of hegemony or leadership of Eastern Asia with a view to imposing a Japanized *Kultur* made up of a fusion of Eastern and Western elements upon at least the eastern portion of that vast continent.

The analogy of Japan's policy in Asia with the Monroe Doctrine has some striking aspects, but is very misleading and imperfect. In so far as Japan desires to prevent further European political aggression in Eastern Asia or to remove a political menace like that of Germany in possession of Tsing-tau, Americans are able to sympathize with Japan's attitude. But in so far as the Monroe Doctrine for Asia includes aims of political aggression, exclusive or monopolistic concessions, a privileged position for purposes of commercial or industrial exploitation, the analogy fails. The United States makes no such claims on the American Continent.

The Monroe Doctrine was originally a defensive policy directed against the Holy or Quadruple Alliance of European States to prevent a threatened policy of interference in the internal affairs of certain Latin-American states. It was declared in 1823: (1) that the American continents were "henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers;" and (2) that we should consider any attempt on the part of the Allied Powers "to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety." But it was also declared that "with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere." In its historically developed form, the Monroe policy may be said to mean that the American people would not tolerate without resistance the permanent seizure of territory, a future attempt at colonization, or an endeavor to control the political destiny of any free portion of this hemisphere by an European or Asiatic Power.*

*The Monroe policy is often said to be vague, ill-defined, and uncertain in its meaning and application. This may be true with certain implications or corollaries which have been drawn from the Doctrine, such as the degree or extent of our responsibilities for the preservation of order or the payment of obligations contracted or guaranteed by Latin-American States. But it is not true with reference to the essence or substance of the Doctrine itself, upon which nearly all authorities are agreed. Nor is it the case that the existence of a sphere of interest or policy on this hemisphere prevents us from having such interests or policies elsewhere.

The United States has never demanded exclusive concessions, special privileges or political powers in Latin-America except in a few cases like those of Panama, Haiti and Cuba, where circumstances rendered such action unavoidable. In this respect the Monroe Doctrine bears a striking resemblance to the Hay policy, which aimed to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of China, and the open door or equal commercial opportunities for all nations.

In respect to Japan's mission as mediator between Eastern and Western civilizations, as also in respect to her aspirations to Asiatic leadership, the most friendly students of Japanese character and institutions have grave doubts as to the fitness of Nippon for either rôle. Even such a patriotic, not to say chauvinistic, Japanese statesman as Count Hayashi* has admitted that "China is far richer than Japan" in what he calls "social civilization." Any missionary, trader or traveler in China will bear witness to the far-reaching and deep-seated antipathy of the Chinese to the Japanese. Moreover, the "Asia for the Asiatics" doctrine strongly advocated by many Japanese seems practically absurd to those who realize the vast interests of Russia and Great Britain in Eastern Asia—not to speak of those of France, Holland and the United States.

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*See *Secret Memoirs*, page 269.

CHAPTER XVII

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

I

UNTIL the unfortunate action in 1906 of the San Francisco school board in ordering the segregation of Japanese school children, very few Americans had been conscious even of the possibility of any serious dispute ever arising between Japan and the United States. It is true that a few Americans may have vaguely remembered the Japanese protest against the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, but that protest had not been pressed and the incident was soon forgotten.

It seems unnecessary to do more than to recall to the mind of any American or Japanese reader the warm and intimate friendship between the two countries which continued for over fifty years after the door of Japan had been pried open by Commodore Perry in 1854. The obligations of Japan to the United States are thus summarized by two eminent Japanese:*

"Japan improved her educational, her banking

*Soyeda and Kamiya in a pamphlet on *The Japanese Question in California* (1915), page 3.

and currency systems and carried out many other changes in her institutions following the example of the Great Republic. She also sent many of her young men to be educated in American Universities.

"The refunding of the Shimonoseki indemnity, the good-will shown at the time of the treaty revision, and the services rendered during the Portsmouth negotiations, have drawn Japan still closer to the United States of America."

The first chill to this friendship seems to have occurred in 1905 when at the close of the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth permitted themselves to be outwitted by the Russian Count de Witte, who, better than Baron Komura and his associates, knew how to play to the gallery of public opinion as represented by the American press. More serious perhaps upon Japanese public opinion was the failure to secure an indemnity from Russia. This served, to a certain extent, to arouse suspicion of the motives of the American people as represented by President Roosevelt, who acted as a sort of mediator in initiating the Peace of Portsmouth. As a matter of fact, President Roosevelt had not proffered his good offices without the knowledge that he was acting in accordance with the wishes of both the Russian and Japanese Governments, but for reasons best known to themselves the rulers of Japan appear never to have corrected these erroneous impressions among their people.

Since 1900 there had been a considerable increase in the number of Japanese immigrants into Pacific ports,* particularly at San Francisco. In the spring of 1905 the *San Francisco Chronicle* opened a very successful campaign against the Japanese in California and this was followed by the organization of the Asiatic Exclusion League made up mainly of trade unionists who objected to Japanese immigration primarily on economic grounds, but whose propaganda appealed largely to race prejudice.

II

It was on May 6, 1905, that the board of education of San Francisco, dominated by trade unionists, unwisely decided to establish separate schools for Chinese and Japanese pupils, but no positive action was taken until after the great fire the next year.†

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*"During the six years from 1901 to 1906, the total number immigrating directly was 34,491. For some years, however, this direct immigration was greatly augmented by an unfortunate indirect immigration by way of the Hawaiian Islands. . . . As against 39,531 admitted directly from Japan during the years 1902 to 1907, some 32,855 are reported to have sailed from Honolulu to the mainland."—Millis, *The Japanese Problem*, page 4.

†One pretext for this action was the alleged presence in the public schools of Japanese adults. "The total number of Japanese children in the twenty-three schools of the city was only ninety-three; of whom nine were sixteen years old, twelve were seventeen, six were eighteen, four were nineteen, and two were twenty. The remainder were all under sixteen years of age."—Millis, *op. cit.*, page 13.

Then was issued a "separate school order" requiring the transfer of the majority of the widely scattered Japanese pupils to the newly created Oriental School in the heart of the city. At about the same time a certain amount of mob violence developed in connection with the boycott of Japanese restaurants.

The Japanese Government on October 23, 1906, protested against the action of the San Francisco school board, claiming that such race discrimination was in violation of treaty rights and the principles of the law of nations. The action of the board was based upon the authority of a state statute and involved difficult and controverted questions of constitutionality as well as of treaty interpretation and of international law.

We can not here enter into a discussion of the technical or legal points at issue*—questions which have never been settled to this day; but there can be no question of the extreme unwisdom and rank injustice of the treatment of the Japanese by a large section of the people and press of California in this, as in other matters.

On the other hand, it was and remains a matter for surprise that Count Hayashi, then Japan's Foreign Minister, should have deemed it necessary to raise the issue at that time and in that manner—

*Any one interested in these questions may refer to the following articles: Judge Baldwin, in *Columbia Law Review* VII, (1907), pages 25 ff.; Hershey, in *American Political Science Review* (1907), pages 393 ff.; and Secretary Root, in *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. I, pages 273 ff.

a method which only resulted in an aggravation of the situation.* The citizens of California and still less the people of the United States (who, in fact, for the most part sided with the Japanese against the San Franciscans in this unfortunate controversy) had not the remotest intention of offending or insulting Japan; but the Japanese are a very proud and sensitive people and deeply resented any discrimination against them, more especially one which classified them with other Orientals.

The school controversy was settled by the mediation of President Roosevelt, who induced the San Francisco authorities to modify the school ordinance so as merely to send all "alien" children above ten years of age to a special school. He also secured from Congress the insertion in our new immigration act of February 25, 1907, of a clause providing that

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*Some observers maintain that immigration was the real issue and that the Japanese Government desired to prevent the passage of a discriminatory immigration law. Others have believed that it was in the nature of a flank or even sham attack to distract our attention from coming events in Manchuria. Says A. M. Pooley in his "Introduction" to the *Secret Memoirs,* (page 20): "Hayashi tried to shut America out from China by raising difficulties for her nearer home. . . . In a few months he killed the long established friendship between America and Japan." This seems to be putting the matter too strongly; for, judging from Count Hayashi's own discussion of the "American Question" (in the *Secret Memoirs,* pages 246 ff.), he did not consider the anti-Japanese agitation in California of much importance. In any case it must be said that the Japanese protest was a diplomatic blunder and that it proved to be a boomerang.

the President might refuse entrance to certain classes of immigrants. Then in a so-called "gentlemen's agreement," the Japanese Government agreed to prevent emigration of laborers from Japan to the United States by a refusal of passports.

This agreement seems to have been carried out by Japan in good faith and has proved very effective. Since 1908 the number of departures from the United States has exceeded the number of admissions.*

III

But this settlement of the immigration problem and the school controversy did not end the anti-Japanese agitation. What has been called the "pin-prick policy" which Japan adopted at this time had the effect of irritating many of those Americans (and they constituted a vast majority) who condemned the Californian methods, but who nevertheless believed in restricting immigration from the Orient. Even the Eastern press began to find fault with Japan's diplomacy. It is an open secret that President Roosevelt, who had warmly espoused the cause of Japan *versus* California, changed his attitude somewhat toward the Japanese, and his sending of the American fleet on its famous cruise in 1907 was undoubtedly inspired by an ardent desire to increase American prestige in the Far East.

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*See table of Japanese immigration statistics in Millis, page 18.

Another source of friction was the situation in China. Though it can not be said that the American people as a whole were much interested in or greatly agitated by events in Manchuria, certain interests were offended by Japanese methods of trade and exploitation in that region and there was a growing sympathy with China as well as a growing distrust of Japanese aims.

As has been already stated,* the Knox proposal in 1909 for the so-called neutralization of the Manchurian railways aroused fierce resentment in Japan and might perhaps be said to have given the final death-blow to the old American-Japanese friendship; but it could hardly be maintained that the Knox proposal represented a popular demand in the United States or, indeed, that the American public took much interest in the matter. The 'American people are as yet too ignorant of international relations and too inexperienced in foreign affairs to be greatly concerned about what passes in remote regions of the world.'

Yet here and there voices were raised against the growing Japanese menace. Captain Hobson had started his anti-Japanese crusade, and the Hearst newspapers had already begun to print sensational articles and to manufacture war scares. Even leading representatives of big business like Jacob Schiff of New York and Lester Shaw, Ex-Secretary of

*See *supra*, pages 287-289.

the Treasury, raised warning voices against Japan. The vague but ominous phrase "Mastery of the Pacific" was frequently heard and exercised its hypnotic influence over the unthinking elements in both countries.

By July, 1911, the danger of a clash between Japan and the United States was considered so serious in England that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was revised to exclude the possibility of Britain's being drawn into the conflict—a service on the part of Great Britain which has never been fully understood or appreciated in the United States. Article IV of the new Treaty of 1911 declared:

"Should either of the High Contracting Parties conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall impose upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such arbitration treaty is in force."

The agitation in California continued and became more menacing than ever. Numerous anti-Japanese bills were being introduced into the California legislature each year. Finally, in January, 1913, about forty such bills were introduced, and the jingo press of Japan became greatly excited, even to the point of threatening war. In the United States, outside of California, these bills were generally denounced. In spite of these threats and criticisms and in spite of Secretary Bryan's personal appeal, the California

legislature passed the Heney-Webb land bill which provided in effect that aliens not eligible to citizenship should not hold or acquire land in that state. Governor Johnson signed the bill on May 19, 1913.*

IV

The Japanese press and public were greatly wrought up over the passage of this bill. Mass meetings were held at which resolutions were passed denouncing the action of the California legislature as unjust and race discriminatory. Absurd rumors of aggressive acts or intended action on the part of one nation or the other circulated in both countries. It must be said, however, that in the United States a vast majority of the newspapers strongly

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The President replied that he was "fully alive to the importance of maintaining good relations between the two nations" and explained at length, as did the Secretary of State, that the enactment in question was based purely on economical considerations and was not the outcome of racial prejudice.* He also added that if, on further study, the law should be found to be in conflict with treaty provisions, the administration would be prepared to seek a judicial remedy, and that, even in case a suit should not be instituted, means would be sought to compensate Japanese for any loss which they might have actually sustained.

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This reply proving "far from satisfactory" to the Japanese Government, a third protest was handed to our Secretary of State on August 26th. In this note it was stated that the act "established a discrimination of a most marked and invidious character against Japan by depriving Japanese of the right of land ownership, while freely continuing the same right, not only in favor of the citizens of all the other Powers with which the United States maintains reciprocal treaty relations, but in favor of many non-treaty aliens, and that whatever causes may have been responsible for the measures, it could not be denied that in its final manifestation it was clearly indicative of racial prejudice, nor could any justification of the Act be found in the simple assertion that the legislation was the outcome of economic conditions and it was, moreover, pointed out that the question of immigration . . . had nothing whatever to do with the present controversy."

There being no reply to this last protest and negotiations for a new convention between the two Governments having failed, the Japanese Government officially terminated the controversy for the time being in June, 1914, but practically gave notice that the question would be reopened at a more convenient time. As late as January 21, 1915, Baron Kato is reported to have said in the Japanese Diet: "The Imperial Government has found the replies of the American Government not at all satisfactory and recognizes the necessity of elaborating other plans for the solution of the pending questions. As regards the nature of these plans, the time to report them has not, to our regret, arrived."*

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The Japanese Government has never raised the question of the national discrimination involved in our federal laws, which only permit the naturalization of "white persons" and "persons of African descent." There has been considerable criticism of these provisions in Japan and the expression of a desire to have them modified so as to permit the naturalization of Japanese. There could be no serious objection to a modification in the interest of all

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Some believe that the California question has merely furnished Japan with a convenient diplomatic weapon by means of which she has been able to divert America's attention and prevent interference with her designs on China.* Others maintain that these controversies are merely the opening wedges for Japanese immigration to the Western Hemisphere.†

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For a time the Hawaiian Islands and California offered a most attractive field for prospective emigrants, but since their doors have been practically closed Japanese prospectors have turned their eyes toward the South Sea Islands and Latin America, more particularly Brazil, Peru and Mexico.† Some have even cast longing glances in the direction of the Dutch East Indies.

The first condition for a future good understanding between the two countries is a realization of the fact in Japan that, so far as lies within our power, the doors of the United States are practically closed to all Oriental races. This is partly a matter of race prejudice, partly a deep-seated fear of the disas-

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trous economic, political and social consequences which, it is feared, would follow in the wake of a flood of Asiatic immigrants. Whether rightly or wrongly, the great majority of our people are persuaded that a considerable immigration from the Orient would result in a lowering of the standard of living, an economic competition fatal to the best interests of the white race, and to the introduction of large elements in our population which could not be assimilated.*

VI

There is an extensive literature on the question as to whether the Japanese are capable of assimilation in this country. Without dogmatizing on a difficult and much controverted subject, there is good authority for the view that they are assimilable to a certain extent. Certainly intermarriage (which is the surest effective means of assimilation) is, for all practical purposes, excluded in the case of Orientals, but the case of the Jews has shown us that very adequate assimilation may occur through the mere influence of the social environment.

It is of course impossible to estimate *a priori* how many Japanese could be absorbed in this latter

*This is also the attitude of Canada and Australia. The Japanese Government, probably from motives of political expediency, has never ventured to raise the issue of race discrimination in these countries.

way. Doubtless the number would be considerable if they could be distributed throughout the country at large, but we know that the bulk of the one hundred thousand Japanese domiciled in this country* reside on the Pacific Coast. Taking into consideration the acknowledged clannish habits of the Japanese, their somewhat fanatical devotion to the Mikado, their pronounced racial characteristics and the tendency toward segregation in particular localities, it would hardly be safe or desirable to admit them in much greater numbers than at present.

On the other hand, there seems to be no reason for still further exciting irritation and hostility in Japan by particular restrictions upon Japanese immigration in our immigration laws. The "gentlemen's agreement" appears to be working smoothly and effectively, and nothing is to be gained by insistence upon our theoretical rights.†

Each nation undoubtedly possesses the right of admission or exclusion of aliens at its own will, whether the rules of exclusion be general in character or applicable merely to persons of a particular class

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*This is exclusive of the Hawaiian Islands. See the *Japan Year Book* for 1916, page 341, for a table of Japanese residing abroad. Out of a total of 171,581 given as residing in the U. S. A., there are 90,808 in the consular district of Honolulu, 53,459 in that of San Francisco, 15,984 in that of Seattle, and 6,893 in that of Portland.

†In 1914 there were issued 8,398 passports to the U. S. A. See *The Japan Year Book,* page 35.

or nationality. This is an incident of sovereignty. As Justice Gray said in an oft cited case:*

"It is an accepted maxim of International Law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and under such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the national Government, to which Congress has committed the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in war. It belongs to the political power of the Government, and may be exercised either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes enacted by Congress."

Though it is not necessary to insist upon this right by formal enactment, it should never be abandoned in principle. And this is one objection to Dr. Gulick's plan, which is advocated especially by pacifists and missionaries. The plan provides for a general immigration law which shall apply impartially to all races. It is thus stated by Dr. Gulick himself:

"The danger of an overwhelming Oriental immigration can be obviated by a general law allowing a maximum annual immigration from any land of

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**Nishimura v. United States* (1891), 142 U. S., pages 651, 659. It is a right which Japan also exercises in the case of Chinese laborers.

a certain fixed percentage of those from that land already here and naturalized. The valid principle on which such a law would rest is the fact that newcomers from any land enter and become assimilated to our life chiefly through the agency of those from that land already here. These know the languages, customs, and ideals of both nations. Consequently, the larger the number already assimilated the larger the number of those who can be wisely admitted year by year. The same percentage rate would permit of great differences in actual numbers from different lands."*

The Gulick plan would certainly seem to have the great merit of seriously curtailing immigration into this country from South and Eastern Europe as well as from China and Japan, while permitting a much increased immigration from Northern and Western Europe;† but such a law would still be discriminatory in spirit, and it would undoubtedly increase the demand for a removal of the federal discrimination against Orientals in the matter of naturalization.

Taking the number of native-born Japanese added to those capable of naturalization on the same terms as Europeans (for this is also a part of the new American Oriental policy announced by Rev. Gulick)‡ as the basis upon which to reckon the an-

*_The American Japanese Problem_, pages 284 ff. See Millis, _op. cit._, pages 293 ff., for a modified Gulick plan.

†See table in Millis, on page 295.

‡See pages 301-2 of _The American Japanese Problem_ for an outline or summary of this policy.

nual five per cent. increase proposed by him, we find that, not counting those born from year to year, the number of Orientals in the country would be doubled about every fourteen or fifteen years. Mr. Flowers* has calculated that by the year 2000 we should have 6,400,000 Japanese in the country, not to speak of an even greater number of Chinese and other Orientals. Allowing for an addition per generation of forty per cent. natural increase through births, we should have 7,110,400 Japanese and possibly 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 Orientals by that not very remote date. Evidently, the Gulick plan is not as innocent as it looks, and though we need not be unduly frightened by Mr. Flowers' estimates (for other factors might enter into the problem) neither should we wholly ignore them in our forecast for the future.

**The Japanese Conquest*, page 188. We do not approve of the tone of this book, nor do we agree with many of its conclusions. Nevertheless, after making all due allowance for bias and exaggeration, it contains some true and interesting matter worthy of serious consideration.

CHAPTER XVIII

POSSIBILITIES OF WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

I

THE questions so often asked, "Shall we have war with Japan?" or "Is war between Japan and the United States inevitable?" "Is war probable?" "Is it possible?" are hard to answer. "Possible?" yes. "Probable?" that depends. "Inevitable?" no.

With the present temper of the Japanese people, their sensitiveness, keen sense of national honor, liability to sudden outbursts of passion in spite or perhaps because of their habitual power of self-control, it is possible that an outbreak of mob violence on the Pacific Coast might precipitate an armed conflict. But this is not likely, under their present form of government, for the chauvinistic spirit of the masses is held in leash by leaders of the clan oligarchy, many of whom understand what sacrifices a war with America would involve. It can not be affirmed that an increase in the power of the Japanese democracy would necessarily make for peace, at least in the immediate future.

War between the two countries is certainly not

inevitable unless it be made so by a failure of statesmanship to solve the problems at issue, or by multiplication of the causes of conflict.

It is not likely that the Japanese Government will absolutely insist upon a greater freedom of immigration into this country, though it will doubtless obtain as much as is possible in this direction without going to war. It will insist that there be no further discrimination such as was involved in the California land law or would be contained in an anti-Japanese immigration law. In this matter the Japanese Government seems to care more for form than for substance, the "saving of face" being the supreme consideration. Besides, it is well understood in Japan that a war with the United States over the race or immigration issue might involve the British Empire, particularly Canada and Australia.

II

More serious and dangerous perhaps than the problems involved in the race and immigration issues are the possibilities of future conflict of interest and sympathy growing out of Japanese political and economic aims in China. While paying lip service and formal homage to the principle of the open door and equal opportunity, Japan is rapidly developing a policy of her own in respect to China—a policy with which she feels that we have no right

legislature passed the Heney-Webb land bill which provided in effect that aliens not eligible to citizenship should not hold or acquire land in that state. Governor Johnson signed the bill on May 19, 1913.*

IV

The Japanese press and public were greatly wrought up over the passage of this bill. Mass meetings were held at which resolutions were passed denouncing the action of the California legislature as unjust and race discriminatory. Absurd rumors of aggressive acts or intended action on the part of one nation or the other circulated in both countries. It must be said, however, that in the United States a vast majority of the newspapers strongly

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It is of course impossible to estimate *a priori* how many Japanese could be absorbed in this latter

*This is also the attitude of Canada and Australia. The Japanese Government, probably from motives of political expediency, has never ventured to raise the issue of race discrimination in these countries.

way. Doubtless the number would be considerable if they could be distributed throughout the country at large, but we know that the bulk of the one hundred thousand Japanese domiciled in this country* reside on the Pacific Coast. Taking into consideration the acknowledged clannish habits of the Japanese, their somewhat fanatical devotion to the Mikado, their pronounced racial characteristics and the tendency toward segregation in particular localities, it would hardly be safe or desirable to admit them in much greater numbers than at present.

On the other hand, there seems to be no reason for still further exciting irritation and hostility in Japan by particular restrictions upon Japanese immigration in our immigration laws. The "gentlemen's agreement" appears to be working smoothly and effectively, and nothing is to be gained by insistence upon our theoretical rights.†

Each nation undoubtedly possesses the right of admission or exclusion of aliens at its own will, whether the rules of exclusion be general in character or applicable merely to persons of a particular class

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*This is exclusive of the Hawaiian Islands. See the *Japan Year Book* for 1916, page 341, for a table of Japanese residing abroad. Out of a total of 171,581 given as residing in the U. S. A., there are 90,808 in the consular district of Honolulu, 53,459 in that of San Francisco, 15,984 in that of Seattle, and 6,893 in that of Portland.

†In 1914 there were issued 8,398 passports to the U. S. A. See *The Japan Year Book*, page 35.

or nationality. This is an incident of sovereignty. As Justice Gray said in an oft cited case:*

"It is an accepted maxim of International Law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and under such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the national Government, to which Congress has committed the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in war. It belongs to the political power of the Government, and may be exercised either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes enacted by Congress."

Though it is not necessary to insist upon this right by formal enactment, it should never be abandoned in principle. And this is one objection to Dr. Gulick's plan, which is advocated especially by pacifists and missionaries. The plan provides for a general immigration law which shall apply impartially to all races. It is thus stated by Dr. Gulick himself:

"The danger of an overwhelming Oriental immigration can be obviated by a general law allowing a maximum annual immigration from any land of

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**Nishimura v. United States* (1891), 142 U. S., pages 651, 659. It is a right which Japan also exercises in the case of Chinese laborers.

a certain fixed percentage of those from that land already here and naturalized. The valid principle on which such a law would rest is the fact that newcomers from any land enter and become assimilated to our life chiefly through the agency of those from that land already here. These know the languages, customs, and ideals of both nations. Consequently, the larger the number already assimilated the larger the number of those who can be wisely admitted year by year. The same percentage rate would permit of great differences in actual numbers from different lands."*

The Gulick plan would certainly seem to have the great merit of seriously curtailing immigration into this country from South and Eastern Europe as well as from China and Japan, while permitting a much increased immigration from Northern and Western Europe;† but such a law would still be discriminatory in spirit, and it would undoubtedly increase the demand for a removal of the federal discrimination against Orientals in the matter of naturalization.

Taking the number of native-born Japanese added to those capable of naturalization on the same terms as Europeans (for this is also a part of the new American Oriental policy announced by Rev. Gulick)‡ as the basis upon which to reckon the an-

**The American Japanese Problem*, pages 284 ff. See Millis, *op. cit.*, pages 293 ff., for a modified Gulick plan.

†See table in Millis, on page 295.

‡See pages 301-2 of *The American Japanese Problem* for an outline or summary of this policy.

nual five per cent. increase proposed by him, we find that, not counting those born from year to year, the number of Orientals in the country would be doubled about every fourteen or fifteen years. Mr. Flowers* has calculated that by the year 2000 we should have 6,400,000 Japanese in the country, not to speak of an even greater number of Chinese and other Orientals. Allowing for an addition per generation of forty per cent. natural increase through births, we should have 7,110,400 Japanese and possibly 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 Orientals by that not very remote date. Evidently, the Gulick plan is not as innocent as it looks, and though we need not be unduly frightened by Mr. Flowers' estimates (for other factors might enter into the problem) neither should we wholly ignore them in our forecast for the future.

**The Japanese Conquest,* page 188. We do not approve of the tone of this book, nor do we agree with many of its conclusions. Nevertheless, after making all due allowance for bias and exaggeration, it contains some true and interesting matter worthy of serious consideration.

CHAPTER XVIII

POSSIBILITIES OF WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

I

THE questions so often asked, "Shall we have war with Japan?" or "Is war between Japan and the United States inevitable?" "Is war probable?" "Is it possible?" are hard to answer. "Possible?" yes. "Probable?" that depends. "Inevitable?" no.

With the present temper of the Japanese people, their sensitiveness, keen sense of national honor, liability to sudden outbursts of passion in spite or perhaps because of their habitual power of self-control, it is possible that an outbreak of mob violence on the Pacific Coast might precipitate an armed conflict. But this is not likely, under their present form of government, for the chauvinistic spirit of the masses is held in leash by leaders of the clan oligarchy, many of whom understand what sacrifices a war with America would involve. It can not be affirmed that an increase in the power of the Japanese democracy would necessarily make for peace, at least in the immediate future.

War between the two countries is certainly not

inevitable unless it be made so by a failure of statesmanship to solve the problems at issue, or by multiplication of the causes of conflict.

It is not likely that the Japanese Government will absolutely insist upon a greater freedom of immigration into this country, though it will doubtless obtain as much as is possible in this direction without going to war. It will insist that there be no further discrimination such as was involved in the California land law or would be contained in an anti-Japanese immigration law. In this matter the Japanese Government seems to care more for form than for substance, the "saving of face" being the supreme consideration. Besides, it is well understood in Japan that a war with the United States over the race or immigration issue might involve the British Empire, particularly Canada and Australia.

II

More serious and dangerous perhaps than the problems involved in the race and immigration issues are the possibilities of future conflict of interest and sympathy growing out of Japanese political and economic aims in China. While paying lip service and formal homage to the principle of the open door and equal opportunity, Japan is rapidly developing a policy of her own in respect to China—a policy with which she feels that we have no right

to interfere. She plainly showed her hand in the spring of 1915, but whether or no* she will play her cards will depend upon the course of future events.

The Japanese do not seem to realize that apart from our material and religious interests in China, we look upon the Chinese as our protégés in much the same manner as we regarded the Japanese themselves after the success of Perry's expedition in 1853-4. Whether, or to what extent, we are willing to back these interests by force or diplomacy remains to be seen. Certainly we can not hope to act alone unless we are willing to maintain a fleet in Pacific waters equal or superior to that of Japan's. If we entertain any purpose of going to the aïd of China, our only hope of success will be in joining hands with England in such an enterprise, after the close of the present great European struggle. Perhaps something may be accomplished in this direction at the coming Peace Conference. In any case the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as a separate alliance, can hardly long survive the war.

It remains to be seen to what extent Japanese, American and British business men can co-operate in the pacific penetration and development of China's vast resources. This was the apparent purpose of Baron Shibusawa's (Japan's leading financier) recent visit to this country. The plan has

*See *supra*, pages 302-314.

the enthusiastic support of Judge Gary and other American business men. If it succeeds, well and good; if it fails, it may only have added another source of future conflict.

From all we have been able to learn, the Japanese have no present intention of invading or annexing the Philippine Islands. Yet we must remember that these constitute a most vulnerable point of attack, and they add greatly to the difficulties of our problem of defense. Nor should we permit ourselves to forget that, from the Japanese point of view, our occupation and retention of these islands may be a source of some fear and disquietude.

It would be easy to demonstrate that war between Japan and the United States would be disastrous from an economic or commercial point of view. We might show, for example, how difficult it would be for a debt-burdened and poverty-laden country like Japan to finance such a war; how injurious it would be to the trade of both countries, more especially of Japan, who would be attacking her best customer; how the losses of the victor in such a struggle would greatly overbalance the gain. These economic considerations are not without weight as deterrents of war, though we fancy that they sound less convincing than they did prior to the outbreak of the Great War. And should the nationalistic anger of the whole people become thoroughly aroused, as it has on several occasions, it might be difficult for those in power to stem the tide.

III

The assumption frequently made in certain circles that the difficulties between the two countries are due to mutual ignorance and misunderstanding and can be removed by campaigns of education contains a measure of truth, but something more is needed than handshakings accompanied by mutual felicitations and an exchange of compliments or expressions of good will. A mutual effort must be made to understand the issues involved, together with the point of view of each nation regarding them.

The Japanese must be taught to understand that the race and immigration issues on the Pacific coast constitute an American economic* problem which can be solved in only one way—by the virtual exclusion of Oriental laborers. In the execution of this policy as much consideration as possible should be shown for Japanese (and Chinese) susceptibilities.

Irritating, unjust and unnecessary laws like the Webb Act should be avoided, and our federal naturalization act might be revised so as to render it non-discriminatory. But on the main point the Japanese must be made to understand that no compromise is possible.

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*One reason the Japanese have difficulty in seeing this is because they are not as yet conscious of a labor problem in Japan. They look at the question too exclusively from the race and capitalistic points of view.

In respect to China, it is our opinion that we should act in conjunction with England and France and adopt a policy looking toward the protection of American interests and the maintenance of Chinese rights which we must be prepared to back by force, if necessary, in conjunction with our allies. Japan and Russia should by no means be excluded from this partnership but should be treated fairly and with the utmost consideration. They should be encouraged to play an equally leading and honorable part in the great enterprise of reforming and reorganizing the Chinese Empire, though they should not be permitted to play a predominant part or a monopolistic rôle. The alternative for the United States is to withdraw from China and leave her to her fate.

Finally, we must not falter in the formulation and execution of plans for complete military and naval preparedness. We have heard prominent Japanese express themselves to the effect that they wished we would arm and equip ourselves adequately. For, as in the case of China, an America which is militarily weak constitutes a standing temptation to strong militaristic nations like Japan and Germany. In such a world as this we are like a voice crying in the wilderness unless and until we have fully girded ourselves with armor.

CHAPTER XIX

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF JAPAN

I

Though relatively little was said about it at the time, there can be no question that the apparent aggressiveness and duplicity of Japan's policy in respect to China as illustrated by her conduct in Shantung and the notorious twenty-one demands* made a very unfavorable impression in Europe as well as in America. That German intriguers and propagandists were busy in misrepresenting the attitude and conduct of Japan in Western countries, and particularly in the United States, is undeniable; but that Japan gave no cause for alarm and suspicion in the West during the spring and summer of 1915 can scarcely be maintained in the face of the facts.

The British press, fearing to alienate Japan during the crisis of the Great European War, for the most part remained silent, but American newspapers were not so reticent. In Japan itself a strong feeling against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance devel-

*See chapter xvi.

oped in consequence of the fearless expression of British opinion in the Far East.

The relations between Japan and the United States, which continued somewhat strained owing to the California land act and the Japanese demands on China, improved perceptibly in consequence of a visit by Baron Shibusawa, the Pierpont Morgan of Japan, to this country in the autumn of 1915. He advocated "co-operation" between Japan and the United States in the exploitation of China's vast natural resources—a scheme which was labeled by a Chinese writer as an alliance between "American money and Japanese brains."*

Meanwhile mutual interests in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as a certain alienation between Japan and Great Britain were drawing Japan and Russia into closer bonds of alliance. Since the outbreak of the Great European War Japan had also been supplying vast quantities of munitions to Russia, and this may also be counted as an important factor in the consummation of a *rapprochement* between Japan and Russia, which had begun as early as 1907. The text of the Russo-Japanese Agreement, as given out by the Japanese Foreign Office, negotiated in July, 1916, is so brief that it may be given in full.

"First—Japan will not become a party to any arrangement or political combination directed

*H. K. Long, in *Review of Reviews* for April, 1916. Count Okuma once proposed a similar scheme for England and Japan.

against Russia. Russia will not become a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against Japan.

"Second—In case the territorial rights or special interests in the Far East of one of the High Contracting Parties recognized by the other are menaced, Japan and Russia will act in concert on the measures to be taken in view of the support or co-operation necessary for the protection and defence of these rights and interests."

Whether the phrase "support or co-operation" be interpreted as involving a mere *entente cordiale* or a formal alliance, there can be no question that the treaty amounts to a virtual defensive-offensive alliance, though it became, of course, a mere "scrap of paper" after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution.

There can also be no doubt that, according to its expressed terms, the alliance was generally directed against any Power, including Great Britain and the United States, which might menace "the territorial rights or special interests in the Far East" of either Russia or Japan.*

*Attached to this convention, there appears to have been a set of "secret" agreements which have thus been summarized by a Japanese writer (Kawakami) in the *Review of Reviews* of September, 1916:

"Russia cedes to Japan the Chang-chun-Taolaisho section (about 75 miles) of the Chang-chun-Harbin branch of the Manchurian railway. For this Japan pays Russia about $7,000,000 in war supplies.

"Russia, with the consent of China, extends to Japan the privilege of navigating the Second Sungari River."

Both Japan and Russia gave the United States the usual assurances that the agreement contained nothing in any way infringing upon the sovereignty of China or violating the principles of the open door and equal opportunity.

Some light may possibly be thrown upon the Japanese meaning attached to the phrase "territorial rights and special interests" by the new Japanese demands upon China which followed the Cheng-Chiatung Affair. This was one of those unfortunate Chino-Japanese episodes which have become quite frequent in recent years. According to the Tokyo version, on or about August 15, 1916, some Chinese troops attacked the Japanese garrison at Cheng-Chiatung near Mukden. There resulted sixty-five casualties, including seventeen killed and one officer wounded. The clash is said to have been due to the resistance to arrest by the Chinese authorities of Japanese vendors of arms from Mongolia.

Having dispatched several thousand troops, Japan was reported, early in September, to be pressing a number of drastic demands upon China. In addition to the usual demands for apology, punishment of the reputed offenders and an indemnity, the Japanese demands appear to have included police rights in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, as well as the extension of certain rights to Inner Mongolia acquired by Japan from China in 1915. The Japanese Government also requested that Japanese officers be appointed as instructors in the Cadet School (presumably at Muk-

den), and suggested that the Chinese Government ask for Japanese advisers in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In reply to inquiries by our State Department at Tokyo, there were, of course, the usual assurances respecting the open door and territorial integrity of China.

These negotiations seem to indicate that the Russo-Japanese compact of July, 1916, included a delimitation of the respective Russian and Japanese interests in Mongolia. Russia had already absorbed Outer Mongolia and Japan was now proceeding to swallow her portion.

On February 12, 1917, it was reported that Japan had withdrawn her demand upon China for the employment of Japanese army officers as advisers in the Chinese army and the establishment of Japanese police stations in Eastern Inner Mongolia. And it appears that by the end of February an agreement had been reached which settled matters to the mutual satisfaction of both Governments. China granted an indemnity and agreed to reprimand and punish the responsible officers, but refused police rights in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. China appears to have disapproved the suggestion for the employment of Japanese military advisors and instructors.

II

The campaign for military preparedness conducted in the United States during the year 1916

was in some quarters suspected as being directed against Japan. This suspicion was, of course, fostered by German agents, propagandists and certain newspapers. While there was little or no ground for such a surmise, in the background of the unexpressed thought of a large number of Americans there doubtless lay the idea that it might be well to be prepared for a possible trial of strength against Japan as well as against Germany. "The Japanese Menace" was regarded as a potential rather than an actual menace, and there were many who believed that the accomplishment of preparedness or a display of military and naval power would be sufficient for our purpose so far as Japan was concerned.

The change of ministry in Japan in October, 1916, at first aroused some misgivings in the Western world. Count Terauchi, the new Premier, former Minister of War and Resident General in Korea, was believed to represent the aggressive militaristic spirit of Japan as well as the Japanese bureaucracy and system of clan government.

But Count Terauchi confounded the predictions of the prophets of evil. He at once announced that the closing of the doors of China was a *non possumus,* and declared that "so long as Japan's interests and dignity are not infringed, . . . Japan will take no aggressive step toward any nation, especially America." He asserted that he did not intend to take up the question of immigration and State dis-

criminatory legislation with the United States, but that a new agitation in California against the rights of Japanese to hold lands might be regarded by the sensitive Japanese as an "infringement on Japan's dignity." Respecting Japan's policy in China, Premier Terauchi said:

"Japan's ambition is to have China benefit, like Japan, from the fruits of world civilization and world progress. The Japanese and Chinese people have sprung from the same stock. Our future destiny is a common destiny that is historically involved."

As early as January 23, 1917, when it must have become evident in inner diplomatic circles that the United States would be drawn into the Great War, there were indications of an increase of interest and activity looking forward to a greater participation in the struggle on the part of Japan. Premier Terauchi asserted in the Japanese Diet that Japan was "working in unreserved unison with the Allies." And Viscount Motono, the Japanese Foreign Minister, expressed a strong desire for amicable relations with the United States. He added:

"I observe with great joy the symptoms of most genuine sympathy manifested for some time between the two countries. Thus proposals for common action in the financial affairs of China have been made by American capitalists."

In speaking of Japan's relations with China, Viscount Motono even admitted that "the greatest cause for China's mistrust of Japan was the regrettable Japanese tendency to interfere in China's domestic quarrels." He added that Japan should recognize the immense interests of other nations in China, co-operate with powers with which there are special arrangements, and generally seek to conciliate her interests with those of other nations. "Japan," he said, "has no intention of pursuing an egotistic policy."

At the annual dinner of the Silk Association of America in New York City on February 3rd, Mr. Sato, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, spoke of Japan and the United States joining "hand in hand" in the promotion of the world's civilization. And Dr. Iyenaga, generally regarded as the unofficial spokesman for Japan in this country, declared that Japan was determined upon the defeat of Germany for the good of the whole world. Among other interesting things, he said:

"While I do not wish to overrate the part Japan has taken in the war, I cannot let pass unchallenged the charge now and then made that she is indifferent to the cause of the Allies. It was neither the wish of her allies nor that of Japan that she should thrust herself upon the European stage, for it is none of her part to act therein. This is the sole reason why she is today standing aloof, doing in the meantime to her best ability what it is within her province to

do, namely, supplyng her allies with munitions and subscribing to their loans. That she is deeply interested in the triumph of the Allies is evident from the fact that she has most zealously backed their decision to reject the peace proposals offered by the Central Powers."

Is it not clear that the far-sighted men who rule the destinies of Nippon had noted which way the wind was beginning to blow, and had hastened, and somewhat modified, their course accordingly? And let it be noted that this was before the outbreak of the Russian Revolution.

III

But it was not all clear sailing in this attempt to secure improved relations between Japan and the United States. Due probably to German intriguers, there was a revival of "war talk" in the early months of 1917, including rumors of a proposed Triple Alliance between Russia, Japan and Germany.

Early in February the Administration at Washington, after Ambassador Sato's visit to the State Department, apparently succeeded in repressing anti-alien land bills then pending in the legislatures of Oregon and Idaho.

On March 1, 1917, was published the notorious Zimmerman note, signed on January 19, 1917, proposing an alliance between Germany and Mexico

for war on the United States, and suggesting that the President of Mexico seek the adherence of Japan to this plan. This note, which laid bare the machinations of Germany in respect to Mexico and Japan, appears to have aroused considerable feeling in Japan, who resented the imputation upon her honor implied in the German note.

It is too soon to attempt to unravel the tangled threads of Japanese versus American and other Allied Diplomacy in connection with China's entry into the Great War. It must suffice to take note of the official denial of Japan that she in any way interfered with China's decision. But there seems eventually to have resulted a clearer understanding between Japan and China, as also between Japan and the United States.

On May 28th, Premier Terauchi, in an address to the prefectural governors of Japan, welcomed the United States as an ally, and stated that the participation of the United States was particularly satisfactory to Japan "because it materially strengthened the ties of interest binding Japan and America."

In an address to the Japanese Diet on June 26th, Viscount Montono also welcomed us as an ally and rejoiced that Japan and the United States were now collaborating against common enemies. He predicted that their existing cordial relations would be further cemented by the war.

In June, 1917, there was some perturbation in Japan over a note which our State Department had

sent to Peking expressing America's "sincere hope that factional and political disputes will be set aside and that all parties and persons will work to re-establish and co-ordinate the government and secure China's position among nations, which is impossible while there is internal discord."

This sincere and unselfish advice was looked upon with grave misgivings and suspicion in some quarters in Japan, and was regarded as an interference in Chinese internal affairs. It was intimated that the permission of the Japanese Government should first have been obtained before such a note was sent. This attitude was resented in the United States as a suggestion that the United States conduct its relations with China through the intermediary of Japan.

IV

In July, 1917, the Japanese Government decided to send to the United States the famous Mission headed by Viscount Ishii which landed at a Pacific port in August. It was received in this country with great courtesy and even enthusiasm. At a dinner given to the mission on August 14th, Viscount Ishii said:

"We are here to say that in this tremendous struggle for those rights and liberties America and Japan are bound together; that when the victory of the allied forces is secure America and Japan should so live that your sons and our sons will have a cer-

tainty of good neighborhood; so live that no word or deed of either can be looked upon with suspicion; that venomous gossip, hired slander, sinister intrigue and influence, of which we have both been the victims, can in future only serve to bring us closer together for mutual protection and for the common welfare.

"The importance of this co-operation was brought home to us particularly as we voyaged safely and pleasantly across the Pacific Ocean. We must indeed have assurance of good order in our neighborhood. We cannot, either of us, take risks. It becomes the first duty of Japan and America to guard the Pacific and to insure safe, continuous intercourse between Asia and the United States, to see to it that the ships of the ferocious pirates whose crimes upon the high seas can never be palliated find no shelter in the waters of our seas.

"It is for us together to enforce respect for law and humanity upon the Pacific, from which the German menace was removed at the commencement of the war. Had this not been so, had the barbarian of Europe not been routed from his Oriental bases, the shuddering horrors of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean would to-day be a grim reality on the Pacific. In the protection of our sea-going merchandise and men, in safeguarding the pleasures of intercourse, you may count on us as we must count on you."

On November 6, 1917, there was published the text of the important Ishii-Lansing Agreement—the result of extended conversations between Secretary of State Lansing and Viscount Ishii—which had

been concluded on November 2nd. The material part of this Agreement, which took the form of an exchange of identical notes, is as follows:

"The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan *has special interests in China*, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous.

"The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

"The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way on the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called 'open door,' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

"Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special privileges that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China."

In an explanatory statement to the press, Secre-

tary Lansing referred to the "feeling of suspicion" which had been growing up between the peoples of the two countries—a "feeling which, if unchecked, promised to develop a serious situation. Rumors and reports of improper intentions were increasing and were more and more believed. Legitimate commercial and industrial enterprises without ulterior motive were presumed to have political significance, with the result that opposition to these enterprises was aroused in the other country."

"These rumors and suspicions," he said, "were fostered and encouraged by a campaign of falsehood conducted by Germany.

"The visit of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues has accomplished a great change of opinion in this country. By frankly denouncing the evil influences which have been at work, by openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relations to China created by geographical position, the representatives of Japan have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of the suspicions which had been so carefully spread by our enemies and by misguided or overzealous people in both countries. In a few days the propaganda of years had been undone, and both nations are now able to see how near they came to being led into the trap which had been skillfully set for them."

Secretary Lansing attributed to Viscount Ishii a spirit of sincerity and candor throughout the con-

ferences which dispelled every doubt and inspired the greatest confidence. He gave the following valuation of the results of the negotiations:

"The principal result of the negotiations was the mutual understanding which was reached as to the principles governing the policies of the two Governments in relation to China. The statements in the notes . . . . not only contain a reaffirmation of the 'open door' policy, but introduce a principle of non-interference with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, which, generally applied, is essential to perpetual international peace, as clearly declared by President Wilson, and which is the very foundation also of Pan-Americanism, as interpreted by this Government."

Secretary Lansing also stated that the Japanese Mission had accomplished the further purposes of "expressing Japan's earnest desire to co-operate with this country in waging war against the German Government." He said:

"At the present time it is inexpedient to make public the details of these conversations [relating to Japan's participation in the war], but it may be said that his Government has been gratified by the assertions of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues that their Government desired to do its part in the suppression of Prussian militarism and was eager to co-operate in any practical way to that end. It may be added, however, that complete and satisfactory understandings upon the matter of the naval co-

operation in the Pacific for the purpose of attaining the common object against Germany and her allies have been reached between the representatives of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who are attached to the special mission of Japan, and the representatives of the United States Navy."

These sentiments of Secretary Lansing's appear to have been fully reciprocated by Viscount Ishii. Before leaving for Japan he issued a statement which, in addition to complimentary references to our Secretary of State and the American people, contained these expressions of confidence and good will:

"The new understanding in regard to the line of policy to be followed by Japan and America respecting the Republic of China augurs well for the undisturbed maintenance of the harmonious accord and good neighborhood between our two countries. It certainly will do away with all doubts that have now and then shadowed the Japanese-American relationship. It cannot fail to defeat for all time the pernicious effects of German agents, to whom every new situation developing in China always furnished so fruitful a field for black machinations. For the rest, this new understanding of ours substantiates the solidity of comradeship which is daily gaining strength among the honorable and worthy nations of the civilized world."

This entente was further strengthened by a special agreement which allotted to Japan a considerable quantity of steel and iron, of which she stood in

great need, in return for tonnage or shipping to the Allies.

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement met with almost universal approval in the press of the United States and the Allies. Though not made the subject of a protest as misrepresented in some quarters, it did undoubtedly cause great concern in China, and the Chinese Government indicated that it did not consider itself bound by its provisions.

The greatest objection to the agreement was our recognition of Japan's special interests in China on grounds of geographical propinquity. Yet it was the recognition of an undoubted truth, for the fundamental facts of geography and particular trade relationships can be neither denied nor evaded. The extent of these concessions or recognition on our part could only be weighed if the "conversations" between Viscount Ishii and Secretary Lansing were published.

Japan's special interests in China from the standpoint of territorial propinquity or contiguity must relate first of all to South Manchuria and possibly to Eastern Inner Mongolia and the provinces of Fukien and Shantung.

V

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement seems to mark for Japan a decisive crisis in her Far Eastern Diplomacy. Japan stands at the crossroads in interna-

tional relations—at a transition point between what we may call the older and the newer diplomacy.

The distinction is one both of aims and methods. According to the older conception of diplomacy, China was a happy hunting ground for concession hunters, loan syndicates and traders of various nationalities. In furtherance of imperialistic designs on the part of certain autocratic governments (especially Russia and Germany) and in accordance with the principles of "dollar diplomacy," these governments vied among themselves, often using dubious methods, in securing by means of "treaty" rights, trade advantages, privileges, loans, concessions or monopolies for their respective nationals, whether corporations or individuals. The result was that Peking became a hotbed of diplomatic intrigue, and a privileged position in China became an object of political wire-pulling (not unaccompanied by fraud and threats of force) to the extent that the very independence and territorial integrity of the country were threatened.

The Chinese Empire was divided into "spheres of interest" and even forced to "lease" certain vital portions of her territory to several European Powers. Indeed, matters had reached such a point by the year 1898, after the "leasing" of Kiao-Chou to Germany and of Port Arthur to Russia, that China was in great danger of dismemberment.

China was indeed in sore need of a champion in 1899, when John Hay, then our Secretary of State,

stepped out upon the arena of Far Eastern politics and issued his famous Circular Note to the Powers in order to "maintain an open market for the world's commerce and to remove dangerous sources of international irritation." Mr. Hay sought to obtain and did in part obtain from the Powers concerned—Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia and Japan—formal assurances to the following effect: (1) that they would not interfere with any treaty-port or with the vested interest of any nation within a so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory which one of them might have in China; (2) that they would maintain the Chinese treaty tariff (except in "free ports") under Chinese management, i. e., guarantee equality of treatment for all nations under the most favored nation clause; and (3) that there shall be equality of treatment for all nations in respect to harbor dues and railroad charges.

These proposals constitute our statement of what is generally known as the open-door policy in China, or the principle of equal opportunity to trade for all nations. Together with a long series of declarations (to which the other nations, more particularly Japan, have again and again assented) in favor of the independence and territorial integrity of China, they constitute the main features of our policy in the Far East.

Doubtless these principles have again and again been violated (more particularly by Japan since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05), but they form

the basis of a new diplomacy and constitute a sort of Magna Charta for freedom of trade in China and the preservation of Chinese independence. These principles must be maintained, by force if necessary, if China is to remain free and our rights to participate in the development of that vast country are to be maintained.

In the spring of 1915 it looked for a time as if Japan would not hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the great European war and our own state of inertia and unpreparedness to set aside these principles altogether and establish a protectorate over China. This would have been the inevitable outcome of her insistence upon the adoption by the Chinese Government of the whole of the twenty-one demands which were then presented at Peking.

But better counsels prevailed, and the worst of these demands were not included in the ultimatum which Japan issued to China in May, 1915. Since that unfortunate date in Chinese history the Japanese Government has followed a more liberal and enlightened policy in Japan and China, and the Lansing-Ishii Agreement between Japan and the United States bears witness to this fact.

Japan has truly reached the parting of the ways in her Far Eastern policy. Her conduct in China and consequently her relations with the United States are bound to become better or worse. Either she will revert to her old aims and methods learned in

an evil school and taught by bad European examples, or she will whole-heartedly and unreservedly adopt the aims and methods of the newer diplomacy as advocated and practised by the United States. In the latter event, China will probably be saved, and the United States, recognizing the "special position" of Japan in the contiguous and adjacent provinces, will only be too glad to co-operate with Japan and other nations in the guidance and industrial development of the Chinese Empire.

VI

There has been much recent discussion of the question of Japanese intervention in Siberia. Our decision in this matter must rest mainly upon our answer to two questions: Can Japan be trusted with the leadership of such an important mission? What is likely to be the effect of such Japanese intervention upon the Russians themselves?

It is evident that no offhand answer can be given to either of these questions. That an allied intervention of a military and political as well as an economic nature is absolutely necessary if Russia is to be rescued from the embraces of the German monster goes without saying. And it also seems true that the bulk of military support or the sinews of war must be furnished by Japan.

It is highly desirable that Russian sympathy and support be obtained for this necessary intervention,

But the German menace is so great, the emergency is so serious, the crisis is so acute, that it may be necessary to intervene against the wishes of a large number of the Russian people themselves in order to save them and us from future Teutonic domination and the Bolshevik menace. It is to be hoped that adequate allied forces under Japanese leadership will be sent into Russia in order to rescue the land and its people from imminent and perhaps permanent enslavement.

But more than military intervention is needful. With the armed forces should go an army of American engineers, educators, sociologists, Red Cross nurses, Y. M. C. A. workers and missionaries, entrusted with the mission of undoing the nefarious work of the Bolshevik and German propagandists, and of aiding the Russians once more to stand upon their own feet in an industrial and commercial as well as in a political and military way.

The Japanese must be given a large, if not a major share, in this enterprise. There is no alternative but to trust Japan in this matter if, for no other reason, because it will help to make Japan trustworthy. If we do not trust the Japanese, and if Germany is permitted to penetrate and dominate Russia, this island people may eventually be forced to make terms with the Central Powers.

In a notable interview with Mr. Gregory Mason of the *Outlook** staff Count Terauchi thus expressed

*See N. Y. *Outlook* for May 1, 1918

himself upon the chances for an alliance between Japan and Germany:

"That will depend entirely on how the present war may end. It is impossible to predict the changes which the conclusion of this war may bring. If the exigencies of international relationship demand it, Japan, being unable to maintain a position of total isolation, may be induced to seek an ally in Germany; but, as far as I can judge from the existing condition of affairs, I see no such danger. In other words, I believe that Japan's relations with the Entente Allies will continue unaltered after the present war. . . .

"What we fear deeply is the possible advent of the German influence in the East, and we will have to be prepared against possible emergencies, for Germany may push her influence too far eastward. But if Japan be obliged to take military action in Siberia, such action will be taken simply because of the necessity of maintaining the peace of the Orient, and will never mean aggression or territorial ambition on the part of Japan. . . .

"For Japan, in particular, it is very desirable that Russia should lie between Japan and Germany; so we will not stint our aid to her, but will give her all possible help. . . . . It is Japan's sincere hope that Russia should be reborn into a strong, well-ordered state. We believe that the existence of Russia as an independent nation will constitute an effective barrier against the encroachment of German influence toward the East, and therefore will be a great factor toward promoting the peace of the Orient and of the whole world."

Japan's great fear is a fear of isolation. This is why she consummated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and later drew close to Russia. This is why she is now cultivating the United States, her interests and Sea Power drawing her to the side of Great Britain and the United States. Her interests as a Continental Power in Korea, Manchuria and China draw her to the side of Russia, and might, if Germany dominated Siberia, draw her to the side of Germany. But we believe that her interests as a Sea Power will in the long run hold her true to the cause of the Allies. This will unquestionably be the case if Germany is beaten in this war. And to be beaten in this war, Germany must also be beaten in Russia.

VII

Apart from her treatment of China during the earlier period of the war, Japan has displayed a friendly and helpful disposition toward the Allies, especially since the advent to power of Count Terauchi in the fall of 1916. Though her share in the struggle has sometimes been exaggerated, Japan has played a not inconsiderable rôle, especially on the high seas. She not only completely destroyed Germany's military and commercial stronghold in the Far East at Kiao-chou, but her cruisers have been active on the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean as well as in the China Seas. In February, 1914, Japan

even landed marines at Singapore to assist in quelling disturbances there, and her torpedo destroyers have chased submarines in the Mediterranean.

Japan has not only supplied Russia with enormous quantities of arms and ammunition, but she has also furnished Russia and other Allies with other supplies. Considering her limited means, she has also invested largely in British and Russian bonds.

To be sure, as in the case of the United States prior to our entry into the war, the Japanese have made enormous profits out of the war. By the autumn of 1916 her specie holdings had increased from $175,000,000 to nearly $350,000,000 and her shipbuilding and cotton industries had expanded enormously. In 1916 her spindles showed an increase of 2,763,000 with 123,000 new hands. Large factories were being erected and fresh capital was being invested in the chemical, metal and other industries.

Japan has been criticized for her apparent indifference and lukewarmness in the struggle. But while it does seem as if she might have done more, particularly in the matter of furnishing tonnage or shipping at the time of the greatest allied need, it should be remembered that to the Japanese the war seemed very far away; and, as in the case of the United States, she did not become greatly alarmed or excited until the smoke had begun clearly and unmistakably to blow in her direction. In the case of Japan, this was only after the debâcle in Russia

had become clearly evident and after the United States had become directly involved in the struggle.

Nippon must and will do her full part in this great war for freedom and democracy. The spirit of *Bushido* is not dead. Japan is not wholly given over to materialism and utilitarianism. As Viscount Ishii, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, has recently said in a speech delivered on July 4th, 1918, "To the old Samurai of Japan the sword was the symbol of spotless honor. His right to wear it signified his worthiness to use it aright."

Viscount Ishii is said to have concluded his address with this message from the people of Japan to the people of America:

"We trust you, we love you, and, if you will let us, we will walk at your side in loyal good-fellowship down all the coming years."

America fully reciprocates these sentiments, and it remains for the peoples and Governments of both countries to show by acts and deeds as well as by words that these sentiments have a more than emotional basis and are, indeed, a living reality.

THE END

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